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ABSTRACT
There is no widely accepted contextual framework for planning, designing, and
evaluating systems of protocols and equipment for detecting, intercepting, and
deterring transport of high consequence radiological and nuclear threats. A
candidate framework is posited for assessment of the design and application of a
security system for detection and interdiction of these threats at an international
border crossing. Results from an examination of the efficacy of this framework
indicate that the use of rarely considered criteria provide a promising framework
for a broad community of stakeholders to use in planning, design and application
of security system upgrades for high consequence threats in the flow of
commerce at a border crossing. These results also indicate that discovery of
these criteria can be informed by a model of the geopolitical structure in which
the border crossing resides.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Many nations and regions are facing decisions about how to improve their
abilities to deal with man-made and natural disasters like hurricanes, tornadoes,
floods, levee failures, earthquakes, fires and epidemics. They establish
organizations that concentrate on understanding how to predict or respond to
these types of events. In addition to natural and man-made disasters,
governments try to protect their citizens from criminal behavior, like burglary,
violence and harassment. At the same time, these governments have other
missions that are extant at international border crossings associated with
immigration control, highway safety, environmental protection, customs and tariff
collection.
Frequently, these additional capabilities and/or protocols must work in the same
spaces as the normal security, law enforcement and compliance services already
extant. In many areas of the world, limited financial resources and/or uncertain
political relationships make the problem more difficult.
An architecture exists in some form to support these standing missions. Police
departments, fire departments, and emergency management organizations work
in some of the same spaces and share some of the same information in many
regions. There may be memoranda of agreement between organizations in
contiguous areas within a metropolitan area that facilitate information sharing and
interoperability. This construct may allow and define the roles and
responsibilities of these organizations when they need to support each other.
Staffing and budget levels will be affected by these agreements. An organization
can save money if they know they can rely on a neighboring organization to
provide some type of support to them when needed (like fire departments and
bomb squads). These relationships and understandings underpin the overall
enterprise of security in a region.
In addition to improving abilities to deal with disasters, many national, regional
and local organizations would like to provide improved security for their citizens.
Considerable attention at the moment focuses on low probability but very high
consequence events, like the detonation of an improvised nuclear device or of a
radiological dispersal device. As technology is developed to detect these types
of threats, and as methodologies are developed for dealing with the
consequences of these events, discussions arise around how to deploy these
technologies and methodologies. In some cases, the organizations that will be
responsible for the utilization of the technologies are those that already have
other missions that occupy their attention, like local police officers, customs
officials, and emergency management officials.
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When a nation or region adds the mission of protection from (or response to and
recovery from) terrorism, the architecture already extant in the region may have
to support the new mission. In some cases, the government may expect the
same policeman who walks a beat looking for criminal behavior also to detect
weapons of mass destruction. A fireman may have to deal with radioactive
materials or new chemical agents in smoke. A highway patrolman may have to
screen vehicles for abnormal radiation as well as looking for normal criminal
behavior.
The government might assume that if they provide new equipment, protocols and
training, then the responsible organizations will make a long term commitment to
support the additional missions, which generally involve low probability, high
consequence events. With limited financial resources and uncertain political
relationships, there may be cases where organizations struggle to budget for and
commit to this additional mission space for the long term. Without a long term
commitment by all parties involved, it seems unlikely that the overall enterprise
will succeed.
In this dissertation, three obstacles in the way of planning for and analyzing the
security of a region are discussed. These obstacles are:
1) A general lack of consensus about what is meant by security;
2) A lack of consensus around metrics important to ensuring enduring
mission success
3) A general lack of frameworks to support the planning and assessment of
security.(McGill & Ayyub, 2009)
This planning is especially difficult for cases where: a) the threats are hard to
detect; b) the occurrence of the threat is likely to be extremely rare; c) the
security plan requires cooperation and coordination of multi-organizational
resources (especially for the case of borders between regional constructs); d) the
security system is complex; and e) the security system involves human
perception and human response. This dissertation addresses this type of
problem, the introduction of a mission to interdict the illicit transport of
radiological and nuclear materials at an international border crossing,
There is no widely accepted contextual framework for planning, designing,
evaluating systems of protocols and equipment for detecting, intercepting, and
deterring infrequent transport of high consequence threats across international
borders. A framework proposed in this dissertation can inform discussions and
considerations around how this interdiction might be implemented. The
framework will include a consideration of the relationships between organizations
with missions associated with the border crossing before the radiological and
nuclear threat screening mission is added, a model of the physical structure of
the border crossing, and a dynamic model of the traffic flows through the border
crossing station. An examination of how the addition of a RadNuc screening
2

mission might change the organizational relationships, the physical structure of
the border crossing station and the dynamic flow of traffic through (and within)
the station is conducted. To more fully characterize these effects, a set of
metrics is developed that relate to high level objectives associated with long term
efficacy of the endeavor.
A description of a hypothetical border crossing provides a focus point for the
study. For this hypothetical border crossing, the study postulates missions of the
types of organizations likely to apply there and the study discusses a likely
associated concept of operations. Later in the study, what may happen when
another mission (for detection and interdiction of radiological and nuclear threats)
is added to the system is discussed. The model of the border crossing is useful
in examining the operational effects of this radiological and nuclear (RadNuc)
mission addition. Then a discussion of the hypothetical geopolitical structure is
used to examine the effects of the RadNuc mission addition to the broader group
of stakeholders. An examination of criteria and metrics for assessment of the
efficacy of this new additional RadNuc mission system then follows.
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CHAPTER II
ADDITION OF RADNUC SCREENING MISSION AT BORDER
CROSSINGS
Problem Statement and Research Questions
Types of border crossings
There are many different types of border crossings, ranging from very simple to
very complex. There are some border crossings which are unmanned, some
which are operational only for certain periods of time, some which are at
locations where only vehicle and foot traffic are allowed, some which are at
locations that include sea ports as well as vehicle and foot traffic, and some
locations which act like border crossings because they serve as ports of entry
inland (like international airports).
The type of border crossings considered within this dissertation will be
considered a location where a checkpoint is installed to monitor and control the
flow of vehicles and people from one national geopolitical construct to another.
For this dissertation, we will examine an international land border crossing with
significant vehicular flow. An example of such a border crossing is shown in
Figure 1.
The flow of people and goods from one country into another facilitates commerce
and legitimate travel. Predominately, this flow is entirely legal, and is monitored
and controlled at border crossings and other ports of entry to ensure that regional
policies and regulations are met. Since delays in commerce have been shown to
relate to economics of a value chain, then the monitoring and controlling of traffic
flow can become problematic. For United Kingdom border crossings, the cost of
procedures and border crossings were estimated to be from 2% to 15% of the
value of the goods crossing the border.(UK KM Revenue and Customs, 2009) A
photograph showing traffic backup at the U.S. San Ysidro (California) border
crossing is shown in Figure 2.
Generally, there are many national policies applicable to border crossings.
Several federal, state and local agencies will have missions to support the
policies. These agencies will have developed regulations to support these
missions. These agencies then will have developed concepts of operations to
support these regulations throughout the nation. At locations like a land border
crossing, these regulations and the associated concepts of operations will be
applied at the same location. This confluence of policies, missions, regulations
and operational constructs at the same location can be problematic. This
situation can become exacerbated when additional mission spaces are laid upon
4

Figure 1. Laredo Port of Entry at the Gateway to the Americas International
Bridge (Wikipedia)

Figure 2. San Ysidro border crossing traffic back-up (List of Mexico–United
States border crossings, Wikipedia)
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the border crossing and the operational construct there.
Critical issues at border crossings – growth in volume, increase in security
measures, limited funding and other resources
How these layers of federal, state, county, metropolitan area, city and township
missions and organizations interact varies from location to location. In some
cases, there is an overall regional integrating organization that helps articulate
common goals, encourages policy and operational alignment where possible and
promotes overall communication and information sharing. Occasionally, the
organizations may act as rigid and totally separate entities. In any case, there
are certainly opportunities for development of different and possibly competing
perspectives about importance of missions, training, equipment purchases,
information sharing and budgets and other resources to advance initiatives. This
disparity in perspectives may change radically in the face of perceived danger
from immediate threats, or the need to respond to disasters or attacks.
The volume of goods and services crossing international borders has been
growing significantly, and is expected to continue growing. The 2008 U.S. and
global economic downturn caused some setbacks, but freight exports continue to
show a long-term upward trend. According to the U.S. Department of
Transportation, world merchandise freight exports nearly tripled in value from
$5.4 trillion to $16 trillion from 1998 to 2008, while U.S. freight exports doubled
from $682 billion to $1.3 trillion during the same period. Their report concludes
that a strong interconnectedness among countries and the increased
globalization of economic activities continue to generate increasing freight
movements.(U.S. Department of Transportation, 2010)
At many of these borders, there have been complaints about the backup of the
flow of commerce and people – at a significant economic cost. For example, in a
study of the U.S. El Paso region, a study predicts that total freight flows through
the area will grow by more than 76 per cent by 2035 and that if something is not
done to relieve the projected congestion at the border crossings, wait times will
result in a contraction of the regional economy by $54 billion (21.8
percent).(Cambridge Systematics, 2011)
At the same time, there has been significant growth in the number of security
related initiatives applicable to border crossings. These security related
initiatives add to the burden of the border operations staff, to the law enforcement
organizations that have to deal with the violations of the regulations and the
judicial systems that have to handle the cases arising from the arrests made
associated with the border crossings. Several nations are struggling with the
question about how best to assess the efficacy of the operational constructs to
support these increasing layers of security missions.
6

Problem statement
The problem statement for this dissertation is to develop a useful framework for
assessing the efficacy of the addition of a radiological and nuclear detection and
interdiction system when it is laid onto an existing set of mission spaces and
concepts of operations at a land border crossing.
Research questions
An approach for addressing this problem statement is presented. The first step
in this approach is the development a set of strategic questions that will help
ensure that a broad integrated perspective will be developed and examined. To
develop these strategic questions, the second step was building a set of models
of a hypothetical border crossing. Then an accompanying set of hypothetical
stakeholders and missions associated with the border crossing was postulated.
A concept of operations to support these missions at the hypothetical border
crossing was developed and examined. Then these models and concepts of
operations were modified to support consideration of what would happen when a
radiological and nuclear materials detection and interdiction mission would be
laid onto the border crossing operational construct. This examination addresses
the following strategic questions:
1. What is a useful approach for eliciting strategic questions to be
considered?
2. What are some strategic questions coming from the work?
3. What are some tactical questions arising from the strategic questions?
4. What are useful metrics related to these questions?
5. What is a useful methodology for evaluating these metrics?

Literature Review and Personal Experience
A literature review supported the need for a framework for assessing the efficacy
of systems for detection and interdiction of radiological and nuclear threats at
land border crossings. This finding aligns well with previous conclusions drawn
from numerous occasions to observe and examine operations at border
crossings and at ports of entry within the U.S.(White, 2011) A discussion of the
literature and observations of the author is organized here as:
1. Description of border crossings
2. General missions and stakeholders for border crossings
3. Addition of security missions at border crossings
4. Need for consensus in definitions of security
5. The RadNuc mission
6. Need for consensus in metrics that relate to enduring success of this
additional RadNuc mission
7

7. Methodologies for assessing efficacy of new missions.
Description of border crossings
An excellent summary of border crossing descriptions, international regulations
associated with border crossings, and typical roles and responsibilities of
government agencies at border crossings is given in the Handbook of Best
Practices at Border Crossings – a Trade and Transport Facilitation Perspective
published by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in
conjunction with the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe.(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2012) The
handbook gives an overview of the existing legal framework related to
international trade and border management. The handbook points out that there
is an international increase in cross-border transactions supporting the growing
global trade. To facilitate that trade, governments are trying to find more efficient
border crossing processes.
Conway, in his “Land Port of Entry”, in the Whole Building Design Guide
sponsored by the U.S. National Institute of Building Sciences, describes the
functions occurring at a border crossing station.(Conway, 2010) These activities
generally take place to meet the missions of several federal agencies. According
to Conway and the previously mentioned OSCE Handbook, the types of activities
include:
1. Compliance checks to ensure that activities involving the crossing of the
border meet the requirements of national legislation;
2. Control of entry into or departure from the country for persons and
materials arriving as commercial, non-commercial, or pedestrian traffic;
3. Collection of revenues;
4. Prevention of illegal aliens from entering the country;
5. Prevention of injurious plant, animal pests, human and animal diseases
from entering the country;
6. Examination of export documents; and
7. Registration of valuable articles being temporarily taken out of the country.
Persons are essentially checked from the perspective of immigration, with the
added objective of detecting and arresting criminals. These checks are carried
out by immigration authorities, border police or, in some cases, by border guards
or troops.
Goods are usually checked by Customs authorities. However, goods can also be
examined by border police when drugs, weapons or, occasionally, undeclared or
prohibited goods are suspected. Goods are sometimes also searched by animal
health/agriculture officials, or by standards and consumer protection agencies.
All such controls may also be delegated to Customs authorities.
8

Commercial vehicles are controlled by road administrations such as ministries of
transport, or sometimes by border police. Immigration authorities may also
choose to inspect commercial vehicles to detect illegal immigrants. Private
vehicles are inspected by Customs authorities or, sometimes, by border police.
Generally, border police are in charge of controlling persons, while customs
officials are in charge of controlling goods. This can lead to an important
question. Can customs officers inspect traveler and identity documents or
passports because, in theory, that is the responsibility of the border police or
immigration authorities? We can see that some sort of agreement, supported by
law, might need to be put in place.
According to the OSCE Handbook, border police frequently are not authorized to
search vehicles or goods. But the identity of drivers may be an essential part of
risk management for customs and, conversely, border police may have good
reasons to inspect rail, road or vessel transport cargo.
Similarly, different administrations may carry out identical verifications for
different purposes, such as weighing the vehicle. The traditional demarcation of
the tasks undertaken by various staff members at border crossings brings with it
the risk of duplication of effort, waste of resources, and lack of commitment to the
areas where missions overlap.
A land border station generally includes a facility that is owned or leased by a
federal agency. A border station is typically open year-round. However,
there may be locations which operate seasonally due to local climate conditions,
and some facilities which are not open twenty-four hours each day.(Conway,
2010)
In practice, a border is a busy area where many government organizations have
a presence. Some have a physical presence, while others delegate their
activities to border crossing operations staff (usually employed by a customs type
organization). For instance, in its study of the UK security environment, SITPRO
Ltd. (now part of the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS))
has identified a series of government stakeholders and divided them into two
groups: those with executive authority directly responsible for controlling the
cross-border environment, and others with a policy development role. Among
these organizations, some have a presence at the border, such as Customs,
while others are only represented at the central government level, such as the
department of trade. Some are represented at both levels.
General missions and stakeholders for border crossings
According to the General Services Administration, a U.S. border station may
include the following agencies and associated missions:
9

General Services Administration (GSA), Public Buildings Service: The GSA is
responsible for the providing the land, design and construction of land ports of
entry. GSA also provides general management, maintenance and repair.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP): CBP facilitates legitimate trade and
travel. Generally, CBP inspects goods and people seeking entry into the U.S. at
land ports of entry. Depending on the need a secondary inspection may be
conducted by the CBP, Veterinary Services (VS), or the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). The U.S. Border Patrol is part of CBP, but does not
participate in inspections at the land ports of entry.
The Department of Transportation’s Federal Highway Administration (FHWA):
The FHWA works with its state, federal, and international partners to ensure the
safe and efficient movement of people and goods across borders.
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA): FDA conducts inspections to control
the import of foods, drugs, cosmetics, medical devices, biological products,
animal feeds and drugs, and radiation-emitting instruments. CBP officers are
trained and certified to detect and intercept shipments.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (F&WS): The F&WS regulates the importation of
birds protected by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES) and the Wild Bird Conservation Act of 1992 (WBCA).
Department of Justice’s Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS): The DOJ,
whose law enforcement branches (the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Drug
Enforcement Agency) coordinate with CBP and Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents when their investigations involve immigration
violations.
Center for Disease Control (CDC): The CDC develops and implements strategies
to monitor for diseases on people, animals, cargo, and conveyances arriving at
the U.S.’s ports of entry. The CDC reviews operations for programs used to
monitor the importation of quarantinable and other specified diseases.
Bureau of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE): ICE’s mission is to
detect and prevent terrorist and criminal acts by targeting the people, money, and
materials that support terrorist and criminal networks. ICE is also responsible for
the collection, analysis and dissemination of strategic and tactical intelligence
data pertaining to homeland security, infrastructure protection, and the illegal
movement of people, money, and cargo within the United States.
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The Transportation Security Administration (TSA): The TSA is charged with
protecting the United States’ air, land, and rail transportation systems to ensure
freedom of movement for people and commerce.
U.S. Border Patrol (USBP): The USBP enforces U.S. immigration law and other
federal laws between official ports of entry along the border and in the interior of
the United States. As currently comprised, the USBP is the uniformed law
enforcement arm of the Department of Homeland Security. Its primary mission is
to detect and prevent the entry of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and
unauthorized aliens into the country, and to interdict drug smugglers and other
criminals.
Department of Agriculture (USDA): The USDA establishes the agricultural
policies that CBP Inspectors execute. Among other things, the USDA
implements stray animal control policies, provides inspection services when
imported animals are re-assembled after importation, and assists with notification
of livestock movement to receiving states. USDA also works with Homeland
Security border inspectors to train inspectors and set policy for plants, animals,
and commodities entering the United States. USDA employs new Import
Surveillance Liaison Inspectors, who are stationed around the nation at Import
Houses and ports of entry to enhance surveillance of imported products.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): The CIA informs INS officers of potential
terrorists, including possible operatives trying to enter the United States.(U.S.
General Services Administration, 2013)
These mission spaces and the agencies responsible for them are summarized in
Table 1. A similar set of mission spaces and the federal, state and local
agencies supporting them for our hypothetical border crossing later will be
developed and discussed later in this report.
All of these organizations operating at borders have different strategic objectives,
requirements, documentation, processes and information technology systems.
This potentially creates a mass of paperwork and duplication. Because these
organizations have their own means of vertical reporting, they tend to work
independently, thus opening up the risk of overlapping activities and operational
gaps. Lack of co-ordination can also result in conflicting instructions and
requirements.
Addition of security missions to border crossings
Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in security regulations. Regulatory
control in trade concerns revenue collection, safety and security, environment
and health, consumer protection and trade policy. In recent years, the addition of
new security initiatives has added many regulatory burdens to businesses.
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Table 1. Federal missions and organizations for U.S. border crossing
Mission Objective
U.S. Agency
Provide and maintain structures, utility interfaces General Services
Administration
Sets federal policies to facilitate cross border
Customs and Border
travel; inspects goods and people
Protection (CBP)
Facilitate safe and efficient movement of people
Department of
and goods along federal routes
Transportation Highway
Administration (DOTFHWY)
Control the import of foods, drugs, cosmetics,
Food and Drug
medical devices, biological products, animal
Administration (FDA)
feeds and drugs, and radiation-emitting
instruments
Regulate the importing of birds and wildlife
Fish and Wildlife Service
protected by international convention
(FWS)
Federal law enforcement, criminal and terrorist
Federal Bureau of
threat response
Investigation (FBI)
Federal law enforcement related to drugs,
Drug Enforcement Agency
smuggling
(DEA)
Develop and implement strategies to monitor for
Center for Disease Control
diseases in people, animals, cargo, and
(CDC)
conveyances
Detect and prevent criminal acts by targeting the
Bureau of Immigrations and
people, money, and materials that support
Customs Enforcement (ICE)
criminal networks
Protecting national air, land, and rail
Transportation Security
transportation systems to ensure freedom of
Administration (TSA)
movement for people and commerce
Detect and prevent the entry of weapons of mass Border Patrol (BP)
destruction, unauthorized aliens, and drug
smugglers and other criminals
Implements animal control policies, provides
Department of Agriculture
inspection
(DA)
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Although there are many security initiatives affecting border-crossing stations,
not all are specifically relevant to Customs authorities. Other agencies also
operate at borders: for example, the police, agencies for the interior or counterterrorism agencies, and administrative bodies responsible for food, drugs, and
veterinary or safety matters.
Furthermore, Customs authorities may also find themselves being required to
implement security measures on behalf of other such agencies. SITPRO, for
example, examined UK sea borders and supply chains and discovered that in
recent years no less than 37 new and existing security-related procedures and
controls had been put in place.(SITPRO, 2008) A listing of recent security
initiative is given here is given here for the UK:
1. Authorized Economic Operator (AEO)
2. Container Security Initiative (CSI)
3. Secure operator
4. Known Shipper (air freight)
5. ISPS Code and SOLAS Convention (maritime)
6. ISO 28000
7. U.S. Customs and Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
8. Transport Asset Protection Association Freight Security Requirements
(TAPA-FSR)
9. Multi Agency Threat and Risk Assessment (MATRA)
10. Export controls (precursor drugs)
11. Import licenses (carcinogenic substances)
12. Rough diamond certificate
13. Export controls (end use and destination)
14. Export controls (technology, dual-use and military)
15. Medical equipment licensing
16. Medicines and drugs licensing
17. Animal health controls and licensing
18. Plant health controls and certificates
19. Food and hygiene controls
20. Bio-terrorism controls for USA
21. Secure freight initiative: 100% freight screening
22. Customs pre-notifications: security
23. Using additional scanning equipment such as X-ray scanners scanning for
radioactive materials and explosives and chemicals
24. Immigration passenger controls
25. Immigration vehicle operator controls
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26. Financial crime and financing of terrorism; restrictions and controls
27. Pre-ship notification
28. Road operator licensing
29. Immigration outward proposed under eBorders
30. Dangerous goods declarations: air
31. Dangerous goods declarations: rail
32. Dangerous goods declarations: sea
33. Dangerous goods declarations: road
34. Compliance with specified health and safety procedures for handling goods
35. Formal co-operation agreements between businesses and executive
agencies including MoUs
36. Due diligence activities such as contracts, guarantees, letters of credit,
reference requests, credit checking and other
37. Commercial insurance.

Need for consensus in definitions of security
The literature indicates a lack of consensus with respect to certain terms,
concepts, metrics and assessment methodologies that limits the quality of
discussions around what should be done (and how much) to improve security.
Clearly, the perspective of the planner/assessor produces a lens through which
he perceives the quality of security in a region.
There probably will be many perspectives that need to be integrated into any
enduring changes in the security posture of a region. A businessman, a police
officer, and a district attorney may define security in terms of threats they deal
with every day. An official within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the
Department of Defense may define security in terms that also include low
probability but very high consequence events. The public at large may define
security in absolute terms, wanting the government to provide total protection
from any threat. Security professionals might define security in relative terms,
knowing that security can never be absolute.
Furthermore, the funding available to the planner may be applicable only to a
particular type of security problem. A federal organization established to support
a nuclear threat mission would have funding available primarily for detection and
interdicting radiological and nuclear threats, but not for recovery from a
detonation of such a threat. Nor does it have funds available for dealing with
chemical or biological threats or natural disasters. A federal emergency
management agency might not have funding for detection and interdiction, but
would have funds applicable to preparedness and response/recovery from
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almost any kind of disaster. An environmental protection agency, a nuclear
regulatory commission, a transportation security administration, a department of
agriculture, a department of defense, and a department of justice all will have
different missions that give their planners different perspectives around the
definition of security.
At a regional or state level, there are still more differences in perspective. Fire
departments, police departments, hospitals, bomb squads, customs officials, and
judges probably all see the term security differently.
This tends to lead to a compartmentalization around the matter of security,
allowing planners and analysts to deal with a smaller scope of mission space.
But this compartmentalization also may crystallize perspectives, making
consideration of other perspectives problematic. In many cases, these security
specialists have to compete for limited resources. For example, this competitive
posture might make the specialist in bomb prevention less interested in flood
relief.
There is a need for a common framework (even at the highest level) to support
dialogue among organizations that are compartmentalized around specific threat
types (or regions). This framework should support a dialogue around how the
organizations involved view security. An important part of this discussion would
be how the increases in mission could be woven into the existing mission spaces
of the organizations that would be touched by it.
A model frequently adds value to this type of discussion. If the mission increase
were to be applied at only one bridge or tunnel, or if it included adding only a little
more information to be shared, then what might have been a serious debate
might instead be a quick agreement. If there are major changes in missions,
then definitions of scope and specifics of implementation become very important.
A model frequently can support the exploration and illumination of what is meant
by otherwise vague terms.
The RadNuc mission
An additional security mission we are considering in this dissertation is screening
and interdicting radiological and nuclear threats. At many border crossings
throughout the world, there are radiation detection instruments used for detecting
whether people or cargo have radioactive materials in excess of what is allowed.
This generally is done for safety purposes. Significant quantities of radioactive
material in transport generally require some sort of transportation containers
approved by the federal government (and international organizations like the
International Air Transport Association, or IATA, and the International Maritime
Organization, or IMO), as well as placarding to alert border crossing officials and
law enforcement officials that there are varying levels of radioactive material in
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transit. At high enough levels, some states require official escort of vehicles
carrying radioactive materials throughout their boundaries. One function of some
border crossings is to detect and monitor these shipments of radioactive
materials.
A high level of concern is associated with the possibility of a terrorist attack using
radioactive materials in a radiological dispersal device or RDD. Generally, an
RDD involves a large amount of radioactive material and a method of dispersal.
In most cases, the method of dispersal involves the use of explosives that would
detonate and spread the radioactive material broadly to contaminate a targeted
area. Other possible methods of dispersal might involve placing the radioactive
material in a water supply, spreading it from airborne platforms or in some cases
just opening a container near an air intake system of a building and letting the
radioactive material evaporate into the intake. For this study, we will consider
only RDD threats that involve large quantities of radioactive material, emanating
significant levels of radiation (which may or may not be shielded).
A nuclear threat, as considered in this dissertation, will involve special nuclear
material (SNM) and will, for the purposes of this report, include a quantity of SNM
sufficient that it could become weaponized in a fashion to cause a nuclear
explosion. This possibility is also considered a very significant security concern.
In this report, the term RadNuc will represent the threats presented by either the
RDD threat or the nuclear device threat.
The shipment without authorization by the responsible authorities of radioactive
materials of significant quantities and of types that could become a RadNuc
threat generally is regarded as illicit. For this dissertation, the general problem of
detecting and interdicting the illicit transport of RadNuc materials at border
crossings is considered.
Kouzes (Kouzes et al., 2003) discusses a problem that arises from naturally
occurring radioactive materials and medical isotopes at border crossings when
one tries to screen for the RadNuc threat in cargo. He points out that the
materials of concern for cargo are plutonium (239Pu), enriched uranium (235U) and
233
U and other special nuclear materials and any radioactive source that could be
used for an RDD. All of these materials produce a gamma radiation signature.
In addition to detecting and measuring the gamma radiation coming from a
person or cargo, many border crossing locations also monitor for neutron
radiation, because plutonium emits neutrons as well as gamma radiation. There
are not many legitimate sources of neutrons, so a detection of significant neutron
flux would raise a concern. Some legitimate neutron sources include californium
(252Cf), americium-beryllium (AmBe), polonium-beryllium (PoBe), plutoniumberyllium (PuBe), and radium-beryllium (RaBe). These neutron sources are
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commercially used for well-logging, and soil and concrete density measurements.
Some neutron sources also are used for scientific research purposes.
In his paper, Kouzes discusses what he calls nuisance sources. These generally
include naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) and man-made sources
like medical isotopes and commercial products containing radioactive material.
Examples of man-made sources are americium (241Am), barium (133Ba), cesium
(137Cs), cobalt (57CO and 60Co), iridium (192Ir), radium (226Ra) and depleted
uranium (DU). Both NORM and man-made sources can have enough radiation
to trigger alarms at border crossings.
Many radioactive materials are frequently in cargo, especially the naturallyoccurring ones. Commodities that contain them include fruits, vegetables,
fertilizer, ceramic glazed materials, polishing compounds, fluorescent lamp
starters, welding rods, propone tanks, kitty litter, road salt, ore and rock, smoke
detectors, oil field pipe, and hot water heaters.
Some drivers or passengers in vehicles crossing a border will have had recent
medical procedures in which radioisotopes will have been injected into their
bodies. The level of gamma radiation emanating from a person injected with
technetium (99mTc), for example, can be easily detected for several days after the
injection. Other medical radioisotopes injected into people for diagnosis and
treatments include radioactive isotopes of iodine, thallium, gallium and indium.
People released from a hospital with gamma radiation measuring several
thousand microR/hr can set off monitors from 100 feet away.(Ludlum Model
3500-1000 Radiation Detector System, 2010) Kouzes points out that about one
in 2600 Americans carries a significant radioactive burden at any one time.
However, this number is a gross average. If the border crossing is near a major
hospital, then the number could be significantly higher. He calculated that for a
typical radiation portal monitor (RPM), alarms might be generated from most
medical isotopes for a period of 3 to 115 days after the medical procedure,
depending upon the isotope half-life.(Kouzes et al., 2003)
The literature shows that many countries are deploying radiation detection
equipment at border crossings (and at other locations not discussed in this
dissertation). This equipment frequently involves the use of RPMs in the form of
large polyvinyl toluene (PVT) panels sensitive to gamma radiation. When a
vehicle is in the field of view of the RPM, the level of radiation coming from the
vehicle can be monitored. If the level is high enough, then the vehicle may or
may not be denied approval to cross the border, sent to a secondary screening
station at the border crossing, detained at the primary screening station for in situ
examination, or just passed on through. How the vehicle will be handled
depends upon the concept of operations in use at the time at that border
crossing.
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One would understand that there might be considerations suggesting that the
sensitivity of the detection equipment might be adjusted to manage the flow of
traffic to an acceptable level. Included here is a quote from the OSCE Handbook
of Best Practices at Border Crossings – a Trade and Transport Facilitation
Perspective “Many countries have invested large amounts of money in radiation
detection equipment and training. In the U.S., for example, virtually 100 percent
of arriving sea containers are scanned by radiation portal monitors. Also each
Customs and Border Protection officer is required to wear a personal radiation
pager. However, such equipment is not always used effectively. At Long Beach,
California, the busiest container port in the U.S., there are about 450 Customs
inspectors. One third of these monitor and mitigate radioactivity alerts. The
average traffic is 32,000 containers per day, generating about 600 alerts. In
many countries where Customs have radiation control responsibilities, false
alerts occur all the time. As a result, Customs officers often “tune down” the
sensitivity of their equipment. Customs managers (or whoever has radiation
control responsibilities) must make adjustments in their staffing, and assignment
processes to accommodate the changes in work caused by the acquisition of
new equipment. Rotterdam seaport traffic amounts to about 20,000 containers
per day, with 200 alerts. However, the Customs in Rotterdam do not take action
in every case. They have a list of commodities that give off high levels of
radiation, such as floor tiles or cat litter. If a manifest states that such
commodities are in a container, Customs lets it enter. To avert the risk of such
commodities being used for smuggling – for example, surrounding a nuclear
device with floor tiles – background risk management is carried out. This,
however, negates the entire rationale behind having radiation
detectors.”(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2012)
If we consider that 600 alerts are generated for 32,000 containers on the average
at Long Beach, then we might conclude that 1.9% of the containers will have
radiation levels high enough to trigger alarms. In the Ludlum manual referred to
previously, they say that about 1% of the cargo will set off alarms due to NORM.
Of course, this depends upon the discriminator settings used for the RPMs and
the incidence of radioactive materials of all types in the stream of commerce at
that point. As lower discriminator levels would be used, we would expect the
number of nuisance alarms would increase, but the sensitivity to the RadNuc
threat might increase.
The problem of having less than optimal detection capability if the RPM
discriminator point is set high enough to limit the number of nuisance alarms is
well known. There are a number of approaches being taken around the world.
One approach is to just forbid any vehicle with a certain radiation level to pass
over the border. A second approach is to take advantage of the fact that
radioactive elements have characteristic energy spectra that are measureable by
several types of detection systems. Under ideal conditions, one can certainly
discriminate between different types of radioactive elements based on their
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energy spectra. (Kouzes, 2005) In the United States, there has been a lot of
activity around developing the Advanced Spectroscopic Panel (ASP) which was
considered to show promise in this regard. Laboratory and field tests of the
ASPs, cost-benefit analyses, and other activities were still under way in 2010 to
inform Congress and the Administration as to its efficacy in detecting an
acceptable amount of the threat space while reducing impact of RadNuc
screening on commerce.(Shea, 2010) Unfortunately, the ASP Program was
terminated in 2011, demonstrating that the tradeoff between detection sensitivity
and impacts on commerce is a delicate balance even now.(U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2011)
Need for consensus in metrics related to enduring success
Another difficulty in planning and assessment in the provision of security involves
the question of metrics. Even with a compartmentalization to limit mission space,
there does not seem to be a consensus on metrics that would indicate enduring
mission success. Instead there seems to be an emphasis on measuring things
that are easier to define and measure. Establishing metrics around how much
funding is allocated and committed, how many pieces of equipment are procured,
and how many first responders are trained to use the equipment does help at
one level. But, in the view of the author, there are more important metrics related
to enduring mission success. These metrics probably will have to be developed
in a partnership among the national, state and local agencies whose missions (or
activities) are touched by the candidate improvements in the security mission
being considered. An example of this type of metric might be the commitment of
the organizations that would have to execute the security improvement. These
organizations might include first responders (police department, fire department,
state and local emergency management personnel, National Guard personnel,
customs officials) and judges and district attorneys within several contiguous
municipalities. A metric that might relate to the quality of commitment among
these organizations might be the presence and activity level of an integrating
committee overviewing the joint mission space. Another metric might be the
presence in the organizations’ strategic plans of budgets to support the resource
needs for the security upgrade. Another metric might be the presence of a public
awareness campaign to support the changes the citizens might encounter.
According to the literature, some metrics of effectiveness used by Customs
organizations include the number of times that tariffs or fines are collected.
Frequently, companion metrics would be the amount of tariff and of fines
collected. Other types of metrics include the amount of commodities that are
processed as a function of time. The literature points out that these metrics are
easy to measure.
The Trade and Transport Facilitation Southeast Europe (TTFSE) program funded
by the World Bank has been exploring the use of a cost benefit analysis
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approach, like the total cost of administration of customs activities to the revenue
collected at a border crossing. TTFSE is a regional partnership involving the
World Bank, the European Union, and the UN Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE), and the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI). Eight
client countries were included – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro. In
Southeast Europe: Improving the Climate for Trade and Transport, Dumitrescu
and Moeller state that revenue collection by customs is the major single source
of revenue for many governments in this region.(Dumitrescu, 2006) They point
out that increase or decrease in the flow and value of trade affects the budget
performance of the government agencies significantly.
In the same report, Dumitrescu and Moeller state that, for the more than 30
border stations and ports of entry representative of South-Eastern Europe, the
TTFSE found that each of the agencies associated with operations at the border
crossing wanted to be responsible only for its own procedures and associated
delays, and was not prepared to take into account delays associated with the
other agencies. They found little if any interest in a holistic look at the border
crossing operation. There was a lot of pushback by the agencies involved
against the notion of a global metric for border crossing operations. Furthermore,
they found a culture in which all of the agencies involved were against the idea of
measuring delays in border crossings, at least initially.
The literature points out that some performance related goals and criteria for one
agency can lead to a burden on other agencies. For example, if customs
organizations have targets related to the annual volume of illegal contraband
detected, then that might lead to overly rigorous measures that would result in
prosecuting relatively minor infractions which would increase the number of
cases to be handled. That might reduce the time and resources available for
more serious investigations. Even if the need to have metrics associated with
quality of operations is acknowledged, the ability to focus on metrics that are
easy to measure seems to result in a focus there.
Methodologies for assessing efficacy of new missions
Shattan provides an excellent discussion of a comparison between cost benefit
analysis methodologies and the analytic deliberative process methodology for
selection and deployment of radiation detection systems for shipping ports and
border crossings.(Shattan, 2008) In his thesis, Shattan discusses how the U.S.
government has insisted that any new policy decision be supported by a Cost
Benefit Analysis (CBA). He explains that CBA became part of public policy
decision making in 1981 when President Reagan signed an executive order
12291 mandating that “No actions by federal agencies should be taken unless
they result in a net positive value to society”. In 1993, President Clinton signed
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executive order 12866 which requires that a regulatory analysis be performed for
all significant regulatory actions.
Shattan said that CBA is generally regarded to have its roots in the Pareto
Optimum concept which results in a perspective that a policy change is an
improvement if some people are better off and no one is worse off as a result of
the policy. Shattan points out that in the real world almost all policy changes
result in someone being worse off. According to Shattan, most CBA’s today uses
a revision of Pareto’s original work put forth by Kaldor and Hicks in 1939.
The U.S. Environmental Policy Administration developed guidelines for
performing a CBA.(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2000) To perform a
CBA, the analyst tries to quantify all the costs and benefits associated with a
proposed change. In our case, that would mean the analyst would try to quantify
all the costs and benefits of adding the RadNuc screening mission to the existing
border crossing operation. The costs should include the costs of designing,
procuring, installing and maintaining the equipment, as well as the costs for
providing the training required for the organizations that will operate the
equipment. Other types of costs that should be included are the government
regulatory costs, social welfare costs, transitional costs and indirect costs.
Government regulatory costs will include the costs for the government to
administer, monitor and enforce the additional regulations. Social welfare costs
would include losses in the cost of reduced commerce caused by slowdowns of
the stream of commerce at the border crossing. A slowdown in the stream of
commerce might result in increased prices of goods that have had to cross the
border at our station. Transitional costs would include modifications to the border
crossing station required by the new RadNuc mission. Indirect costs would
include fewer companies shipping goods across the border as a result of the new
mission. Some of these costs will be relatively easy to define and capture.
Others may not be so easy because there will be many organizations and
stakeholders affected by this additional mission.
For the CBA analysis, the benefits may be analyzed from the perspectives of the
public’s willingness to pay and the public’s willingness to accept the changes
arising from implementation of the new mission. Frequently these variables are
measured by structured surveys. Another approach is to use a benefit transfer
method in which results from application of another policy or another location are
then applied to the new policy under consideration.
French presents a comparison of CBA and Decision Analysis.(French, Bedford,
& Atherton, 2005) He points out that in CBA the analyst seeks to describe
potential courses of action and to show their monetary worth to a large group of
people. That means the analyst would like to show the total cost of the policy in
dollars (in the U.S.) and the total benefit in dollars. French argues that it would
be very difficult for two individuals to agree on the monetary values of the specific
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costs and specific benefits. It would be very difficult then to produce a single
objective valuation of any course of action.
There have been some recent issues in the U.S. with the application of CBA to
the assessments of the efficacy of the Advanced Spectroscopic Panel for a
RadNuc detection and interdiction mission. (Government Accountability Office,
2006) The criticism centered around focusing on reducing the time necessary to
screen traffic at border check points and reduce the impact of any delays on
commerce rather than a more complete set of objectives of the larger enterprise.
French argues that multiattribute utility methods (MAUT) provide an alternative
methodology to CBA. “Through sensitivity analysis MAUT can address the
perceptions of all stakeholder groups, facilitating constructive discussion and
elucidating the key points of disagreement. It is also argued that by being
explicitly subjective it provides an open, auditable and clear analysis in contrast
to the illusory objectivity of CBA. CBA seeks to justify a decision by using a
common basis for weights (prices), while MAUT recognizes that different parties
may want to give different valuations. It then allows the analyst to explore the
ways in which different parties might (or might not) come to the same conclusion
even when weighting items differently.” He points out that a key difference
between CBA and MAUT is that the analyst assumes in CBA that there is some
objective weight that is external to the stakeholders while the analyst using
MAUT wants to consider the views of all the stakeholders separately and then
compare them in the end. He argues that CBA will devolve into a subjective
process rather than the objective process which is its goal.
The National Research Council published a report in 1996 proposing an analyticdeliberative process for risk characterization.(Stern, 1996) In this book, the
Council points out that analysis and deliberation can be regarded as two
complementary approaches. Analysis would require the use of rigorous
techniques regarded as best practices by a relevant technical community.
Deliberation would use formal or informal communication to raise and collectively
consider issues. The Council emphasizes that the values of all the stakeholders
should be captured in an evaluation.
Generally, the literature suggests that a combination of subjective surveys used
jointly with quantitative surveys provides a good coverage. Subjective surveys,
based on interviews, panels, and questionnaires do not require a detailed
analysis, but must be collected with the use of reliable tools. Quantitative
surveys, based on the collection of all available data, or a more limited sample
are credible and cheap to produce, but require subsequent analysis.
Duggan points out that borders are not easily controlled nor secured at the
desired level and, therefore, the enterprise can be viewed from a risk
management perspective.(Duggan, 2009) She points out that it is important to
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understand the traffic currently crossing the border and to examine how the traffic
might change as a result of changes related to border security policies and/or
protocols. She provides an interesting presentation of the relationships between
goals, metrics and measures. Some metrics discussed by Duggan are captured
here for consideration later within this dissertation. A high level metric mentioned
by Duggan is the stability of the border. Attributes of this metric include how well
the border is defined, whether the border is registered and the extent to which
the border is demarcated. Duggan also, in a discussion of smuggling, introduces
some metrics that might be relevant to our border crossing. They include the
ability to functionally detect the threat, the number of threats detected, the
amount of material seized, and the number of arrests leading to prosecution.
One approach found in the literature for assessing and planning for improving
processes related to border crossing operations is benchmarking.(Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2012) Of course, one of the issues
would be how to select this best in class border crossing operation, especially
with a RadNuc mission among all the other missions. The steps generally will
include identification of problem areas, identification of organizations (or border
crossing sites) that seem to be leaders in the areas of interest, visits to them for
observation of their operations, surveys of their best practices and then choice of
leading edge approaches to solve some of the problems seen or expected at our
hypothetical border crossing.
Need for models that support an integrated holistic view of security
The experiences of the author lead him to the conclusion that a model
sometimes provides a useful framework for discussion amongst different
perspectives. Frequently, analysts and planners build models that are mission
specific. These models are easier to build since they are used to support limited
perspectives. For security upgrades that touch several organizations,
appropriate models should enable the analyst/planner to examine the effects on
all these organizations. Models of this breadth can allow each organization to
view the system from their own perspective. A greater benefit is that each
organization can see an integrated whole view of the problem, visualize the
deployment of the security upgrade, and simulate the effects of the upgrade
(positive and negative). This simulation might include an integration of physical
models, information sharing models, models of organizational relationships,
economic models, training models, and models of the flow of goods, services and
people throughout the region under consideration.
Shea points out that a country or an initiative needs an integrated layered
approach to detect and interdict threats.(Shea, 2009) This type of approach is
being taken by the U.S. government to protect the nation from terrorist nuclear
attack. In this layered approach, the U.S. government is reaching out to other
nations, assisting them in trying to limit the amount of illicit nuclear and
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radiological materials leaving their borders. For our border crossing, then, it
might make sense to consider the degree to which Country A and Country B
have mutual agreements for the same purpose. We might view, then, the border
crossing RadNuc mission to be a part of a broader strategic plan for mutually
agreeable purposes between the countries. Shea goes on to say that decision
makers attempting to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of the architecture
supporting the mission will likely require a methodology for establishing metrics,
qualitative and quantitative, for each layer or sublayer of the architecture. He
says that the appropriate metrics for evaluation might not be those most quickly
considered, like outcome oriented metrics, like the number of threats found, or
the number of vehicles cleared. He suggests that higher level metrics might be
more appropriate although they may be more difficult to articulate.
One technique that Shea mentions for assessment is “red teaming”. He points
out that the effectiveness of these tests in assessing efficacy might be limited if
the tests are not designed to test the architecture for the purpose it was
designed. In a red team test for our border crossing RadNuc screening mission,
one might put carefully controlled and monitored amounts of nuclear or
radiological material in a vehicle and determine how well the vehicle is interdicted
under various conditions of traffic flow, weather, seasonal conditions, etc. In the
experience of the author, this type of activity requires a great deal of planning,
coordination, training, authorization (for use of radioactive materials of significant
strength and for having red team personnel inside the security envelope of
operations) and expense. One obvious analysis that would have to be performed
is the impact of our RadNuc screening mission on traffic delays at the border.
The importance of transport and trade facilitation is becoming widely recognized,
and is expected to grow. However, there are countries that are still applying
outdated approaches to handling border operations, where wait times at borders
sometimes last as long as a whole day.(Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2012) The Handbook states: “As we strive to eliminate
common misconceptions about border operations and procedures, we should
adopt a broader and more holistic approach that extends to reform for all border
agencies”.
Our approach
How is one, then, to evaluate the efficacy of this type of organizational construct
to take on a new initiative, like the RadNuc mission? First, we take a look at the
general operating envelope at our hypothetical border crossing, examine the
probable way that the missions are executed there by the organizations we have
assumed, and then look at how things might change with a RadNuc mission
initiative added to the mix. This examination will help us develop criteria that we
predict would be important for success of the new initiative. Then we will discuss
the metrics by which we might assess the criteria.
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CHAPTER III
MODEL FOR HYPOTHETICAL BORDER CROSSING LAYOUT,
MISSIONS AND STAKEHOLDERS
There are many possible types of organizational structures for missions
associated with land border crossings, ranging from a situation in which there is a
very simple land border crossing where there is one guard who mainly checks for
correct documentation to an extremely busy crowded border crossing involving
land, water and air transport of goods and services and pedestrians. The
political structures can vary from one in which the federal government handles all
of the monitoring and response to a much more complex situation in which
various federal, state, county, and city organizations need to cooperate to
execute all of the missions associated with movement of people, hazardous
materials, other controlled materials from one country into another.
To assess the efficacy of adding a RadNuc screening mission to a border
crossing station, the enterprise was examined from several perspectives, with the
goal of having a more holistic view of the enterprise. At first, a diagram of an
international land border crossing with only vehicular traffic was developed. That
means pedestrian traffic or boat traffic did not have to be considered. In the
production of the diagrammatic construct, we had to decide whether the border
crossing was a small crossing with only occasional traffic or a large, complex
border crossing with various types of commodities and vehicles crossing the
border, or something in between. Then we had to decide whether the border
crossing station was near a large metropolitan area or just a rural area, because
the difference might be important with respect to resources available for handling
alarm situations, as we will see later in this dissertation. Furthermore, backup of
traffic at a border in a rural area might not be perceived in the same way as a
backup in a large metropolitan area where traffic conditions at the border might
affect traffic conditions for many people not involved with crossing the border. A
modeler will need to decide what level of traffic volume will be crossing the
border at our station because that will affect how many lanes of traffic will be
required and how many personnel will be required to perform the necessary
functions there.
This leads to the need for a model of the missions extant at the crossings and a
hypothetical construct for federal organizations that will execute those missions.
As this construct is developed, we will remember that the literature points out that
there are several missions and several organizations at large complex border
crossings. In the model used in this report, a set of missions and organizations
to execute them were assumed like those seen in the literature for U.S. border
crossings.
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To look at the possible effects of adding a new RadNuc mission at our border
crossing, a modeler would anticipate that there will be impacts on traffic flow,
operational profiles and concepts of operation. To get a feel for how much
impact, one will need an image of the operational area. That image will help an
analyst/modeler think through the concept of operations before and after adding
the new mission. One question to address is whether there is room at this border
crossing for a secondary inspection station and if so how many vehicles it might
hold before traffic would begin to back in the primary inspection zone because of
space restrictions. [In fact, there have been some U.S. border crossings which
have room for only one vehicle in secondary inspection.] Early deliberation
resulted in the need for a tertiary inspection station when the RadNuc mission
was added. Then a reasonable question (not contemplated before) was whether
this border crossing would already have a tertiary screening station or the
modeler would have to add one just because of this new mission.
Considering the problem from the perspective of impact on the flow of goods and
people through the border crossing station, questions arose as to how much
traffic flow the model would need to simulate, and how many lanes of traffic will
cross the border. For our study, a model produced simulates a high traffic border
crossing similar to what exists now at U.S. border crossings with Mexico and with
Canada. The literature shows that a problem that really confounds supply chain
planning and projections is the variation in time required to cross the border, not
just the average time. Since we want to examine the extent to which the addition
of our RadNuc mission complicates this problem, then we will need a model to
support that examination. This dynamic simulation model will be discussed later
in this dissertation. The model was constructed such that it can show variation in
the traffic flow resulting from variations in the number of vehicles failing the
primary screening and having to travel to secondary screening. In our dynamic
model we also had to prescribe times allowed for screening in primary,
secondary and tertiary screening.
When the RadNuc screening mission is added, then all of the models come into
play. With the physical model, the modeler has to decide what types of radiation
detection equipment to use and where it will be used at the station. We will
decide whether to have this radiation detection equipment in some of the lanes,
in all of the lanes, whether it will be repeated in secondary and tertiary screening
or whether we will have different equipment. If one chooses to use different
types of equipment, then there will be an increase in the training requirements for
the personnel using the equipment. As one considers these types of equipment,
then he is drawn to consideration of what happens if the system detects radiation
levels that are above the limit (which the modeler will have to set). Does anyone
have the authority to detain that vehicle because of a higher than desired
radiation level? If so, who? If the radiation alarm cannot be resolved readily,
then does anyone have authority to detain the person further? What if the
vehicle has a suspicious radiation reading and no one at the border crossing
26

station is able to resolve the alarm? How will the vehicle be controlled while the
alarm resolution continues? Are there resources that can be called upon for a
reachback capability (national experts more familiar with radiation characteristics
than the border crossing staff)? Then, if there are these resources available and
there still is a question, the border crossing people might need to open the
vehicle (trailer, truck or car trunk or bus undercarriage, for example). Because of
a concern about a possible explosive device, frequently a bomb squad type
person may be called in. These people generally come from a police department
or a fire department. That is why the presence of a nearby metropolitan area or
city or township can be important. If there is more than one source of this type of
explosive expert, that is helpful because there might be some sort of problem
(like a fire or other type emergency) that would affect one source of expert help
but maybe not another in a separate location (like another precinct or township).
Since the literature shows that different types of commodities have different types
of radiation levels and therefore have a different likelihood of triggering an alarm,
that variation will need to be reflected in the model. Assumptions were made
about how many vehicles will have various levels of radiation levels (gamma and
neutron) to account for variability in commerce. A type of vehicle was added to
the model to simulate the presence of a driver or passenger who has had a
radioisotope-based diagnostic test or treatment that leaves them with a
radioactive level strong enough to set off a primary screening monitor.
As the dynamic simulation model shows traffic backup increase as the modeler
lowers the alarm trip point of the gamma and the neutron detection, he will need
to consider the impact on the organizations that operate the facility. But then the
question arises about how will increases in the number of vehicles stopped and
sent to secondary (and maybe tertiary) affect the number of fines or arrests. As
the sensitivity to radiation coming from vehicles increases, in the attempt to
detect more of the threat space, more of a burden on the regional law
enforcement infrastructure would result because more out of compliance
situations would be detected involving the transport of radioactive materials.
Since it is very unlikely that any of these detections would be from an actual
RadNuc threat (because the probability of a RadNuc presence is so low), then
these detections become more compliance monitoring, and, therefore would
increase non-compliance detections. This point indicates the need for
consideration of the effect of the RadNuc mission on the regional law
enforcement and safety organizations.
As these constructs and models are built out, a broader better informed
perspective is gained from which to develop goals for the RadNuc screening
mission. The goal statements then can be more strategic and inclusive in nature.
From these goals, a set of metrics is developed later in this study. The total set,
then, of models, goals and metrics form the framework upon which several types
of analysis can be performed.
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Model of Hypothetical Border Crossing Layout
A hypothetical high traffic border crossing on a major highway between two
hypothetical countries, Country A and Country B, as shown in the Figure 3 was
considered in this study. For simplicity, this border crossing was assumed to
allow only truck and automobile traffic. For the study discussion, we will assume
that we are responsible for monitoring and controlling the flow of vehicles (and
materials and personnel within them) traveling into Country A from Country B.
To illustrate the problem, a hypothetical regional organizational architecture was
considered. The region of interest was assumed to include the major
metropolitan area (MA1) around a city (CityA1), which is located in a County A1
(CNTYA1), all in a State A in Country A. The area is assumed also to include
townships, Township A (TWNA) and Township B (TWNB), all in County A
(CNTYA) within State A, and to include County A2 (CNTYA2) all in State A.
In our study, our responsibility is to protect metropolitan area MA1 from RadNuc
threats coming down the interstate from Country B, and if, as described
previously, our mission has to be supported by cooperation of several
organizations within the geopolitical structure of Country A, then we should
examine this structure and the relationships that should be formed to support our
mission.
One important question is whether Country B organizations need to cooperate
continuously with Country A organizations for our mission to have enduring
success? If that does need that to happen, what would be the metric that one
would use and how would one measure it? To get at these questions, a little
more detail was needed. Models were developed for help in getting to these
details.
Another important question is what impact do changes in what Country A does at
their side of the border crossing have on Country B? In several of the
methodologies discussed in our literature review, more optimal solutions were
likely to be those in which there would be significant positive impacts on some or
all the stakeholders but no negative impacts among the stakeholders. In the
case that there were negative impacts, then some analytical approaches in the
literature suggest accounting for some remuneration or tradeoff or willingness to
accept these negative consequences.
For the model development, it was assumed that there would be many non
RadNuc roles for the hypothetical border crossing location, typical of large,
complex international border crossings.
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Figure 3. Hypothetical border crossing between Country A and Country B

Of course, Countries A and B will already have organizational structures in place
to support their governance requirements, as codified in various laws and
regulations. These laws and regulations will, in our example, include agreements
concerning the flow of goods, commerce and people within them and crossing
between them. These agreements may also include provisions for mutual
support in certain types of law enforcement special events, and possible support
for response to natural disasters. For such a border crossing, many federal
organizations have policies and regulations which apply to monitoring and
controlling the flow of vehicles carrying materials and people. To ensure
compliance with these policies and regulations, we assume that the border
crossing will have systems, protocols and operations – in alignment with the
agreements mentioned above - personnel to examine the vehicles and personnel
within them.
Some example federal organizational constructs for a border crossing were seen
in our literature review in Chapter II. A structure similar to that for a U.S.
international land border crossing was assumed, as shown in Table 2.
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Table 2. Country A and country B federal missions and stakeholders for
hypothetical border crossing
Mission Objective

Country A

Country B

Provide and maintain structures, utility
interfaces
Sets federal policies to facilitate cross
border travel; inspects goods and
people
Facilitate safe and efficient movement
of people and goods along federal
routes

General Services
Administration
Customs and Border
Protection (CBP-A)

General Services
Administration
Customs and Border
Protection (CBP-B)

Department of
Transportation
Highway Administration
(DOTFHWY-A)

Control the import of foods, drugs,
cosmetics, medical devices, biological
products, animal feeds and drugs, and
radiation-emitting instruments
Regulate the importing of birds and
wildlife protected by international
convention
Federal law enforcement, criminal and
terrorist threat response
Federal law enforcement related to
drugs, smuggling
Develop and implement strategies to
monitor for diseases in people,
animals, cargo, and conveyances
Detect and prevent criminal acts by
targeting the people, money, and
materials that support criminal
networks
Protecting national air, land, and rail
transportation systems to ensure
freedom of movement for people and
commerce
Detect and prevent the entry of
weapons of mass destruction,
unauthorized aliens, and drug
smugglers and other criminals
Implements animal control policies,
provides inspection

Food and Drug
Administration (FDA-A)

Department of
Transportation
Highway
Administration
(DOTFHWY-B)
Food and Drug
Administration
(FDA-B)

Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS-A)

Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS-B)

Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI-A)
Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA-A)
Center for Disease
Control (CDC-A)

Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI-B)
Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA-B)
Center for Disease
Control (CDC-B)

Bureau of Immigrations
and Customs
Enforcement (ICE-A)

Border Patrol (BP-A)

Bureau of
Immigrations and
Customs
Enforcement (ICE-B)
Transportation
Security
Administration
(TSA-B)
Border Patrol (BP-B)

Department of
Agriculture (DA-A)

Department of
Agriculture (DA-B)

Transportation Security
Administration (TSA-A)
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In support of these requirements, States A and B also will have structures,
policies and agreements in place, especially for routine situations. Similarly, the
counties in the region will have organized themselves to deal with normal
situations, and may have developed mutual support agreements to deal with
natural or man-made challenges like floods, hurricanes, and widespread fires.
Our primary city, CityA1 (and assumed target for radiological or nuclear terrorist
activity), will have, at least for the purposes of this study, developed policies and
protocols for routine and many types of emergency events, and a structure for
supporting them.
For the purposes of this paper, we define the regional architecture as the
complete set of policies, organizational structures, personnel, equipment,
protocols, agreements, training and budgets in place to meet all the known
requirements for Country A, for States A and B, for the counties within the region
and for our city CityA1 and the townships TWNA and TWNB all in MA1. This is
an important definition because the execution of any increase in security
missions within the region probably will be performed by the existing architecture
or additions/modifications to it.
The diagram in Figure 4 shows a hypothetical structure for these federal
organizations for Country A. For our study, we will assume that there is a parallel
organizational structure for Country B.
For the states in Country A and B, there will be there will be state organizations
with missions that support the federal missions. Similarly, we will assume that
there are organizations at the metropolitan area, city and township levels that
support these missions. An important point regarding Country A federal
organizations is that they each have their own overall missions, strategic plans,
internal initiatives, and budget priorities. In many cases, they compete with each
other for federal resources and occasionally mission space. The quality of their
relationships with their international parallels (especially Country B) and states
(especially State A and State B) will affect their efficacy, to some point. For State
A, we will assume the following mission and organizational structure to support
the missions in alignment with the federal missions, as shown in Table 3.
Later in the dissertation, we will discuss how organizations at the county,
metropolitan area, city and township levels may need to support the state and
federal missions associated with our hypothetical border crossing.
How these layers of federal, state, county, metropolitan area, city and township
missions and organizations interact varies from location to location. In some
cases, there is an overall regional integrating organization that helps articulate
common goals, encourages policy and operational alignment where possible and
promotes overall communication and information sharing. In other cases, the
organizations may act as rigid and totally separate entities. In any case, there
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Table 3. State A organizations and missions related to border crossing
State A organization
Department of Transportation (DOTSA)

Mission
Ensuring registration and licensing of
movers of goods and people, protect
infrastructure from overweight vehicles
Highway Patrol (HWYPAT-A)
State highway law enforcement for
State A
Department of Justice (DOJ-A)
Sets and adjudicates policy for State A
Department of Safety (DOS-SA)
Ensuring safe transport of goods and
people within State A
Department of Health (DOH-SA)
Control the import of foods, drugs,
cosmetics, medical devices, biological
products, animal feeds and drugs, and
radiation-emitting instruments
Department of Agriculture (DOA-SA Implements animal control policies,
provide inspection services for imported
animals, implements state policy for
agricultural products
State Bureau of Investigation (SBI-A) Sets and implements law enforcement
intelligence policies
State Emergency Management
Prepare for and respond to State A
Administration (SEMA-A)
emergencies

are certainly opportunities for development of different and possible competing
perspectives about importance of missions, training, equipment purchases,
information sharing and budgets and other resources to advance initiatives. This
disparity in perspectives may change radically in the face of perceived danger
from immediate threats, or the need to respond to disasters or attacks.

Adding RadNuc Detection and Interdiction Mission to the Model
Many border crossings have stations which include systems of equipment,
personnel and operational procedures to detect, intercept and handle many of
types of dangerous materials. With the perception that terrorists might want to
smuggle quantities of these dangerous materials sufficiently large to cause
catastrophic damage, there has been a growing interest in expanding the
application of these systems and in improving the systems already deployed.
Two types of threats getting a lot of attention are radiological and nuclear.
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Figure 4. Hypothetical structure for federal organizations in Country A for border crossings
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Department
of Defense

National
Guard

A nuclear threat generally is considered to be a weaponized assemblage of a
significant quantity of nuclear materials in a fashion such that a nuclear chain
reaction will cause a very dramatic release of energy in a short period of time,
like in a nuclear bomb. The nuclear materials most often discussed are highly
enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium-239. Neither the exact quantity, chemical
form nor the choice of nuclear material is important for this dissertation.
A radiological threat generally is considered to be a weaponized assemblage of a
sufficient quantity of materials that emit ionizing radiation in a fashion such that
they could be released in a manner to cause significant radiation damage or
contamination to people or property. The exact type of material and quantity are
not important for this dissertation.
In our example, we want to develop an enduring mission around the threats from
radiological or nuclear terrorist activities. In our city CityA1, and in the counties in
which it is located, and in the contiguous counties in State A in Country A and in
State B in Country B, a broad range of organizations will be impacted. The
border and customs officials who generally are policing against smuggling, illegal
aliens, and other criminal activity may now have to add detection and interdiction
of illicit radiological and nuclear materials to their mission spaces. This probably
will include the purchase and maintenance of new equipment, development of
new concepts of operations of the new equipment within the existing operational
requirements, development of new information sharing and fusion agreements,
development of new training programs, development of new protocols for
prosecution, development of new agreements between contiguous jurisdictions
to support tracking and interdiction of the threat, the development of public and
private business awareness around the changes in policies and procedures, and
finally the development of budgets within all of the impacted organizations to
support the additions. All of these changes will need to fit into the existing
architectural construct. The fact that the probability of this type of terrorist activity
is low (relative to fires, floods, storms, other criminal activities) may engender a
lack of enduring commitment to the increased mission by some of the
organizations involved.
According to a report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) standard procedures direct vehicles,
containers, and people coming into the country to pass through portal monitors to
screen for the presence of radiation. Most RPMs use technology—known as
“plastic scintillators” (PVT) – that detect the presence of radiation but cannot
distinguish between harmless and dangerous nuclear or radiological materials.
This results in the need for “secondary inspections”. To confirm and identify the
presence of radiation, this secondary inspection includes CBP officers using
Radiation Isotope Identifier Devices (RIIDs) to localize the source of radiation,
determine whether the radiation being emitted is from a harmless source, such
as kitty litter, or a dangerous source, such as weapons-grade nuclear material.
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Typically, completing a secondary inspection takes about 15 minutes but can
take much longer.(Government Accountability Office, 2006)
In this dissertation, the assumption is made that either of these two types of
threats could be carried across the border between Country A and Country B in a
truck, van or automobile. The implications of adding the mission to detect,
interdict or deter nuclear and radiological (RadNuc) threats to the mission space
already existing at our hypothetical border are examined. The types of
equipment to be used at the border crossing are typical for detection and
characterization of radiological and nuclear materials. The equipment types will
include:
1. Fixed instruments - Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) – capable of
scanning most sizes of vehicles crossing the border at our station. These
RPMS are very sensitive to gamma radiation, partially because of their
large size, but do not give spectrum information that would be helpful in
determining the nature of the material emitting the gamma radiation. They
also will contain neutron detectors. We will assume that these RPMS will
be at each lane located at the Primary Screening Station (hereafter called
Primary), and also one set will be located in the Secondary Screening
Station (hereafter called Secondary).
2. Portable radiation detection equipment, including handheld radioisotope
identifiers (RIIDs). These will be present at the Secondary Inspection
Station.
3. Portable gamma radiation detection equipment, including radiation pagers.
These are useful because they give a sensitivity that enables the officer in
Secondary to be able to separate the vehicle with gamma radiation from
the others. They can also help identify whether the driver or passengers
or vehicle are emitting the highest levels of gamma radiation.
4. Portable neutron search detectors (NSD) will be used in secondary
Screening to help localize neutron sources in the vehicles.
5. Whole vehicle x-ray machines that will be gamma through transmission or
gamma backscatter devices that will produce radiographic images of the
vehicle as the vehicle drives by or the machine itself can drive by the
vehicle. In our case, these systems will be placed in Tertiary screening
(hereafter called Tertiary) – unless the border crossing station already has
them in Secondary for non-RadNuc screening purposes.
There are difficulties with this type of mission (RadNuc) in a complex border
crossing situation, like the one assumed in this study. One of the difficulties is
that the border crossing is a location where a great deal of activity may be taking
place. As the literature search showed, there may be opportunities for overlap of
missions resulting in duplication of measurements,
Another difficulty is that the frequency of detecting an actual radiological or
nuclear threat is very, very low but the frequency of detecting radiological or
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nuclear material is not low. Many types of commodities carried across borders
have enough radioactive materials within them that resultant gamma emissions
might be intense enough to trigger alarms at screening stations. Furthermore,
drivers or passengers occasionally have medical treatments that result in a
sufficient amount of radioisotopes within their bodies that radiation detection
equipment will alarm within considerable distances.
The possibility of illicit transport of dangerous materials across borders and into
highly populated areas has been recognized as a significant threat to most
industrialized countries – especially the United States of America.(Shea, 2009)
There are many types of dangerous materials transported across borders of
countries every day. Types of materials include: radiological materials, explosive
materials, hazardous chemicals, ammunition.(Kouzes et al., 2003)
The postulate made earlier was that the development of a set of models can
facilitate the discussion of how much security is reasonable for a
government/regional citizenry because it can provide a framework for that
discussion. The existence of the model set would be useful in the articulation of
requirements for security and the metrics that might be used in the tradeoff
discussions around how much security is reasonable. The model set should
support deliberation around:
1) Political constructs (as shown in the organization type charts) that would
facilitate/limit the actions required to provide/improve security;
2) Metrics/measures that would frame discussions around how much security
is reasonable for the financial resources required, and/or the impacts on
the citizens of the region, and/or the impacts on other aspects affecting
the economics of the region;
3) Amount and types of capabilities that are needed and their geographical
deployment;
4) Resources needed to operate and maintain any equipment needed;
5) Roles and responsibilities of private and public organizations regarding
deterrence, detection, interdiction, response, recovery; and
6) Methodologies for assessing the quality of security provided.
In this chapter, we have seen that in Country A there are more than ten federal
organizations and at least eight state organizations which have missions at the
hypothetical border crossing. An introduction of a new mission at the border
crossing should be examined from the perspectives of each organization which
might be affected. We also have raised the question about how a new mission
for Country A might affect Country B. There is also the likelihood that other new
security or trade facilitation initiatives will be introduced into the border crossing
enterprise. The analyst should consider how changes in operation borne through
those initiatives might affect the efficacy of the RadNuc mission. A further
consideration is that changes in Country B border operations might affect the
operations for Country A.
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These points demonstrate that a simple set of diagrams of physical layout and a
set of organization type charts (with articulated missions) can provide a
perspective from which considerable insight could be developed. It becomes
obvious that the introduction of new missions into existing border operations
might be better informed by consideration of a broader, complete set of
organizations associated with the border crossing.
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CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONAL MODEL OF HYPOTHETICAL BORDER
CROSSING

Approach
This chapter discusses the development and use of an operational model for a
hypothetical, high traffic, complex land international border crossing. The model
is used to examine the likely operations of the border crossing, the effects of the
missions at the border crossing on traffic flow, including the necessity for
secondary screening. We also discuss likely relevant regional geopolitical
constructs around the border crossing.
To the hypothetical international border crossing mission space, the mission of
interdicting and/or deterring radiological and nuclear threats is added. This
mission addition requires the addition of radiation portal monitors in the Primary
location, and radiation portal monitors and portable radiation detectors in the
Secondary inspection station. We also add a Tertiary inspection station for the
cases where additional inspections might be required for further adjudication of
alarms. An emphasis is placed on estimating the necessary resources needed to
maintain security and functionality at the site.
For this simulation, a computational model approach known as agent-based
modeling (ABM) is used. ABMs (also known as multi-agent systems or multiagent simulations) use a computational model to simulate the actions and
interactions of autonomous agents to see their effects on the system as a whole.
The model discussed in this report was created using an agent-based
programming language and integrated modeling environment known as NetLogo.
A 3 dimensional model of the international border crossing was also created
using a 3D modeling program (Google SketchUp)
The development of the operational model supported a consideration of how
agencies associated with the border crossing would have to work together to
implement the new RadNuc detection and interdiction mission. The expectation
was that this model would help us better articulate goals, develop strategic
questions and discover metrics which we will use later in our framework for
assessing mission efficacy.
Before designing the model for the hypothetical international border crossing,
descriptions of typical international border crossings were considered to get a
sense of layout, traffic routing, numbers of lanes, and general operational
profiles.(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2012) This
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author also has had experience observing operations at border crossings and,
with others, prepared a restricted distribution report on the application of RadNuc
screening missions in regions containing border crossings and ports of
entry.(White, 2011) From these considerations, preliminary models were
developed to examine operations before implementation of the RadNuc mission.

Overall Preliminary Model Description
Border crossing model without a RadNuc mission
The model was developed in a way to support the examination, highlighting and
demonstration of some aspects of border crossing operations that would be
impacted by introduction of an initiative around a RadNuc mission. The first
aspect of the model is a three dimensional sketch showing the layout of the
hypothetical border crossing for this work. This sketch is described in a way that
demonstrates how the border crossing might be laid out and operated spatially.
A second aspect of the modeling is a consideration of how some of the relevant
organizations would have to work together, before and after the RadNuc mission
begins. This can be viewed as the geopolitical aspect of the border crossing.
The third part of the model is a dynamic simulation of the traffic flow through the
border crossing, including a Secondary inspection area. This dynamic model
shows how traffic might back up along the highway crossing the border and how
the number of vehicles sent to Secondary screening might vary as screening
parameters change. The need for a Tertiary Screening Station is discovered and
discussed.
For simplicity, the model will only take into account an interstate and no other
crossings such as railways, river crossings, air traffic, or other highways. The
interstate at the border station will consist of six lanes of traffic traveling in
opposite directions, for a total of twelve lanes of traffic. Our responsibility (in this
research) is to consider the traffic coming from Country B into Country A. We
have chosen, however, to include traffic going from Country A into Country B in
the model to be able to investigate any requirements for cooperation between
Country A and Country B organizations.
The diagram in Figure 5 was developed using Google SketchUp. [Licenses for
SketchUp are available to the public at no cost, but are explicitly limited to noncommercial use]. It shows six lanes of traffic crossing the border from Country B
into Country A and six lanes of traffic crossing the border from Country A into
Country B.
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Figure 5. Top view of model of hypothetical border crossing using Google
SketchUp

The six lanes of inbound and outbound traffic will each be equipped with normal
equipment for a border crossing station. They will have a Primary inspection
station booth in which works a border crossing guard. This guard in a booth in
each lane is responsible for screening for all the types of parameters described
previously. He will follow the Concept of Operations developed by the State A
Customs and Border Control organization to ensure that the vehicles have the
required labels, DOT numbers, manifests for cargo, licenses, and identity
paperwork as described previously in Chapter II. In some cases, the
documentation will not be complete and the driver will be directed to Secondary
screening locations as shown in the diagram. Other reasons for sending vehicles
to Secondary include suspicious behavior of the driver or passengers, presence
of alcoholic beverages, and overweight vehicles. Occasionally, a vehicle may be
directed to secondary screening on a random basis. A good description of
40

general operations at a U.S./Canada border crossing is given in the “Border
Crossing Guide for Commercial Truck Drivers”.(United States Department of
Transportation, 2008) The officials in Primary will represent many of the
requirements and regulations from the missions of several agencies, shown
previously in Table 2. State organizations shown previously in Table 3 also will
have some impact on or be impacted by operations at the border crossing.
There frequently will be law enforcement vehicles at the border crossing as
shown in Figure 6. These law enforcement vehicles may be used to: a) escort
the vehicles from Primary to Secondary screening under positive control; and b)
to chase down vehicles that cross the border in a way that violates the protocols.
This on-site law enforcement presence in our model will be provided by the State
A Highway Patrol under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the
Highway Patrol and the Country A Department of Homeland Security. The MOU
will specify the number of this type of law enforcement vehicle that will be at the
border crossing, the number of hours during the day for each day of the week,
and the manner in which the law enforcement officers will be notified which
vehicles need to be escorted or chased down.
The legal basis for the State A Highway Patrol officers to chase down the
vehicles that have violated some protocol at the crossing will be the responsibility
of the State A Department of Transportation. The DOT-A will work with state,
regional and local district attorneys and judges to develop a consensus that the
concept of operations for detaining these drivers and vehicles is well considered.
As the vehicles are escorted to Secondary, they will follow the escort vehicle until
they are parked. In our construct, the drivers will be met in Secondary by officers
from the Country A Customs and Border Protection (CBP-A). These officers will
have a range of inspection protocols for paperwork associated with the driver and
other occupants of the vehicles and protocols for determining whether proper
decals are in place, for examination of registrations and for authorization for
transport of hazardous materials.
In addition to federal and state agencies, some local agencies will be involved in
activities that support or will be affected by the border crossing station. The
sheriff’s department and police department may be involved in interdiction on
roads or streets near the border crossing. Police and fire departments frequently
have roles associated with controlling vehicles carrying hazardous materials.
They also provide explosives experts who support the opening of suspicious
vehicles or containers within them.
2-Dimensional dynamic simulation model description
The purpose of this model is to help discover and understand operational
features important to the success of the missions at the border crossing. For
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clarity and to help visualize the 2 dimensional dynamic simulation model used to
simulate traffic flow through an international border crossing, an additional model
perspective includes an isometric view of the crossing station, shown in Figure 6.
The model consists of 6 lanes of traffic on both the incoming and outgoing sides
with a secondary inspection location situated between the incoming (right side)
and outgoing lanes of traffic. The law enforcement vehicle is shown in the
innermost lane.
In Figure 7 is another isometric view. For convenience, the model has a
construct for the border crossing laid out in a way that there is a contiguous
arrangement for vehicles coming into Country A and those coming into Country B
whereas they normally would be separated. This allowed a little broader
perspective than just considering flow in one direction.
This dynamic model will simulate the traffic flow through and within the border
crossing station before and after implementation of the RadNuc screening
mission. Before and after this mission implementation, there is interest in the
backup of vehicles trying to cross the border and the impact of screening
operations in Secondary on resource requirements there.
Before the addition of the RadNuc mission, normal screening for compliance,
security and immigration will affect the traffic flow. The first phase of modeling
simulates this effect. But since our focus is on the effects of the RadNuc
screening mission, we will assume that all of the relevant agencies have worked
out acceptable fractions of traffic flow sent to secondary inspection, acceptable
backups at the border and the concepts of operations and supporting
agreements to enable the enterprise to run smoothly.
In this first phase, the assumption is made that there is a detection system that
looks over the entire mission space and detects noncompliance, safety concerns,
immigration issues, and suspicious behavior. There will also be random
selection of vehicles for examination. The model assumes a probabilistic nature
of the traffic and persons passing through this detection system, resulting in a
stochastic nature of the number of vehicles failing the Primary detection
discriminator and consequently sent to Secondary. After this model simulation
represents what seems to be a reasonable operating envelope, RadNuc
screening operational elements are added to the model in the next phase.
Simulation using agent-based modeling
The dynamic simulation model was built using NetLogo. [NetLogo is free and
open source software, under a GPL license. It is written in Scala and Java.]
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Figure 6. View of the 6 incoming lanes of the border crossing model

Figure 7. Alternate view of the border crossing model showing the
incoming and outgoing lanes of traffic as well as the secondary inspection
location
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Figure 8 below shows an image of the two-dimensional model designed. Just as
in the three-dimensional model, the two-dimensional model consists of 6 lanes of
traffic on both the incoming and outgoing sides, giving a total of 12 lanes. The
incoming side is denoted by red vehicles while the outgoing side has blue
vehicles. Each of the 12 lanes has a toll booth which serves as a security
checkpoint and the primary inspection location. This is denoted by the vertical
red bars in the center of the figure. During the agent-based model simulation,
vehicles are assigned probabilities by a random number generator. If the
number assigned exceeds the discriminator threshold then the vehicle is required
to go to Secondary. The incoming side is shown at the bottom of the figure while
the outgoing is shown at the top of the figure. The Secondary is located in the
middle of the figure between the incoming and outgoing lanes of traffic.
This phase of model development has the purpose of simulating the operation of
the border crossing without a RadNuc screening mission. As a simplification, we
assume that there is one detection system that will look at all of the reasons that
might require a vehicle to be sent to a Secondary Screening station. The goal is
to simulate the number of vehicles coming into Primary, a stochastic variation in
the number being sent to Secondary and then released from Secondary. We
want the model to show that the border crossing operation before the addition of
RadNuc screening runs efficiently, with a fraction of vehicles going to Secondary
that is non-zero, but does not overwhelm the officers’ ability to clear the cars from
Secondary before there is a significant backup in Secondary. Then In the next
phase of the model, the RadNuc screening mission will be added to examine the
effects of this additional mission on the border crossing operation.
For the general detection system (representing the totality of screening due to
non RadNuc causes), discriminator levels will be varied to get about the right
level of Primary and Secondary activity to use as a base case before adding
RadNuc screening. In this agent-based model, vehicles are assigned
probabilities by a random number generator. If the number assigned exceeds the
discriminator threshold then the vehicle is required to go to Secondary. It can be
seen from the figure that if the discriminator levels are lowered (increased
sensitivity) then there is a higher probability of a vehicle exceeding the threshold
level. Increasing the sensitivity of a detector would therefore increase the
number of vehicles that set off alarms. This would lead to a higher volume of
vehicles required to receive a secondary screening.
A computational model using agent-based modeling is used to simulate the
actions and interactions of autonomous agents to see their effects on the system
as a whole. For this study an emphasis is placed on determining how varying the
inputs of traffic volume and discriminator level affect the wait times of vehicles
crossing the border, the security and functionality of the border crossing, and the
resources needed to maintain this security and functionality (both manpower and
equipment). Three distinct test cases were run.
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Figure 8. Border crossing model during the beginning of the simulation
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Before the model is started some major initial inputs are required such as the
number of cars and trucks to be placed in each lane, the maximum speed the
vehicles can obtain, and most importantly the discriminator level of the Primary
Screening operation. The discriminator level is modeled by assigning a random
value reading to each vehicle that enters the Primary Screening Station. This is
accomplished by assigning a different random number from 0 to 1 to each
vehicle and comparing it to the current Primary discriminator alarm value to
determine which vehicles will be required to go to the Secondary inspection
location. The equation below represents the mathematical form of this.
Sec. Insp. Requirement = ifRandom(0−1) > Current Discriminator Level
The probability distribution of the randomly generated numbers is generated by
NetLogo. We used settings in the code to get the general shape we felt
reasonable. A typical distribution from the model is given in Figure 9. The data
for Figure 9 was obtained by running the model for 35,075 iterations,
Once a discriminator level is chosen the random number of the vehicle is
compared to the discriminator level. If the random number is larger than the
discriminator level the vehicle is treated as if it alarmed a detector in the Primary
Inspection Area and is required to go to the secondary inspection location. The
discriminator alarm levels are chosen through the use of slider bars on the main
graphic user interface and can be changed at any time throughout the simulation.
Thus, any probability (detector discriminator level) of being required to go to
secondary screening can easily be applied. This is a good feature because it
allows easy manipulation of the model to see the effects.
It is possible to change the number of cars and trucks to be placed in each lane
in the model. For example, choosing a number of 3 for incoming trucks and 3 for
incoming cars will place 3 trucks and 3 cars in each lane on the incoming side
(bottom), for a total of 36 vehicles on the incoming side. A typical case for a
sample vehicle on the incoming side will be examined in detail to describe the
process flow of the rest of the model.
During the simulation the vehicles are asked certain questions such as the color
of the patch that they are on (NetLogo uses patches to describe where the
vehicles are located on a grid) to determine if an action needs to take place or
not. For example, in the beginning of the simulation (as well as throughout the
rest of the simulation) vehicles are asked if the color of the patch they are on is
red, the color designating the toll booths. If so, then the vehicles are required to
slow down to a speed of nearly 0 to model the time spent at the RPM being
scanned. If not, then they continue on their normal path and speed.
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Figure 9. Probability distribution obtained from the NetLogo model using a
random number generator for a log-normal distribution

Once the vehicles progress through the red region they move until they reach the
vertical blue bar. At this point probabilities are assigned to determine if the
vehicle is required to go to secondary screening or not. If so, the vehicle is rerouted to the secondary inspection location. If not the vehicle continues to the
end of the map at which point it wraps back around and starts the process again.
The process of wrapping the vehicles around to the beginning of the model
introduces artificiality into the model that is not ideal. More realism could be
added to the model by using a text file to input traffic flow data as a function of
time.
If the vehicle is required to go to secondary screening it is re-routed and sent to
the secondary portion of the model. If there are no vehicles in the secondary
inspection station then the vehicle will undergo a second screening to validate
the first “alarm”. If a vehicle is already present in Secondary then, just as in real
life, the second vehicle is required to wait in line until the secondary inspection
screening process becomes available. The secondary screening takes longer
(approximately 10 total minutes in this model phase) and is reflected in the model
by requiring the vehicles to pass slowly through an extended zone larger than the
primary screening zone. In this first phase of the model (without the addition of a
RadNuc screening mission) we assume that all vehicles pass the secondary
screening and are allowed to pass through the border crossing. To model this,
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the vehicles are simply looped around the secondary portion of the model until
they reach the entrance once again. At this point a random number is chosen to
distribute the vehicle back to one of the 6 initial lanes. After being placed
randomly onto one of the 6 lanes the vehicle will continue forward until it reaches
the end of the model and wraps back around to start the process again.
Throughout the simulation the vehicles are required to follow certain rules such
as a speed limit, maximum acceleration and deceleration, and to stop when they
reach the vehicle in front of them. Assumptions made in the simulation include
the following:
1. That all vehicles passing through the primary and secondary inspection zones
do so in the same amount of time. This assumption deviates from actual border
crossing operations. More variation will occur more during the secondary
screening process than during the primary due to the thoroughness of
examination of paperwork and physical inspection amount done during the
secondary screening process. Reviews of documentation, vehicle weight,
decaling, licensing or safety permit information are generally required at this time.
2. That all vehicles pass the secondary screening process. In the rare event that
a vehicle does not pass the secondary screening, extra time must be taken to log
the event and to notify the proper authorities. In real life, this process can take
up to a day in some countries. But we are assuming we have a relatively modern
well-functioning border crossing with well-established protocols and well trained
officers.
3. Any dependent relationship between vehicles in line or in adjacent inspection
booths was neglected. It is possible that a group of vehicles with similar
problems (like lack of proper documentation or decaling) could show up at nearly
the same time. This would require the vehicles in any of the Primary Screening
area that had been alarmed to be escorted to the secondary inspection location
for further screening. This type of situation is possible and might cause a
temporary backup.
Test Cases for Phase 1 model
Test cases were designed to address the following questions:
• What probability of detection in primary would cause the security organization to
have to add one more set of officers (assuming a set equals 3 shifts and 1 backup)?
– Security personnel are only capable of monitoring a certain amount of vehicles
in the secondary inspection location. We have made this threshold level of
secondary screening capability a variable. It can be set using the slider bar in
the main graphic user interface. It represents the maximum number of vehicles
that can be in the secondary inspection before another trained and certified
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officer would need to be brought to the station.
– Because of the added length of time that it takes for a secondary inspection it is
possible for secondary to back up. Therefore it would be beneficial to determine
how varying the inspection time in secondary would affect the flow of vehicles
through secondary and the subsequent requirement of security officers.
Test Case I – Effects of detection rates in primary screening
If the threshold is exceeded then the Secondary Screening operations will be
required to add more security officers. In Test Case 1, we address the following
questions:
• What flow rate in primary begins to have deleterious effects on wait times and
number of officers required in secondary?
– Increased flow rates through the primary inspection systems increase the
probability of alarming a primary detector, causing a subsequent increase in the
number of vehicles required to go to the secondary inspection location. It is
possible that this increase in vehicles could overwhelm the security personnel
causing a back-up of vehicles in primary.
• How does improving the speed of resolution of alarms in secondary affect the
retardation of flow through secondary as well as the resources (officers)
required?
To setup the simulation, 5 cars and 5 trucks were chosen to be placed in each of
the 6 lanes on both the incoming and outgoing sides. Therefore a total of 120
vehicles are present in this simulation at all times. We have set a criterion that
more than 5 vehicles in the secondary inspection location will result in the
additional costs of adding one more set of officers (a set being 4 to cover 3 eight
hour shifts plus a backup). This is assumed to be the maximum number of
vehicles that can be present in the secondary inspection location before the
security officers become overwhelmed. The test case was run multiple times
(different simulations) with different primary inspection station discriminator levels
to determine which level overwhelms the security personnel. Each simulation
was run for a maximum of 30,000 ticks (we have chosen a tick to be one
second). If the simulation was run for 30,000 ticks without exceeding the
threshold level it was considered to pass the criterion and a lower discriminator
level was chosen for the next simulation. A simulation was considered complete
and cut short if the threshold level was exceeded. Also, if a simulation exceeded
the threshold level it was run again to confirm the validity of the previous
simulation. If a simulation was run 3 consecutive times, with all 3 simulations
exceeding the threshold level, then the simulation with the current inputs was
confirmed and the result for the minimum detection probability for primary was
considered determined found.
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The first simulation (simulation 1) was run with an alarm discriminator level of
0.85 for both the incoming and outgoing flows of traffic. Vehicles with a random
number greater than 0.85 were required to go to Secondary for additional
screening. With a discriminator level of 0.85 the simulation ran for the full 30,000
ticks without the secondary inspection location exceeding 5 vehicles. The
maximum number of vehicles to be in the secondary inspection location at one
time was found to be 1. This is shown in Figure 10 below.
Simulation 2 was run with an alarm discriminator level of 0.65. The simulation
was able to complete a full 30,000 ticks without exceeding the secondary
inspection threshold level. Figure 11 shows that secondary met the threshold
level twice throughout the simulation but never exceeded the level at which the
Secondary is at capacity.
With these current inputs the security organization would be required to add one
more set of security officers. Figures 11 through 13 reflect simulations 3, 3-a,
and 3-b respectively. It should be noted that in Figures 12 and 13 the total
number of vehicles did not fully reach the threshold level on the plot before the
simulation was stopped. This is due to the way vehicles are counted in the
secondary inspection location. Because of the probability of the random
numbers generated it is possible that a simulation can be run for a higher
discriminator level in which the simulation will pass. Therefore a range of
discriminator levels should be recorded as the lowest detection probability for
primary. Thus, a range of 0.63 to 0.65 was chosen as the minimum detection
probability in primary without exceeding the threshold level requiring the security
organization to add another set of security officers.
Test Case II - Effects of primary flow rate
We examined the effect that the primary flow rate has on the wait times and
security officers required in secondary. In this test case simulations were run by
varying the initial number of vehicles in the model. Three simulations were run
for this test case: low, medium, and high volume traffic flows. Each simulation
was run for a total of 30,000 ticks. A secondary inspection location threshold
level of 5 vehicles was used to determine the effect of the traffic flow on
secondary. The discriminator alarm levels for both flows of traffic were set to
0.65 for each simulation.
Simulation 4 was run with 5 cars and 5 trucks in each lane on both the incoming
and outgoing sides. This simulation serves as the low volume traffic flow
simulation. It was determined that the average wait time experienced by vehicles
waiting to cross the border was in the range of 75 to 140 ticks. This is reflected
by the red (incoming) and blue (outgoing) curves in Figure 14 given below.
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Figure 10. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time
for simulation 1 obtained from the NetLogo model

Figure 11. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time
for simulation 2 obtained from the NetLogo model
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Figure 12. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time
for simulation 3-a obtained from the NetLogo model

Figure 13. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time
for simulation 3-b obtained from the NetLogo model
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The maximum wait time experienced by a vehicle is shown by the green curve in
Figure 14. Figure 15 shows the number of vehicles in secondary screening as a
function of time. It can be seen from the figure that the threshold level is
exceeded for most of the simulation. Therefore with the current density of traffic
and discriminator alarm level the security organization would be required to add
at least one more set of security officers or increase the discriminator level
temporarily. Because the maximum number of vehicles in secondary at any one
time during the simulation was 14 the security organization would be required to
add two additional sets of security officers, assuming that one new set of officers
would be required for each increase of 5 vehicles in the Secondary Inspection
station.
Simulation 5 was run with 15 cars and 15 trucks in each lane of the incoming and
outgoing lanes of traffic. This simulation serves as the medium volume traffic
flow simulation. From this simulation it was determined that the average wait
time experienced by all vehicles waiting to cross the border ranged from 250 to
455 ticks. This is a longer wait time than the vehicles in simulation 4
experienced. Figure 16 gives the wait times of the vehicles waiting to cross the
border as a function of time, while Figure 17 gives the number of vehicles in
secondary as a function of time. It can be seen from Figure 18 that the wait
times of the incoming vehicles were higher than the outgoing for a portion of the
simulation. This was due to the random placement of the vehicles as they are
wrapped back around the model to start the process again. On occasion, one
lane will become longer than the rest resulting in longer wait times for vehicles in
that lane. As seen in Figure 19 the maximum number of vehicles in secondary
was 12.
Therefore using the assumption of a maximum of 5 vehicles with the current
number of officers, the security organization would be required to add two
additional sets of officers to operate without becoming overwhelmed.
Simulation 6 was the same as simulation 5 except that 20 cars and 20 trucks
were placed in each lane of the incoming and outgoing traffic flows. This
simulation serves as the high volume traffic flow simulation. Figure 18 gives the
wait times of the vehicles waiting to cross the border as a function of time. The
average wait time of vehicles ranged from 350 ticks to 570 ticks. Figure 19
shows the number of vehicles in secondary as a function of time. It can be seen
from the figure that the threshold level was exceeded once again. However in
this simulation the maximum number of vehicles in secondary was 8. This would
require the security organization to add only one more set of officers to operate
without becoming overwhelmed. Just as was the case for simulation 5, the
vehicles in simulation 6 experienced longer wait times than those in simulation 4.
The highest average wait time in simulation 6 (570 ticks) is over 4 times the
highest average wait time of vehicles in simulation 4 (140 ticks).

53

Figure 14. Wait times of vehicles waiting to cross the border as a function
of time for simulation 4 obtained from the NetLogo model

Figure 15. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time
for simulation 4 obtained from the NetLogo model
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Figure 16. Wait times of vehicles waiting to cross the border as a function
of time for simulation 5 obtained from the NetLogo model

Figure 17. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time
for simulation 5 obtained from the NetLogo model
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Figure 18. Wait times of vehicles waiting to cross the border as a function
of time for simulation 6 obtained from the NetLogo model

Figure 19. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time
for simulation 6 obtained from the NetLogo model.
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The results obtained from the simulations run for this test case show that an
increase in traffic flow leads to an increase in the wait times experienced by
vehicles waiting to cross the border. This effect was expected. The increase in
the number of vehicles means that more vehicles will be screened in primary. It
is possible at very low traffic flow rates that a small increase in the traffic flow will
not significantly increase the wait times experienced. However, for the 3
simulations run here, increases in the traffic flow rate led to significant increases
in the wait times of the vehicles.
A result that was not expected was the number of vehicles that were required to
go to secondary screening. In simulation 4 the maximum number of vehicles in
secondary was 14. In simulations 5 and 6 the traffic flow was increased but the
maximum number of vehicles in secondary was found to decrease to 12 and 9
respectively. Reasons for this unexpected nature could be simply due to the fact
that the vehicles required to go to secondary screening are chosen by
probabilities assigned from a random number generator. It is also possible that
the maximum rate at which vehicles can pass through the primary screening was
met in simulations 4, 5, and 6. Therefore the rate at which probabilities are
assigned to vehicles passing through the crossing is the same in these 3
simulations. The only difference in the simulations is that the increased flow rate
results in longer lines of vehicles backing up behind the primary screening.
Test Case III - Effects of secondary inspection times
Secondary inspections take an extended amount of time when compared to
primary inspections. This extended amount of time could have negative effects
on the traffic flow through secondary. Therefore it is desirable to determine how
improving the speed of resolution of alarms in secondary affects the retardation
of flow through secondary as well as the required resources (officers). This test
case builds upon the two previous test cases in which detection probability and
traffic flow were varied to determine the effects. Therefore 3 simulations will be
given: high, medium, and low speed of resolution. The 3 simulations will be run
by varying the amount of time that it takes to clear a secondary inspection.
Simulation 7 was run with 5 cars and 5 trucks in each lane. Both the incoming
and outgoing discriminator levels were set to 0.65 while the average inspection
time for a vehicle in secondary was 545 ticks. Just as in other simulations the
model was run for 30,000 ticks. This simulation serves as the high speed of
resolution simulation. Figure 20 gives the number of vehicles in secondary as a
function of time.
Just as in simulation 7, simulation 8 was run with 5 cars and 5 trucks in each
lane. The simulation was also run for 30,000 ticks. The only difference between
the simulations is that simulation 8 was run with an average secondary
inspection time of 770 ticks. Figure 21 gives the number of vehicles in secondary
as a function of time.
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Figure 20. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time
for simulation 7 obtained from the NetLogo model

Figure 21. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time
for simulation 8 obtained from the NetLogo model
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Figure 22. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time
for simulation 9 obtained from the NetLogo model.

For simulation 9, the average secondary inspection time was 1100 ticks. The
simulation was run with 5 cars and 5 trucks in each lane, and was run for 30,000
ticks.
It can be seen from simulations 7 through 9, and their supporting figures, that as
the average secondary inspection time per vehicle increases, the number of
vehicles in secondary increases. This effect is expected. Because of the
extended screening times vehicles begin to backup.

Results
3 major test cases were run to determine the effects that varying major inputs
have on the wait times on vehicles crossing the border as well as the resources
required by the security organization. Test Case I was used to determine the
probability of detection in the primary inspection location that would cause the
security organization to add one more set of security officers. Discriminator
levels of 0.85, 0.65, and 0.63 were used in simulations of this test case. From
these simulations it was found that as the discriminator level is lowered the
probability of detection of a vehicle with some characteristic requiring Secondary
Screening increases. This can be seen in Figure 15. As the discriminator level
is lowered the location on the curve is lowered (moved left). This leads to a
larger area being above the discriminator threshold level, thus leading to a higher
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probability of a vehicle alarming a primary detector. As Figures 18 through 20
show as the discriminator level is lowered the number of vehicles in secondary
increases. When a discriminator level of 0.63 was used it was found that the
simulation was not able to pass and exceeded the secondary threshold level.
Two additional simulations were run to verify the same result using the 0.63
discriminator level. From this it was determined that the lowest possible
discriminator level that could be used with the current traffic flow and security
officers was in the range of 0.63 to 0.65. Any discriminator level lower than this
would require the security organization to add another set of security officers.
Test Case II was used to determine the effects of the primary flow rate on wait
times of vehicles and security officers required in secondary. Simulations were
run by varying the initial number of vehicles in the model. Figures 18 through 21
show the results of these simulations. It was found that an increase in traffic flow
leads to an increase in the wait times experienced by vehicles waiting to cross
the border. An unexpected result however was that the number of vehicles
required to go to secondary screening did not increase with increasing initial
traffic flow. A reason for this could be that the maximum rate at which vehicles
can pass through the primary portals was met in simulations 4, 5, and 6. This
means that the number of vehicles required to go to secondary in these
simulations was strictly dependent upon probability and the numbers generated
randomly.
Test Case III helped to determine the effects that varying secondary inspection
times have on the vehicles required to go to secondary. Three simulations were
run in which the average inspection time per vehicle in secondary was changed.
The simulations covered average times of 545, 770, and 1100 ticks. As Figures
21 through 22 show, an increase in the average inspection time causes an
increase in the vehicles in secondary.
Conclusions/Future Directions
The results obtained led to a richer overall understanding of border crossings,
traffic flow models, and agent-based modeling. As expected, the model showed
that increasing the traffic flow through the crossing ultimately requires the
security organization to hire additional sets of security officers. This can be
rather expensive due to the fact that if one additional security officer is needed
for a shift, three more officers on top of the initial one are required. This is
assuming three 8-hour shifts as well as a backup. Since we would expect overall
traffic flow to vary from hour to hour and from day to day, follow-on work should
take those variations into account.
Results also showed that other inputs to the model such as discriminator alarm
levels and secondary inspection times have an impact on the system as a whole,
as expected. Delays experienced by vehicles waiting to cross the border as well
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as the number of vehicles required to go to secondary screening all hinge on
these inputs. Therefore it is important to understand how these inputs affect the
system. This is why an agent-based model was designed and developed. The
model enables the user to change inputs with relative ease to see the effects
visually.
Some of the assumptions made when designing this model could be added in
future revisions to add more realism to the model and the subsequent
simulations. Currently the number of desired vehicles is chosen through the use
of a graphic user interface and slider bars. Once the number of vehicles is
chosen the vehicles are placed randomly throughout the model as described
before. A nice addition would be to improve the code so that a text file could be
created as an input to the model. The test file would contain data on the traffic
flow rate as a function of time. This would allow an added complexity, such as
rush-hour traffic in the morning and evening, to be added to the simulations to
see the effects.
Another assumption made was that all vehicles that are required to be screened
in the secondary inspection location always pass this secondary inspection. In
real life this is not the case. There will be occurrences in which the problem
causing the primary alarm cannot be resolved with the personnel or equipment
on site. There is also the possibility that a more serious situation would be
suspected, like an explosive or a chemical or biological hazard. In either case
the event must be logged and the proper authorities must be notified. Therefore
the addition of these scenarios would allow yet another set of effects to be
viewed that are not possible with the current model.
We have assumed that all primary inspections take the same amount of time.
We also assumed that for the secondary inspections except the secondary
inspections were given a longer length of time. In reality there will be a
distribution of times that it takes for vehicles to pass through the primary and
secondary inspections. Using probability distributions, ranges of times could be
assigned to all vehicles passing through primary and secondary inspections.

Dynamic Simulation Model for Addition of RadNuc Mission
Addition of RadNuc mission to hypothetical border crossing
For this next phase, we will assume that Country A has decided to add the
RadNuc mission to the operations around the border crossing. The following
assumptions also are made:
1. Country B will also add a RadNuc mission to its border crossing
2. The sponsoring organization for this initiative is Country A Department of
Homeland Security (DHS-A).
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3. Instrumentation will be added to the border crossing to help detect the
presence of radiological and nuclear materials.
4. DHS-A will specify the operating parameters of the equipment
5. DHS-A will provide funding for the initial purchase of the equipment.
6. These RPMs will include measurements of gamma and neutron radiation
as the vehicles slow down and then stop for Primary Inspection.
Equipment involved
In our model, there will be a radiation portal monitor (RPM) at each Primary
Inspection Station. This will serve as the primary detection location for radiation
detection. The RPMs at each toll booth will be equipped with both gamma and
neutron detection capabilities. The secondary inspection location will be utilized
to examine further any vehicles that alarm a detector in the primary inspection
location. The secondary inspection location will be comprised of: a second RPM
to verify the first hit, handheld detectors equipped with an radioisotope identifier,
and radiography equipment (e.g., to scan a whole truck spatially, etc.)
Typical operating procedure
In this section an example is used to show the typical RadNuc screening process
flow of a vehicle through our hypothetical international border crossing. As a
vehicle enters the primary inspection location primary screening begins. At this
time the monitor will begin a gross neutron and gamma count. During primary
screening official documents such as passports, driver’s licenses, shipment
manifests, etc. are verified. Once the vehicle has passed any toll requirements,
the gross gamma and gross neutron counts recorded will be compared to the
normal background count. Depending on the outcome of the count the vehicle is
either allowed to proceed through the crossing or is required to go to the
secondary inspection location for further screening.
If the vehicle is required to go to the secondary inspection location, it is escorted
to a monitoring station where it will first go through another RPM monitoring
system much like that in Primary to see if the readings that lead to the alarm are
repeated. The next step would involve inspectors doing visual inspections as
well as using a hand-held monitor to determine the location of the radioactive
materials in the vehicle. Inspectors will also review any licensing or permit
information. If the radioactive material is identified and is found to be an innocent
source, the occurrence is logged and the individual is released. If the source is
identified as not consistent with the list of innocent radiation sources, the
occurrence is logged and technical assistance is contacted for further guidance.
If the source cannot be identified then the personnel associated with the vehicle
as well as the vehicle itself are examined further. If the cause of the alarm is
judged to meet requirements and no danger is discovered, the occurrence is
documented and the individual is released.
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The following assumptions were made about the radiation portal monitors
(RPMS), neutron detectors and the level of radioactivity in the trucks and cars.
Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) will include gamma radiation detectors and
neutron detectors. The outputs of the RPMs will be gamma and neutron
readings as a function of time as the vehicle travels by the RPMs. The
discriminator settings for gamma alarms and for neutron alarms can be set at
whatever level we choose. But there will be consequences for setting the alarms
at a particular level. If the discriminator level for gamma radiation is set to zero,
any gamma reading above zero will trigger an alarm. If any gamma alarm results
in a decision to send the vehicle to Secondary, then it might be possible that
vehicles would be sent to Secondary frequently enough that the capability of the
existing officers to resolve the alarms would be overcome.
Since one of the new mission spaces for Secondary Inspection will be for
adjudication of alarms that occur in the Primary lanes, the Secondary station will
also have more radiation detection equipment that has some isotopic
identification capabilities and is portable so that hot spots of radioactivity can be
determined.
Occasionally there will be cases where the Secondary Inspection area will not
have the capability to resolve the question about whether the radioactive material
is only normally occurring radioactive material (NORM).
For those cases, we assume the border crossing will have another area called
Tertiary. In this area, the drivers and other occupants of the vehicles will be
separated from the vehicles, the vehicles will be placed under stricter
administrative controls, and additional assets will be called in to help resolve the
radiation readings. In some of these cases, specialized capabilities will be called
upon to ensure that the vehicles can be inspected manually. This might involve
the use of bomb squads from regional police or fire departments. This Tertiary
Inspection Area is not shown in the Google SketchUp diagrams but is shown in
the user interface of the two dimensional dynamic simulation model. The large
space between the incoming and outgoing lanes of traffic is the secondary
inspection location and serves to be a further (second) screening location in the
event that the primary inspection location detector alarms. The actual location of
the secondary screening is the horizontal green bar located in the center at the
top of the secondary inspection location. If a primary inspection location detector
alarms vehicles are escorted to the secondary inspection location by a security
officer so that a second screening can be done to confirm the validity of the first
alarm. Figure 23 below shows an image of the model with the simulation in
progress. It can be seen how traffic backs up at the Primary Inspection Areas.
Also shown in Figure 23 is an incoming (red) vehicle in the secondary inspection
location.
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Figure 23. Two dimensional simulation model layout of border crossing

Assumptions for vehicle radioactivity (incoming/outgoing colors)
To screen for the RadNuc threat, the system will measure gamma and/or neutron
radiation emanated from a vehicle in the field of view of the RPM in Primary
Screening. In truck traffic, there will be a broad range of commodities, most of
which will not emanate any radiation (detectable by our RPMs). Some of these,
however, will still fail some of the screening done in Primary Screening and will
be sent to Secondary for resolution of the problem. Possible causes include
improper paperwork, improper decaling, and vehicle weight different than
expected and suspicious behavior of the driver or passengers. At some border
locations, vehicles are occasionally selected on a random basis for Secondary
Screening.(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2012)
The adapted model will continue to simulate the stochastic variation in the rate at
which these vehicles are sent to Secondary for reasons not associated with the
RadNuc screening mission – and then add the impact of vehicles failing the
radiation screening system in Primary Screening.
In this adapted model, there are six types of vehicles, with differing levels of
radioactivity either in the commodities carried by the trucks, the luggage in the
cars, or radioactive medical burdens in the people in the vehicles as a result of
medical treatments or diagnostic tests. The types of radiation detected by the
RPMs and the portable radiation detectors only include gammas and neutrons,
as is normally the case in border crossings.(International Atomic Energy Agency,
2013) In this model, most vehicles (85.6%) do not contain enough gamma or
neutron radiation to trigger an alarm even at the lowest setting on the RPMs.
Actual levels of radioactivity in vehicles going across border crossing will vary
from location to location and occasionally from season to season. In the dynamic
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simulation model, trucks or cars with no measurable radiation are called Non
RadNuc. They will show up as red for vehicles coming from Country B into
Country A and as blue going from Country A into Country B. [For our model, we
were constrained by the icons we could assume at one time. The model uses a
total of 6 types of vehicles having different types and levels of radioactivity,
leaving 36 non RadNuc vehicles for a ratio of 85.6%.]
For radioactive classes of trucks and cars, the model uses arbitrary units for the
expected levels of gamma and neutron radiation. This approach stays well away
from any classification issues. There is a great deal of sensitivity around the
levels of radiation emanating from vehicles, how well it could be detected by
RPMs (and more advanced sensors), and the level of radiation given off by
different types of commodities in different types of packaging in different types of
vehicles. These details about radiation levels and energy spectra associated
with the radiation are really not very relevant to the strategic questions addressed
in this dissertation.
However, we do want to examine how RadNuc screening at different
discriminator levels will impact throughput, backups in Secondary and other
operational considerations. To give some detail in these operational
considerations, the model includes various classifications, reflecting broad levels
of radiation (gamma and neutron) that we might expect to be emanated from the
vehicles. The broad categories are named in terms of low or high gamma
radiation emanations and low or high neutron emanation levels.
Two in 42 (4.8%) of the vehicles will be trucks with a low level of gamma
radiation and no neutron radiation. Truck cargo occasionally does have some
gamma radiation coming from potassium-40 bearing materials taken from the
earth. Examples are bricks, stones and plants. Generally, this type of cargo has
no neutron radiation. In the model, these are called Lowgamma trucks. They will
show up as brown for vehicles coming from Country B into Country A and as
violet going from Country A into Country B. The gamma radiation level was set
arbitrarily at 5 and the neutron radiation level was set to 0 (since this type of
cargo has typically has no neutron radiation measureable in our border crossing
scenario).
One in 42 (2.4%) of the vehicles will be a truck with a medium level of gamma
radiation and no neutron radiation. In our model, this type of truck cargo would
have some more gamma radiation than that coming from potassium-40 bearing
materials taken from the earth. Examples are small to medium commercial,
scientific and medical radioisotopes.(Kouzes, 2009) Generally, this type of cargo
has no neutron radiation. In the model, these trucks are called Medgamma
trucks. They will show up as pink for vehicles coming from Country B into
Country A and as sky blue going from Country A into Country B. The gamma
radiation level was arbitrarily set at 10 and the neutron radiation level to 0 (since
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this type of cargo has typically has no neutron radiation measureable in our
border crossing scenario).
One in 42 of the vehicles (2.4%) will be a truck with a high level of gamma
radiation and no neutron radiation. This type of truck cargo would have
significantly more gamma radiation than that coming from potassium-40 bearing
materials taken from the earth. Examples are large commercial and scientific
radioisotopes, as well as drivers or passengers who have had recent medical
treatments. These are called Highgamma trucks in our model. They will show
up as orange for vehicles coming from Country B into Country A and as magenta
going from Country A into Country B. The gamma radiation level was arbitrarily
set at 100 and the neutron radiation level to 0 (since this type of cargo has
typically has no neutron radiation measureable in our border crossing scenario).
One in 42 (2.4%) of the vehicles will be a truck with a medium level of gamma
radiation and some detectable neutron radiation. This type of truck cargo would
have somewhat more gamma radiation than that coming from potassium-40
bearing materials taken from the earth. But in this class of vehicles, there will be
neutron emanation at a level high enough to be detected in Primary Screening.
Examples are commercial items like moisture gauges and scientific
radioisotopes. Other examples would include trucks carrying significant
quantities of nuclear reactor fuel (UO 2 or UF 6 ). Another type of neutron alarm
can be generated when a shower of cosmic ray particles strike high-Z materials
and generate neutrons. This occasional spike in neutron levels around materials
in cargo generates nuisance alarms. Since plutonium emits neutrons and since
plutonium is an element of concern for nuclear weapons, any significant neutron
detection would likely cause a vehicle to be stopped and sent to a Secondary for
alarm resolution. We assume that will be the operational concept our model.
These are called Neutron trucks in the model. They will show up as yellow for
vehicles coming from Country B into Country A and as lime going from Country A
into Country B. The gamma radiation level was arbitrarily set at 10 and the
neutron radiation level to 5 (since this type of cargo typically will have neutron
radiation measureable in our border crossing scenario).
One in 42 (2.4%) of our vehicles will be a car with a high level of gamma
radiation and no neutron radiation. In the model, for this case the drivers or
passengers in the cars will have had recent medical treatments. These are
called Cargammas in our model. They will show up as orange for vehicles
coming from Country B into Country A and as magenta going from Country A into
Country B. The gamma radiation level was arbitrarily set at 100 and neutron
radiation level to 0 (since people generally have no neutron radiation
measureable in our border crossing scenario).
A summary of these types of vehicles, their distribution and the color code for
incoming and outgoing vehicles is shown in Table 4.
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Table 4. Radioactivity types and levels for vehicles in the dynamic
simulation model
Turtle
Name
Non
RadNuc
Lowgamma
Medgamma
Highgamma
Neutron
Cargamma

Type
Truck
and Car
Truck
Truck
Truck
Truck
Car

Fraction

Gamma

Neutron

Incoming

Outgoing

85.6%

0

0

Red

Blue

4.8%
2.4%
2.4%
2.4%
2.4%

5
10
100
10
100

0
0
0
5
0

Brown
Pink
Orange
Yellow
Orange

Violet
Sky
Magenta
Lime
Magenta

This means that 14.4% of the vehicles in our model contain radioactive materials
of a quantity to have gamma or neutron emanations to be detectable by RPMs at
Primary Screening.
The dynamic simulation model will show the movement of the trucks as cars as a
function of time. By observing the shapes (truck icons look like trucks and car
icons look like cars) and the colors, one can watch how the various classes of
cars and trucks move through the system, including Secondary.
Developing the concept of operations resulted in questions about how to handle
a truck with a neutron signature (yellow color for incoming or lime for outgoing).
Neutron alarms are frequently resolved by a quick scan of the vehicle to see if
there are still neutrons detected near the vehicle. In some occasions the
neutrons emanations were caused by the “ship effect” and, therefore, the new
measurement will not detect neutrons.(Kouzes, Siciliano, Ely, Keller, & McConn,
2008) But in our case, the Neutron Truck actually will have neutron sources on
board. The screening official will not know a priori whether it was a ship effect
measurement. But when an official measures in Secondary, he will also continue
to detect neutrons. This can cause a significant concern. The author has
observed border crossing personnel escorting vehicles in this type of situation to
a separate part of the station, which we will call the Tertiary Screening Station,
where the vehicle is kept under strict administrative control until the neutron
alarm is resolved. In the model analyst interface, the Tertiary Screening Station
is shown within the large dark gray lot with a peach colored stopping strip. In the
model, Neutron Trucks would be held in Tertiary for considerably longer times
than would be expected for Secondary. In our model, the officials will stop
vehicles for about an hour in Tertiary as opposed to 20 minutes in Secondary
stopping strip.
As we set up the model, there are a number of obvious questions which spring
up. Where would Tertiary Screening actually take place? What would really
happen in Tertiary screening? What organizations would need to be involved?
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How could we be assured that those organizations are committed to support
Tertiary Screening, especially if they have simultaneous demands on their time
elsewhere?
The first question about where Tertiary screening would take place points out
that the Country A General Services Administration, GSA-A, will have to make a
special place available for Tertiary Screening at the border crossing station. That
might require allocation of already limited space at the station. It might require
special fencing or other physical boundaries to help secure the vehicle. It might
also require a low background radiation site. A correlated question would be
whether there already was a Tertiary Screening Area at the station because of a
similar need for Non-RadNuc reasons. Some border stations already have large
x-ray stations that can radiograph an entire tractor trailer to nonintrusively
produce an image of the cargo inside the vehicle. In that situation, provision of
the space might be simple. But for the case where there is limited space
available, this might be an obstacle.
The second question addresses the concept of operations for Tertiary Screening
for RadNuc threats. Possibilities include further examination of the information
related to the manifest, the driver, the vehicle and the shipper. Other possibilities
include slower, more complete scanning of the vehicle for better characterization
of any radiation hot spots, using higher resolution gamma detectors to look for
radioisotopes that have gamma and neutron emanations. Another possibility is a
reachback capability in which a group of experts with more advanced knowledge
of radiological and nuclear threats would review the information and provide
advice. A related question then would be which organization would provide this
reachback capability and how would we know they had an enduring commitment
to provide it? A possibility is that some official would decide that the inside of the
vehicle and its cargo should be examined physically. This would require legal
standing to open a car trunk or to open the trailer behind a truck. But that
decision would probably require first that the vehicle be examined to ensure there
was an acceptable risk that opening the trunk or trailer would result in
catastrophic results. For example, a bomb squad would travel to the border
crossing station from some nearby authority to examine the vehicle for some sort
of explosive device. We have observed that some police organizations and
some fire organizations have this capability. That possibility then raises another
set of questions. Which organization would have the responsibility (and with
what liability) to certify the vehicle safe to open? What set of agreements would
need to be in place to provide this service on a timely basis? Our assumption is
that this capability would not be needed frequently at the station and, therefore,
would not reside at the facility. But if there were situations in which this capability
would be required for three hours a day, which would be problematic. It is
possible, then, that this capability might be offered by more than one organization
in the region. In that situation, there would be a more complicated, but maybe
more reliable, set of relationships and agreements required.
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These questions add to our list of discovered questions and metrics for
consideration later in the dissertation.
Cases Investigated
Four cases were examined. The first case, Case A, represents the situation at
the border crossing before the RadNuc mission is introduced. The dynamic
situation model was made to correspond to this case by setting the discriminator
alarm levels for gammas and for neutron above any radiation level exhibited by
the trucks and cars. The model should show that traffic will flow along readily,
with some vehicles sent to Secondary to resolve paperwork or other issues not
associated with the RadNuc mission. The buildup of vehicles in Secondary
should be on the average below 5 vehicles because we have designed our
protocols to be manageable with the number of Secondary screeners on site to
handle up to 5 vehicles at one time.
The second case, Case B, shows the impacts of adding a RadNuc screening
mission onto the existing framework of mission screenings (law enforcement,
immigration, vehicle safety, vehicle registration, etc.). For Case B, the RPM
discriminators at set a level where some vehicles would set off radiation alarms
in Primary and then be sent to Secondary for resolution of RadNuc alarms. For
this case, the secondary screeners will have to be trained to use a set of
specialized equipment and to use additional protocol steps beyond those already
in place for non-RadNuc mission space. For this and other RadNuc cases, the
model has to include a Tertiary for the situations where the Secondary screeners
cannot resolve the alarms. This might occur if the instrumentation indicates the
gamma radiation profiles or neutron presence that seem out of character from
the vehicle manifests or the explanations of the drivers of the vehicles. These
situations can be difficult to adjudicate. In some cases, radiographic images of
the entire vehicle can be performed with specialized equipment and specially
trained operators. These images can help the officer to understand the
configuration of the cargo and verify it agrees with the description in the manifest
and/or the explanation given by the driver. Sometimes off site support may be
required from reachback specialists in characteristics of RadNuc threats. In
Tertiary, there may be a requirement for opening the vehicles and performing
manual inspection of the cargo. But if the vehicles and their cargo in Tertiary are
considered possible RadNuc threats, other specialists might be required to
determine whether it would be safe to open the vehicles (trailers, trucks or trunks
of cars, for example). These specialized skills generally are found in local police
or fire departments. The time to resolve alarms in Tertiary Screening can vary
widely. Our model assumes a resolution time of one hour.
The third case, Case C, examines the impact of a more aggressive application of
RadNuc screening. The discriminator settings for gamma and neutron radiation
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are set to only alarm for pretty significant gamma levels and for pretty low
neutron levels. The model should show that more vehicles would be sent to
Secondary and occasionally to Tertiary.
The fourth case, Case D, examines the effect of very aggressive application of
RadNuc screening. The discriminator settings for gammas and neutrons will be
set so that any detection of gammas or neutrons will cause the vehicles to be
sent to Secondary Inspection. We would expect enough vehicles to be sent to
Secondary to overwhelm the capacity for Secondary screeners to resolve the
alarms in reasonable time frames. The model should show that the number of
vehicles sent to Tertiary might overwhelm the capacity of the specialized teams
to adjudicate the alarms.
The summary of the conditions in Cases A through D is given in Table 5. The
results of these dynamic simulations for each of these cases will be discussed
first. Then the impacts of these results on the geopolitical constructs will be
considered. This will support our discussion of metrics for predicting the long
term efficacy of applying the RadNuc mission into this border crossing construct.
For the user interface of our updated dynamic model, we use the color coding
shown in Table 6. This will make it possible to see which types of vehicles are at
what positions at various times during the simulation. In fact, one can watch
individual vehicles as they move throughout the system during the simulation,
observing whether they pass through Primary without significant delay, have to
go to Secondary or even have to go to Tertiary Screening, as shown in Figure
23. The analyst can see how long each vehicle stays within the screening areas.
This allows us to determine the effects of changing discriminator levels of various
types of vehicles during the simulation.
We show in Figure 24 a more complete view of the analyst interface for this
updated model. On the left side of the analyst interface to the dynamic
simulation model, we have located 15 slider bars. The sliders can be moved to
change the values of fifteen parameters. The first parameter is the number of
nonradioactive trucks in the simulation set up. The second slider bar is to set the
number of nonradioactive cars. The third is the number of Lowgamma trucks
(which we have described as having the radiation levels of gamma reading of 5
for gammas, and 0 for neutrons). The fourth is the number of Medgamma trucks
(gamma reading of 10, neutron 0), and the fifth is the number of Highgamma
trucks (gamma reading of 100, neutron 0). The sixth is the number of
Cargammas (gamma reading of 100, neutron 0), and the seventh is the number
of neutron trucks (gamma reading 10, neutron 5). The eighth is the discriminator
level we use for normal screening (regulatory compliance, immigration, safety,
etc.) for traffic coming into Country A, the ninth slider bar is the discriminator level
we use for normal screening for traffic traveling from Country A into Country B.
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Table 5. Cases represent different levels of screening for RadNuc threats
Case

A

Gamma
discriminator
level
143 (>100)

Neutron
discriminator
level
7 (>5)

B

41(>10)

1

C

8 (>5)

1

D

0

0

Represents

Case where no RadNuc screening is
carried out
Lower level of RadNuc mission
screening
Medium level of RadNuc mission
screening
Very aggressive screening; any
radioactive material would result in alarm

Table 6. Color coding for dynamic simulation model layout
Feature
Border Crossing
Radiation
Detector
Secondary
Secondary
Stopping Strip
Tertiary
Tertiary Stopping
Strip

Description
Hypothetical border crossing
Radiation portal monitor station (RPM)
Secondary inspection zone
Location where secondary screening
occurs
Area where suspect vehicles failing
secondary screening are examined
Strip where model counts vehicles as
being in tertiary screening

Color on model
graphic
Red
(Blue/Sky Blue)
Light Gray
Light Green
Dark Gray
Peach

The tenth is for the discriminator level for neutrons, the eleventh is the
discriminator level for gammas. The twelfth sets the criterion for the allowable
number of vehicles in tertiary screening, the slider bar next to that is to set the
criterion for the acceptable number of vehicles in secondary screening. The two
bottom slider bars are to set the acceleration and deceleration values for the
vehicles in our simulation.
Results for Case A
In Case A, we set the discriminator levels for gammas and neutrons so high that
none of our vehicles trigger an alarm. This case could represent the situation
before the RadNuc mission would be applied to the border crossing. Since there
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will be no alarms, then the only vehicles that would be sent to Secondary would
be those that are sent there because of some other issues for which the border
crossing officers in Primary are not satisfied. The actual model settings for this
case have the discriminator setting for gamma counts at 143 and the neutron
count rate set at 7. Since in our model the highest gamma reading for any truck
or car is 100 and the highest neutron reading is 5, it is clear that there would be
no situation for which a truck or car would be sent to secondary for a RadNuc
mission for Case A. These settings are shown in the slider bar section of the
analyst interface in Figure 24.
A larger view of the part of the analyst interface showing simulated traffic at
10800 seconds is shown in Figure 25. The model shows that there are two
trucks in the outgoing Secondary, one of which is in the way out. In Figure 26,
the model shows that the number of vehicles that are in secondary screening for
incoming and outgoing both reach 3 but remain below the threshold of 5 vehicles
above which we are assuming that additional secondary screening officers would
be required. Therefore, no extra secondary screening personnel or additional
secondary space is necessary. In Figure 27, results show 4 vehicles in incoming
secondary at about 7500 seconds, but they are cleared out of Secondary by the
end of the simulation.
As we also would expect, there are no cars or trucks sent to Tertiary because
this is the case for which there is no RadNuc mission screening. It remains
empty at the highest discriminator level because the RPMs are essentially turned
off. The plot in Figure 28 below shows a value of zero for the number of vehicles
sent to Tertiary.
The number of vehicles waiting to cross the border during the simulation for Case
A is about 30 to 35 for both incoming and outgoing (for a total of 70-72), as
shown in Figure 29, or about 6 per lane for the 12 lanes. We will assume that
this level of backup is acceptable to the Customs and Border Patrol of Country A
and Country B. This seems like a reasonable assumption for a border crossing
operation that is very efficient.
In Figure 30, model results show that around 1050 incoming and 1050 outgoing
vehicles (for a total of 2100) have crossed the border in the 10,800 seconds of
simulated time (3 hours). This means that an average of about 59 vehicles per
hour will cross the border in each lane. This rate of vehicles passing through
each lane would indicate that our border crossing process is reasonably efficient
and that the concept of operations for dealing with all of the missions before
RadNuc screening is introduced does not lead to a significant delay in traffic.
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Figure 24. Analyst interface for two-dimensional dynamic simulation model for Case A
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Figure 25. Enlargement of operator interface showing traffic flow for Case
A

Figure 26. Number of vehicles in secondary screening for Case A
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Figure 27. Number of incoming vehicles in secondary screening for Case A

Figure 28. Number of vehicles sent to tertiary for Case A
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Figure 29. Number of vehicles waiting to cross the border for Case A

Figure 30. Number of vehicles that have crossed the border for Case A
76

For reference, according to the U.S. GSA, the world’s busiest Land Port of Entry
(LPOE), the San Ysidro LPOE supports 24 northbound vehicle lanes into the
United States serving more than 50,000 northbound vehicles daily. That means
they have an average of 2083 per hour crossing the border going north per hour
in each of 24 lanes, or 86 vehicles per hour per lane. According to their website,
they expect traffic to increase by 87% by 2030.(U.S. General Services
Adminstration, 2013)
In Figure 31, the model shows that 155 vehicles which have radioactive materials
in their cargo, luggage or persons have crossed the border from Country B into
Country A, and that 145 vehicles that have radioactive materials have crossed
from Country A into Country B in the 10,800 second run. That means that a total
of 300 vehicles carrying radioactive materials have crossed the border in one
direction or the other out of a total of 2120 vehicles, or about 14.15% which is
consistent with the 14.3% shown in Table 4. This indicates that our simulation
model is working well. There is a difference in the number of incoming and
outgoing radioactive vehicles. This is because of the randomness in our model
probability distribution function for the non-radioactive vehicles.
The wait times for vehicles to cross the border are shown in Figure 32. The
maximum wait times seem to be 600 to 700 seconds.
A pictorial view of the traffic showing back up in the Primary Inspections Areas
and the number of vehicles in Secondary Inspection is given in Figure 33. In the
screen shot of the model shown in Figure 33, the number of cars backing up in
the lanes is shown to vary from lane to lane. The interface shows that are only 2
vehicles remaining in the incoming secondary after 3 hours. One is a car and the
other is a truck.
As expected, there are no vehicles in Tertiary screening, as shown in Figure 34. Figure

35 shows the number of vehicles in Secondary Screening for vehicles coming
into Country A from Country B as a function of time for Case A. Only trucks and
cars with verification issues are screened in secondary. The total reaches 3
incoming vehicles at 10000 seconds. Since we have set our threshold at 5
vehicles in Secondary before additional manpower would be required, our model
indicates that the screening protocols are adequate up to this point.
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Figure 31. Number of radioactive vehicles that have crossed the border for
Case A
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Figure 32. Wait time of vehicles crossing the border for Case A

Figure 33. Expanded view of screen shot for Case A showing traffic flows
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Figure 34. Number of vehicles in Tertiary Screening for Case A.

Figure 35. Number of vehicles in Secondary Screening for Case A

Results for Case B
In this second case, Case B, the impacts of adding a RadNuc screening mission
onto the existing framework of mission screenings (law enforcement,
immigration, vehicle safety, vehicle registration, etc.) will be examined. For Case
B, the RPM discriminators are set at a level where we would expect to see that
some vehicles would set off radiation alarms in Primary and then be sent to
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Secondary for resolution of RadNuc alarms. The gamma discriminator level was
set at 41 and the neutron discriminator level at 1, as shown in the analyst
operator interface in Figure 36. At these settings, the Highgamma trucks
(gamma level set at 100) and Neutron trucks (neutron level set at 5) would be
detected, interdicted and sent to the Secondary. For this case, the secondary
screeners will have to be trained to use a set of specialized equipment and to
use additional protocol steps beyond those already in place for non-RadNuc
mission space.
The model may now begin to show what happens when the Secondary
screeners cannot resolve the alarms. This might occur if the instrumentation
indicates gamma radiation profiles or neutron presence that seem out of
character from the vehicle manifests or the explanations of the drivers of the
vehicles. These situations can be difficult to adjudicate. They may require
specialists in RadNuc threats understanding and characterization. In Tertiary,
there may be a requirement for opening the vehicles and performing manual
inspection of the cargo. But if the vehicles and their cargo in Tertiary are
considered possible RadNuc threats, other specialists might be required to
determine whether it would be safe to open the vehicles (trailers, trucks or trunks
of cars, for example). These specialized skills generally are found in local police
or fire departments. The time to resolve alarms in Tertiary Screening can vary
widely. For our model, we assume a resolution time of one hour.

Figure 36. Analyst interface for two-dimensional dynamic simulation model
for Case B
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In Figure 37, the model results show that in this case, Case B, even though we
have set the discriminators for gammas at 41 and for neutrons at 1, the number
of vehicles coming from Country B into Country A sent to Secondary (Incoming
only shown in the figure 38), reaches 7 and the number for traffic going from
Country A to Country B reaches 4. The graph shows that the dynamic model
calculates that the Outgoing secondary never reaches the threshold of 5 vehicles
and the Incoming surpasses that threshold criterion at 1200 seconds. In our
model, the criterion is that once there are 5 vehicles in secondary screening, then
Secondary has reached the limit of the capability to resolve the alarms.
Therefore, the model will assume that another secondary screening officer will
have to be brought on board for each shift. If we assume that the border
operates 24 hours per day, then that would mean adding at least three screening
officers, each of which would have to have training on RadNuc missions. This
training would have to be provided and financed by the geopolitical structure. In
our model, we assume the CBP-A (and corresponding CBP-B) would provide the
officers, the initial training and provide refreshed training over the foreseeable
future.
In Figures 39 and 40 results show that some vehicles are sent to the Tertiary
area. They are present there from 2000 – 4000 seconds and 6000 – 10800
seconds. Within our geopolitical construct the model assumptions are that the
Tertiary Inspection Screening area is where:
a. vehicles will be held under tighter administrative control by CBP-A,
b. special inspection capabilities like full vehicle radiography might be used
by CBP-A,
c. specialists (like bomb squad technicians from CityA1 police department or
Township A or Township B or fire department) will determine whether the
truck or car can be inspected manually,
d. those manual inspections would occur by CBP-A or perhaps the FBI-A
(requiring opening of truck or trailer containers) and opening of car trunks,
opening of packages, and
e. further manual inspections might occur by CBP-A or perhaps the FBI-A.
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Figure 37. Number of vehicles in secondary screening for Case B

Figure 38. Number of incoming vehicles in secondary screening for Case B
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Figure 39. Number of vehicles in tertiary screening for Case B

Figure 40. Number of vehicles in incoming tertiary screening for Case B

Figure 41 shows that the number of vehicles waiting to cross the border during
the simulation for Case B is about 30 to 35 for both incoming an outgoing, or
about 6 per lane for the 12 lanes, much like in Case A. We will assume that this
level of backup is acceptable to the Customs and Border Patrol of Country A and
Country B. This seems like a reasonable assumption.
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In Figure 42 the model shows that about 2050 vehicles cross the border, a little bit

less than for Case A (2100), in which we did not screen for vehicles with
radioactive materials, because fewer vehicles are sent to Secondary. This
means that if we only look for vehicles with very high rates of gamma emissions
and/or any measurable neutron emissions, we would not expect to see much
effect on the total number of vehicles crossing the border. But we would need
need to add some space and skills to resolve alarms in a Tertiary.
Results shown in Figure 43 are that around 170 radioactive vehicles cross the
border in Case B because of the high gamma and neutron discriminator settings.
Figure 44 shows that the wait times for vehicles crossing the border reaches a
maximum of about 630 seconds, but on the average is about 100 seconds for
both incoming and outgoing vehicles. Results indicate that this least aggressive
level of screening for radioactive materials does have some effect on wait times
in our model, especially for the maximum wait time.

Figure 41. Number of vehicles waiting to cross the border in Case
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Figure 42. Number of vehicles that have crossed the border in Case B

Figure 43. Number of radioactive vehicles that have crossed the border for
Case B
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Figure 44. Wait times of vehicles crossing the border for Case B

Results for Case C
The third case, Case C, models the impact of a more aggressive application of
RadNuc screening. The discriminator settings for gamma and neutron radiation
are set to only alarm for pretty significant gamma levels and any of our vehicles
emitting neutrons. We would expect that more vehicles would be sent to
Secondary Inspection and occasionally to Tertiary Inspection.
The analyst interface for the two-dimensional simulation model for Case C is
shown in Figure 45. Results in Figure 46 are that the number of vehicles sent to
Secondary exceeds our criterion of 5 quickly. In Figure 47, the model shows that
the number of vehicles in incoming Secondary first exceeds the threshold around
800 seconds. The number varies from 3 to 7 during the simulation.
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Figure 45. Analyst interface for two-dimensional dynamic simulation model
for Case C

Figure 46. Number of vehicles in secondary screening for Case C
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Figure 47. Number of incoming vehicles in secondary screening for Case C

The number of vehicles in tertiary screening is shown in Figure 48. Generally the
number in incoming tertiary varies from 0 to 1, as does the number in outgoing
tertiary. In Figure 49 there is no more than one vehicle in incoming tertiary
screening.

Figure 48. Number of vehicles in tertiary screening for Case C
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Figure 49. Number of incoming vehicles in tertiary screening for Case C

The number of vehicles waiting to cross the border is about 30 in each of the
outgoing and incoming cases, as shown in Figure 50. The number of vehicles
crossing the border is about 2000 cars in Case C, with about the same number of
incoming and outgoing, as shown in Figure 51

Figure 50. Number of vehicles waiting to cross the border in Case C
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Figure 51. Number of vehicles that have crossed the border in Case C

Figure 52 shows that around 100 total radioactive vehicles crossed the border in
this case. All low gammas crossed without being screened to Secondary (two
incoming and two outgoing), plus around 10 medium or high gammas as well as
any neutrons that cleared secondary in time to cross the border.
The average wait time to cross the border for case C is about 150 seconds, with
a maximum of about 550 seconds, as shown in Figure 53.
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Figure 52. Number of radioactive vehicles that have crossed the border in
Case C

Figure 53. Wait times of vehicles crossing the border for Case C
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Figure 54. Expanded view of screen shot for Case C showing traffic flows

The analyst interface, shown Figure 54 above, displays an enlarged view of the
traffic simulation. At 10800 seconds, there are 5 vehicles in the incoming
Secondary and 6 in the outgoing Secondary. There is one truck in the outgoing
Tertiary and one car just leaving the incoming Tertiary.
Results for Case D
The fourth case, Case D, models the impact of very aggressive application of
RadNuc screening. The discriminator settings for gammas and neutrons were
set so that any detection of gammas or neutrons will cause the vehicles to be
sent to Secondary. Expectations are that enough vehicles would be sent to
Secondary to overwhelm the capacity for Secondary screeners to resolve the
alarms in reasonable time frames. The number of vehicles sent to Tertiary would
be expected to overwhelm the capacity of the specialized teams to adjudicate the
alarms. The analyst interface for the two-dimensional simulation model for Case
D is shown in Figure 55.
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Figure 55. Analyst interface for two-dimensional dynamic simulation model
for Case D

An enlargement of the operator interface to show visually the backup of vehicles
at 10800 seconds is shown in Figure 56. We can see here there are 9 vehicles
in the incoming Secondary and 8 vehicles in the outgoing Secondary.

Figure 56 Dynamic simulation model of traffic backup for Case D

In Figure 57, the graph shows that extra personnel would become necessary

almost immediately. Both incoming and outgoing traffic piled up in Secondary
and the issue would not resolve for several hours even if no more cars entered
secondary.
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Figure 57. Number of vehicles waiting in secondary for Case D

A view of the number of vehicles in the incoming Secondary only is shown in
Figure 58. The number of vehicles in Secondary will overwhelm the screening
resources beginning at about 300 seconds and continue to do so.

Figure 58. Number of incoming vehicles in secondary screening

Figure 59 and Figure 60 show that the number of vehicles in Tertiary screening is 1 for
incoming and outgoing vehicles. The number of vehicles waiting to cross the border

is shown in Figure 61.
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Figure 59. Number of vehicles in tertiary screening for Case D

Figure 60. Total number of vehicles in tertiary screening for Case D
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Figure 61. Number of vehicles waiting to cross the border in Case D

The total number of vehicles that have crossed the border in 3 hours is around
1900 or 633/hr, as shown in Figure 62. Figure 63 shows that almost no
radioactive vehicles cross the border. Around 10 vehicles were able to clear
secondary in time to cross the border in three hours (10800 seconds).
The maximum wait times reached 553 seconds for vehicles that did not go
through secondary, as shown in Figure 64. The average wait time was around
150 seconds.
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Figure 62. Number of vehicles that have crossed the border in Case D

Figure 63. Number of radioactive vehicles that have crossed the border in
Case D
98

Figure 64. Wait times of vehicles crossing the border for Case D
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Developed Model of Geopolitical Structure and Examined Effects
of RadNuc Mission Addition
The construction of the hypothetical concept of operations for the border crossing
showed that there would be state, regional and local organizations on which the
mission would depend. There would be a need for the State A Highway Patrol to
agree to chase down vehicles that might run through the border crossing after an
alarm at the Primary Screening Station. It is reasonable to assume that this
provision already is made under an existing memorandum of agreement for other
situations involving a driver that would refuse to stop at the border. This
situation, however, would be more complicated because the vehicle might
contain a radiological or nuclear threat. There might need to be a provision in the
memorandum about how to handle that concern. We would expect to see
sections in any memorandum of agreement and in the concept of operations
covering this situation.
It is also possible that the local Sheriff Department or Police Department would
get involved in the interdiction and arrest. In our isometric model of the border
crossing station, there is an icon to represent the presence of a local police car.
The icon could represent the Highway Patrol, Sheriff’s Department or Police
Department presence. For the situation in which there is criminal activity related
to radiological or nuclear materials at our hypothetical border crossing, the
Metropolitan Area MA1 police department (in our case) will be responsible for
escorting the driver, passengers and/or vehicle to their headquarters – unless a
threat is suspected or found in the vehicle. In the case of a found threat, then the
vehicle may be escorted by an FBI or military representative to a secure location
removed from populations centers. There would need to be a memorandum of
agreement among these organizations articulating which of them will be
responsible for these special cases. These cases also should be covered in a
regional concept of operations.
In the case of criminal behavior, the local District Attorney’s office would be
involved. For the case of radiological and nuclear materials, a District Attorney
with the most relevant capability might have agreed to take the case. If a
radiological or nuclear weapon was found or suspected, federal assets would be
called in after the local officials had secured the situation. In our large
metropolitan area, an Information Fusion Center will have been established and
will communicate with the State A Information Fusion Center about the vehicle,
driver and cargo to see if there is any more information relevant to the situation
that might help the border crossing officials or the local law enforcement officials
assess the situation. These considerations are reflected in Table 7 below.
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Table 7. Additional stakeholders derived from analysis of model
Highway Sheriff
Patrol
State A
Metro
Area
MA1
City A1
County
A1
County
A2
Township
A
Township
B
National
Guard

Police
Dept.

Fire
Dept.

Safety
Dept.

District
Attorney

X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Military
Guard

X
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Information
Fusion
Center
X
X

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION OF METRICS

Systems Engineering, Requirements and Metrics for Enduring
Mission Success
If we assume that there is a for need continuing participation by all of the relevant
organizations in all of the relevant jurisdictions throughout the region, then there
would be a need to develop enduring consensus and commitments around goals,
objectives, requirements and expectations. However, these attributes are not
stand alone, but rather they will exist in a pool of other previous agreements and
commitments. Furthermore, consensus may erode due to changing perspectives
and/or pressures on resources. Our system for detection, interdiction and
response to radiological and nuclear threats will need to blend into the existing
system of systems in the region. This is a typical systems engineering problem
in which interface requirements become very important. For example, the
systems engineer will need to determine how much of what kind of information
can be shared at what speed under what conditions between the systems within
the information fusion centers of Country A and B, States A1 and B1, and the city
CYA1.
Techniques for development of consensus goals, objectives and requirements
are well known by systems engineers, especially for new systems. At this level
the focus generally is on increasing the probability of threat detection and
interdiction assuming certain levels of efficacy for the equipment to be provided.
Plans and budgets are built around providing enough equipment to provide
coverage of likely pathways for threat introduction and for the training of the
personnel who would man the equipment and respond to threat indications.
For this case of adding functionality to an existing system of systems, the basic
systems engineering constructs still seem applicable. More emphasis needs to
be placed on interface requirements and on impacts on the existing
infrastructure, like power requirements, data storage capabilities, information
fusion capabilities, space availability for equipment, manpower ceilings of state
and local organizations, modifications to training modules, and modifications to
existing concepts of operations.
When the additional mission cuts across multiple state, local, and federal
jurisdictions, the problem is more complicated. There will be many competing
priorities. The outlying counties in State A1 may not feel as threatened as
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City CYA1, and, therefore, feel that less priority should be put on low probability
high consequence events. The systems engineer cannot force a commitment
from these partners, but will need to understand and plan for what the partners
will pledge to provide.
When an additional mission execution requires international coordination (as in
our example), then another level of complexity is introduced. Country B may be
more interested in protecting its citizens from threats traveling into their country
from Country A than they are interested in detecting threats moving into Country
A. Agreements will need to be in place to support building of plans, protocols
and budgets for effective partnering between Countries A and B.
The metrics to support planning of a program to add or increase a radiological
and nuclear threat mission of a region should include those factors that are
important to enduring mission success. Another factor that should be considered
is the degree to which this mission and the activities necessary to support it are
symbiotic with other missions at the international, national, regional and local
levels. If the new mission is viewed as part of an larger set of missions important
to the security of a broad base of stakeholders as well as providing benefits
locally, then the prospects for continuing willingness to accept this mission
probably will increase. This chapter discusses the types of metrics that will be
helpful in planning and assessing this type of program.
Different perceptions around increase in security from radiological and
nuclear threats
Development of requirements for an integrated system should take into account
all the perspectives of the partners in the enterprise. Many partners are more
interested in increasing overall security from every day threats than low
probability high consequence events. Examples might be businessmen, police
officers, district attorneys. An official within the Country A Department of
Homeland Security, the Country A Environmental Protection Agency, the Country
A Department of Health or the Country A Environmental Protection agency may
define security in terms that also include low probability but very high
consequence events. The public at large may define security in absolute terms,
wanting the government to provide total protection from any threat. Security
professionals might define security in relative terms, knowing that security may
never be absolute.
The funding available to the planner may be applicable only to a particular type of
security problem. The Country A Department of Homeland Security mission has
funding available primarily for detection and interdicting radiological and nuclear
threats, but not for recovery from a detonation of such a threat. Nor does it have
funds available for dealing with chemical or biological threats or natural disasters.
The Country A Federal Emergency Management Agency does not have funding
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for detection and interdiction, but has funds applicable to preparedness and
response/recovery from almost any kind of disaster. The Country A
Environmental Protection Agency, the Country A Transportation Security
Administration, the Country A Department of Agriculture, and the Country A
Department of Justice all have different missions that give their planners different
perspectives around the definition of security.
These differences in perspective and restrictions within the appropriations and
budget processes frequently lead to a compartmentalization of security missions.
With this compartmentalization may come a compartmentalization of goals,
objectives, and requirements. Especially in the example where multinational,
multi-state and multi-jurisdictional authorities will be involved in execution of the
mission, there is a need to establish requirements and metrics that meet the new
mission needs while also continuing to meet the pre-existing mission needs of all
the partners. There may be two opposing forces, then. One force is the drive to
keep planning simple, controllable and easy to measure (compartmentalized).
Another possible competing force is to develop systems that support the existing
missions within the region while enabling the new functionalities of the
radiological and nuclear missions. This would require the articulation of broader
consensus of goals, objective and requirements and associated metrics.

Strategic Goals and Questions
A set of strategic goals were developed for this hypothetical enterprise. Then a
set of strategic questions were developed that will help articulate metrics
important for assessment of overall efficacy.
Strategic goals
The first strategic goal would be to establish a new worthwhile mission of
detection and interdiction of radiological and nuclear threats at the hypothetical
border crossing.
The second strategic goal would be to provide enduring support to this new
mission at the border crossing station.
The third strategic goal would be to bring support to the international, national
and regional missions and associated initiatives that affect or are affected by
RadNuc screening operations related to the border crossing without doing any
unacceptable harm to any of those missions.
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Strategic questions
Related to strategic goal for a worthwhile mission, what is the process used by
whom to judge the effectiveness of the mission and with what results?
Related to the strategic goal about enduring support, are adequate plans put into
place for organizations to continue to support this mission and at what levels?
Related to the strategic goal for bringing support to other missions affected by
this RadNuc mission, how will which organizations ensure that this mission is
symbiotic with the other international, national, state and local missions that
affect or are affected by operations related to the border crossing?

Development of Supporting Questions
The development of the next level of questions to expand our understanding of
the efficacy of the addition of RadNuc screening to the border crossing station is
accompanied by a discussion of some related metrics. For each strategic
question, a set of supporting questions is developed.
Is the new mission worthwhile?
The exploration of the questions as to whether the new mission will be
worthwhile leads to suggestions for more detailed questions that will provide
insight into the process and the metrics used to answer this question. The first
supporting set of questions is related to the ability of this new mission to provide
deterrence of radiological and nuclear threats. As our literature survey shows,
this set of instruments, protocols and trained officers will not, even in the best of
circumstances, be expected to be able to detect and interdict every type of threat
100% of the time. However, the very presence of the mission capabilities at the
border crossing station is expected to add another layer of difficulty for the
adversary to consider when contemplating an attack. This will provide some
degree of deterrence. A next set of questions would be concerned with what
fraction of the RadNuc threat space does the RadNuc screening operations have
to detect and interdict RadNuc threats. To detect the threats, a level of
discrimination will have to be used sufficient to provide sensitivity to the presence
of the threat. But we have seen from our dynamic simulation model results that
as we increase the sensitivity to gamma and neutron radiation, there will be
consequences in terms of traffic backup and in terms of number of Secondary
screening personnel. The literature clearly shows that as traffic backs up and the
amount of trade going through the border crossing decreases, there are serious
concerns about associated costs. We also saw that in some cases, a Tertiary
screening capability would be needed, with likely support from national level
assets for reachback and for local bomb squad support. It is certainly probable
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that as the level of detection increases, then the number of arrests might
increase, with an attendant increase in case loads for investigation and
prosecution.
From the diagrams showing the broad range of agencies that would be involved
or affected, it seems clear that there would likely be a large group of
stakeholders. When we consider that businesses and trade activities will be
affected, and that their commodities shipped across the border will cause alarms,
it becomes clear that they will in some way be stakeholders. Considering that
people crossing the border in private cars will be affected by traffic slowdowns,
occasionally get stopped because of radioactive materials in their bodies from
medical test and procedures, and also have to deal with reminders of their
vulnerability to radiological and nuclear threats, leads to the conclusion that the
public affected by the border crossing also will be stakeholders. As the benefits
and costs associated with this mission are considered, there will be a need to
define a broad set of stakeholders for whom we want to assess the benefits and
costs (and the willingness to pay the costs or accept other considerations).
As we consider the costs, we will want to ask how the costs will be controlled.
The first requirement will be to examine the full range of costs to the stakeholders
identified. An examination will also consider how costs could be lowered by
leveraging assets already available in the region. Benchmarking of similar
mission stand up and operations will help ensure that costs are reasonable.
There will need to be a well detailed and reviewed procurement plan including
provisions for requisite training and maintenance (including spare parts
management).
Beyond the consideration of cost, stakeholders will ask whether the system will
work to meet the expectations. Included in this line of reasoning will be
questions about what fraction of the threat space is covered by the innate
capacity of the equipment, whether the staff has the requisite training to use the
equipment, whether there are adequate concepts of operations, and whether
there is adequate supporting reachback and response staff to resolve the alarms
and respond to incidents of illicit transport (or threats). Associated with whether
the system will work are considerations around readiness of the equipment and
the staff. With respect to readiness, there will be questions about the
commitment of the requisite staff to actually operate and respond to the
equipment.
From these considerations, supporting questions around deterrence and fraction
of threat space addressed are:
1. Given the limitations of the RadNuc screening mission that may exist, is
there a consensus on the level of deterrence provided versus that
needed? We would look for metrics related to the level of deterrence the
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presence of this mission activity at the border would provide. In the
literature, we have not found a widely accepted set of metrics on this
subject. In fact, there is a difficult question around who should make that
evaluation. It could be made at a local level, but since this system might
be part of one layer in a multi-layer RadNuc architecture, then the
evaluation might need to include the perspectives of national (and perhaps
international) partners. Furthermore, since discussions around this type of
metric might be considered sensitive and not open for public discussion,
there is a question about how to discuss deterrence at a high level in a
way to gain broad support by the people and organizations likely to pay
the costs of delays in transit at the border crossing. While getting multiparty agreement on the level of deterrence would be difficult, we would
expect to see an acknowledgement that some aspect of worthiness of the
enterprise should be discussed with respect to deterrence. The most
valuable metric then is likely the most difficult to obtain. To support our
approach, we still need to articulate the metrics most likely related to
deterrence. Related metrics are:
–

A broad enduring consensus of the definition of deterrence

–

A broad enduring consensus on the definition of deterrence of the
Radnuc threat

–

A broad enduring consensus on the level of deterrence of the
RadNuc threat that is worthwhile

–

A consensus among the agencies associated with the border
crossing of the level of deterrence achievable at an acceptable
cost.

2. When we developed the diagrams showing the large list of agencies
whose missions would include, support or affect our new RadNuc mission,
we pointed out that many of these would be stakeholders for the mission.
We also noted that the public and businesses affected by the border
crossing operations would be stakeholders. The exact number and types
of stakeholders will vary from location to location. The question here is
whether the appropriate stakeholders have been identified. Related
metrics will be
–

The presence and quality of a reviewed consensus document
acknowledging the stakeholders and describing how they have
been considered in the planning for, the execution of and the
assessment of the prospects for the success of the mission. These
stakeholders may come from international, national, regional and
local considerations. The stakeholders will also include
representatives of the regional public.

–

The presence and quality of a document that articulates the
benefits and costs to all of the stakeholders that will:
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–

–

 Derive benefit from the mission
 Be affected by the mission
 Affect the mission as they execute their other missions
Documentation recording committee formation to discuss ways to
increase benefits and decrease or compensate costs to all of the
stakeholders.
Documentation showing agreements among the stakeholders on
how costs and benefits are assessed. This is likely to be a difficult
metric because of the wide range of interests and goals of the
stakeholders.

3. Has there been sufficient activity to elevate awareness of the threat, of the
approach to counter the threat and of the expected consequences of the
approach? Increasing public awareness is a way to help stakeholders find
a rationale to accept the cost of the system, the cost of the deployment
operations and the cost to trade and to convenience would seem to be
one way to establish a pathway for getting their buy-in of the mission.
Related metrics would include:
– The number of times the mission is discussed in the popular
regional press
– Frequency of popular media showing delay times at the border
crossing before and those predicted after installation of the mission
screening operations
– Number of workshops held to brief community leaders on the
nature of the threat, on non-threat sources of radiation, on detection
methods, on operational considerations, and on expected costs to
trade and convenience
– Number and quality of advanced training courses and workshops in
law enforcement and emergency response communities
– Number and fraction of relevant district attorneys and judges have
been briefed on the initiative
– Documentation identifying necessary legal points of contact
relevant to RadNuc mission actions
– Quality of communication to support the medical community. This
would include raising their awareness around the intensity of
radiation emitted from patients receiving diagnostic tests or
treatments that result in radioisotopes residing in the bodies of
patients. This also would include supporting the medical
community in explaining to the patients that they might cause
alarms in the detection systems at our border crossing. An
associated metric would be the fraction of these patients who would
have access to documentation to carry with them in case
documenting why they would have elevated radiation levels for a
certain period of time.
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4. What portion of the RadNuc threat space can be addressed by the
equipment utilized? Under the proposed operational protocols, how much
of that space will be covered? Related metrics include:
– Types of equipment purchased for Primary, Secondary and Tertiary
screening stations
– Types of equipment purchased to support communications within
the station and to regional or national information fusion centers
– Test results giving the probability of detecting various threat types
for the RPMs in the presence of the nuisance alarms expected
– Test results giving the probability of resolving the threats in
Secondary screening
– Modeling results that estimate the effects of varying conditions, like
traffic speed, weather conditions, temperature changes on the
ability to detect threats and resolve alarms
5. How does the lead agency assure readiness of the equipment, the
operations personnel and support services? Related metrics include:
– Failure modes and effects of the various system components, like
detectors, communication systems, displays, procedures
– Calibration plans and reports
– Data related to quality assurance of the measurements systems
– Effectiveness of training
– Trainee knowledge scores following initial and refresher training
courses
– Fraction of trainees demonstrably capable of executing RadNuc
screening duties
– Evaluation scores during drills and other exercises.
6. How well does this RadNuc mission deployment at the border crossing
support the Country A’s overarching missions related to radiological and
nuclear materials? Country A will have broader missions related to
radiological and nuclear materials. Some of these missions will include
ensuring the transport of these materials along the federal highways is
done in a controlled and safe manner, ensuring that all attempts to import
or export these types of materials is authorized, participation in
international agreements to control and interdict the unauthorized
production, storage and trade of these types of materials. Related metrics
are:
– The presence of written and reviewed documents (or set of
documents) articulating how this mission of screening at the border
crossing supports these broader missions related to radiological
and nuclear materials.
– The presence of a reviewed plan to continue to upgrade the level of
support as technology and methodology advances. Examples
would include agreements to support the operational evaluation of
these advancing technologies in detection, communication and
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information fusion. Other examples would include evaluation of
more integrated concepts of operation as the mission gets a
broader footprint.
7. What is the likely rate of encounter with normally occurring radiological
and nuclear material? We have seen in the literature that there are many
types of NORM that can cause alarms. What effect will this rate of
interaction have on operations at the border crossing station? Related
metrics are:
– Types and quantities of commodities expected to flow through the
border crossing
– Types of packaging and packing that might change the levels of the
radiation reaching the RPMs from these commodities
– Predictions of frequency of nuisance alarms in primary screening
as a function of detection settings for gammas and for neutrons.
8. As was discussed in previous Chapters, the response to a NORM alarm
might require a Tertiary screening which might require specialized
capabilities (like bomb squads from regional and local police stations or
fire stations). Related metrics are:
– The predicted times for responses by these special capabilities
– The expected minimum and maximum times for resolution
– The variation inability to respond depending on frequency of
request, and other factors like regional fires, weather conditions,
and public events
– Documentation (like Memoranda of Agreements or some other
documentation) describing the commitments among these
organizations to provide timely, certified support to the border
crossing station.
9. Are there documented concept of operations and reachback protocols?
Are they benchmarked against some other installation regarded as
successful? Are they being implemented? Are they being tested with red
team exercises and/or drills? If so, what are the results? Related metrics
include:
– The presence of a signed regional concept of operations (ConOps),
detailing the roles, responsibilities and protocols for all the principal
partners.
– How frequently the basic concept of operations is tested. This
would involve testing of actions taken by the primary screening
station upon the presence of an alarm. Does the operator send the
vehicle to secondary under physical control? Is the concept of
operation for secondary followed?
– How frequently the complete concept of operations is tested. This
would include the operation of secondary and tertiary screening as
well as reachback and bomb squad support. Since this type of
operation generally involves cooperation between multiple
organizations in more than one jurisdiction and since we expect the
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occurrence of radiological and nuclear threats to be low in
frequency, we might expect the concept of operations to be less
familiar to the personnel whose daily attention is placed elsewhere.
– The response time to adjudicate alarms during the more frequent
detection of normally occurring small quantities of radiological and
nuclear materials being transported throughout the region in the
course of normal business activities.
10. What is the level of commitment to this RadNuc screening mission by the
people at the border crossing station, and by the people who have to
respond from off site? Metrics related to level of commitment may be
difficult to develop and measure. Related metrics include:
– The types and amount of additional equipment they have to operate
– The types and amount of additional equipment they have to
maintain
– The degree of additional concept of operations responsibilities they
have to train for and execute
– The degree that these personnel feel that the changes brought
about by the RadNuc mission enables them to perform their jobs
more or less effectively
– The degree to which they have confidence in the equipment to
detect things they care about
– The degree to which they are likely to turn off the equipment or
ignore alarms.
11. What is the appropriate level of information sharing to support this new
mission requirement? Radiological and nuclear threats can be
transported throughout a region very quickly. To improve the likelihood of
detecting the movement of these threats, a region can use data and
information fusion centers. Relevant metrics include:
– The presence and use of information fusion centers for collecting,
analyzing and sharing information that might be relevant to all sorts
of criminal activity, and relevant to situational awareness for natural
disasters, like fires, floods, earthquakes, severe storms, etc.
– Memoranda of agreements among the institutions (international,
national, state, regional) which would have or want this data. We
expect this to be a difficult metric because information that is
aggregated up to sensitive or classified levels will have restrictions
on distribution. This information is also likely to contain personal
information that will need to be controlled, like driver’s license
information, passport data and arrest records,
– The partners might have to decide how to share threat information,
situational awareness reports, and readiness levels
– Ability to get timely and sufficient information to the users
throughout the region, as demonstrated in exercises.
12. What will be the cost of the equipment? This will include purchase price,
installation cost, maintenance cost for an acceptable frequency of
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maintenance, and cost of spare parts. We expect that some metrics in this
area will be easy to capture. They would include publicly available budget
projections and reports related to:
– Capital and annual support costs for each equipment type
– Routine calibration, maintenance and repair costs
– Average cost to equip and train each type of equipment operator.
13. What will be the cost to the other agencies not directly related to this
mission but affected because of it? Obtaining an answer to this question
might be difficult because these organizations will be accustomed to
accounting nomenclature and information clustering and cost tracking
around the missions for which they have lead responsibility. Related
metrics are:
– The annual cost for each relevant organization to execute and
support the new or increased mission
– Cost of red team exercises and/or drills for each participating
organization.
14. What space will be required for this RadNuc screening operation? Will a
Tertiary screening station be required, and is there space to accommodate
that need? Related metrics include:
– The presence and quality of a space utilization plan showing how
the space required for this mission fits into the overall space
management strategy
– The presence and quality of a plan to provide special needs for
Tertiary screening, where the vehicle should be placed under
stricter control, access by others should be controlled, special
equipment will be used.
15. How are RadNuc equipment types/models for procurement selected?
Related metrics are:
– Presence of a committee responsible for selection of equipment for
the RadNuc mission. The members of this committee should
include representatives knowledgeable about current and planned
the infrastructure at the border crossing station.
– Committee members are familiar with testing of the RadNuc
equipment in accordance with expected operating requirements
(power quality, power cycles, temperature, vibration, moisture,
wind, ground currents, thermal shock, dropping, snow, rain,
temperatures, radiofrequency spectrum, time required to start up
after operational upsets).
– Reference to benchmarking performance with similar equipment
used in other locations.
16. Does procurement of the equipment follow a procurement plan approved
at the appropriate levels? Related metrics include:
– Clarity of description of source of funding (federal, state, and/or
local agencies)
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Clarity around which organization will be responsible for the first
purchase of equipment, and then which organizations will continue
to buy equipment as needed
– Degree of consideration of standardization of equipment throughout
Country A, or at least in DHS-A
– The presence and quality of a plan reviewed by competent experts,
supported by modeling and simulation that establishes the number
and types of equipment needed
– The level of understanding by the authorizers of the procurement
around the mission requirements and at some level the technical
basis for the equipment selection
– The level of consideration of the long term requirements for
maintenance and spare parts, and spare instruments
– The quality of adequate conditioned space for storage of the
equipment, including spare parts
– The presence and quality of an analysis around whether the
procurement plan helps or hurts the prospects of any of the other
missions relevant to the border crossing
– Clarity of the acceptance requirements for procured equipment.
17. How well is the procurement plan being followed? We would expect to
see:
– Evidence that the acceptance tests were performed in accordance
with the plan
– Documented results of testing
– Evidence of communication of the results to the appropriate people
– Data showing how much of the equipment was found to be
unacceptable and why.
18. Is there a maintenance plan for the long term maintenance of the
equipment, reviewed by the appropriate authorities? Related metrics
include:
– The presence and quality of a written and reviewed maintenance
plan that details how the equipment will be maintained: by
individual agencies, by a regional capability, and/or by vendors
– Inclusion of the costs of this maintenance plan in the estimated
procurement and operating costs
– Degree to which the maintenance planning addresses the
equipment of all of the agencies which will support the mission.
19. Are the costs incorporated into an overall business model that also
includes the costs of impact of the screening? Related metrics include:
– Quality of a business model
– Discussion of cost expectations related to impact on flow of
commerce through the border crossing
– Revenue generation from fines and tariffs
– Costs of additional caseloads associated with arrests
–
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Presence of periodic updates to validate or improve business
model.
20. Does this mission leverage existing capabilities in the region for detection
and interdiction of RadNuc threats? These capabilities might include
equipment (like handheld radioisotope identifiers, radiation pagers, and
calibration sources), protocols (like protocols used by police or emergency
management organizations dealing with hazardous materials), training (for
dealing with suspicious cargo or vehicles) and legal constructs (right to
stop, detain, arrest suspicious vehicles or persons)? To what degree does
this mission application use these existing resources to control costs to
lower or control costs? Related metrics will include:
– Type and numbers of equipment
– Documentation of training and certifications for hazardous materials
characterization, handling, examination, especially radiological and
nuclear
– Number and quality of existing protocols and procedures for
response to radiological situations (spills, orphaned sources)
– Type and number of exercises and drills in the country, state and
region applicable to the RadNuc mission operational envelope
– Number and type of emergency responders within each agency in
the region.
21. What approach was taken (e.g. seminars, workshops, meeting, etc.) to
establish a common understanding of the RadNuc mission among partner
agency representatives (e.g., the nature of the threat, detection methods,
etc.)? Which agency leaders participated in these efforts? Related
metrics include:
– Types and numbers of their planned workshops, seminars for
RadNuc reachback operations
– Types and numbers of drills to reinforce learning and test skill
levels and protocol efficacy
– Types and numbers of agency leadership participation in drills.
–

How will the mission endure?
The literature showed that that there are many new security related initiatives
being placed onto border crossing operations. In some cases funding is provided
for initial startup and initial operations of security missions but there may be an
expectation that the mission will be integrated into border crossing operations in
a manner that continuing funding from the originating agency for the mission will
stop or at least be reduced as time goes on. A further challenge is that the
RadNuc screening mission can be viewed as looking for a threat that hopefully
will never occur. That means that for an entire career, a border crossing official
will be dealing with nuisance alarms and may never see an actual threat, all the
while having to execute his other mission responsibilities. This is exacerbated by
the fact that, as we saw in the literature, he may be evaluated by the amount of
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goods he processes or the amount of violations of regulations he detects. His
management may not have a mechanism to get any revenue from this RadNuc
screening operation. As we saw from the literature, in some countries, a
significant part of their budget comes from tariffs and fines at border crossings.
In the case of RadNuc screening, there may have to be some sort of revenue
generating paradigm.
Another challenge is that the public may get tired of paying the cost in terms of
delays in vehicle crossings, in terms of increased costs of goods that have to be
screened, and in terms of societal costs of being reminded about their
vulnerability to radiological or nuclear terrorism.
Supporting questions related to whether the mission will endure are:
1. Is there a championing organization in the region for the mission and for
the application of the mission to the border crossing? Related metrics
include:
– Level of advocacy publicly through the press
– Level of advocacy at planning meetings among the stakeholders.
2. How will an enduring awareness of the need for the RadNuc mission be
established? As metrics, we might expect to see:
– Scores from public opinion polls around whether the cost
(financial as well as societal) is reasonable for the threats
– Number of threat awareness, detection, interdiction and
response workshops held
– Number of press/media releases
– Presence of and participation in citizen engagement programs
for radiological and nuclear security
– Quality of a plan to establish and maintain a sound legal basis
for detection and interdiction.
3. How is this mission regarded in Country B, in other countries, in other
states and regions? Is the threat continuing to be viewed as credible?
4. How will political support in Country A be maintained? Related metrics
include:
– The number and fraction of appropriate officials briefed
– Number and fraction of strong partnerships with international,
national, regional, state and local organizations associated or
affected by the mission.
5. What levels of legal support are required, and how will that support be
sustained? Related metrics include:
– The quality of a plan to establish and maintain a sound legal
basis for detection and interdiction.
– The number and fraction of appropriate district attorneys and
judges briefed.
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6. Has the lead agency implemented a transition plan and sustainment
concept to provide the ability to maintain operational capabilities? Related
metrics include:
– The presence and quality of an approved plan for long term
operations
– The presence in the budgets of other agencies of the necessary
funding to fully support the mission long term as necessary
– A sustainable consensus between partners over the multiple
years required to develop and solidify an effective regional
capability
– Presence and quality of a clear business model for the RadNuc
mission in the region
– Evidence that the agencies involved or affected have a clear
understanding of the transition plan for the operations to go from
startup to multi-year term continuous operation.
7. How will the lead agency engender an enduring commitment by the
personnel to continue to use the appropriate detection equipment and do
so in a manner aligned with the agreed upon concept of operations?
When the mission is new and there may be some excitement about the
new equipment and new relationships associated with the concept of
operations, then the level of commitment might be high. However, if there
are several nuisance alarms that take time away from other activities the
personnel normally do, then that might lead to an erosion of commitment.
In our case, we want to protect the metropolitan area MA1 From which we
would expect many of the staff to come. But if the staff feels the threat is
really to areas outside their circle of interest, they also might have an
erosion of commitment. Related metrics include:
– The presence and quality of a written and reviewed plan to
maintain commitment.
– Results of benchmarking for maintaining commitment in similar
mission spaces
– The presence and quality of a methodology to assess
commitment, including a discussion of best practices in other
similar low mission spaces
– Documentation discussing quality of commitment during
refresher training
– Demonstrated capabilities of personnel in red teaming exercises.
8. Does a plan for sufficient continuing training beyond first operation include
all of the agencies and personnel necessary to support the RadNuc
mission? Is the planning being followed? Related metrics include:
– Number and type of training courses for each agency
– An assessment of the quality of the training around the concepts
of operations training
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Availability of additional complementary specialized training
(hazardous materials, responder operations, tactical operations,
response, FBI-A training on handling suspected or actual threats
of different types, and vendor training)
– Written and budget authorized plans for requalification of
personnel involved in scanning, especially in Secondary, in
Tertiary and in reachback operations
– Availability and use of refresher training and/or requalification
– Frequency of updates to the training plan
– Degree to which training costs are controlled, minimized and
judged reasonable by the agencies and the individual
participants.
9. How many additional personnel need to be trained for each agency as a
result of this additional mission? We would expect to see analyses of the
impact on other agencies affected by the new mission.
10. What drills and other exercises are planned/performed that include the
border crossing station? Related metrics include:
– How many personnel from each partner agency participated in
each?
– Is participant performance quantified as part of these exercises?
If so, how, and with what results?
– What is the number and quality of after action reports?
11. Is there evidence of taking stock about what seems to be working well and
what does not work well regarding inter-agency coordination? We would
expect to see:
a. Committee meetings for the purpose of discussion around interagency coordination issues and approaches for optimization.
12. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the RadNuc screening mission
program and the program structure? What could be done better? Related
metrics are:
– Transparency of structure
– Transparency of decision-making processes
– Clarity of long range view
– Continuing assessment of costs of the mission application
– Continuing assessment of the benefits, including the difference
the mission is making relative to regional security (expected
benefits would include improved technologies and integrated
concepts of operations resulting in increased detection of other
regulatory compliance transgressions)
– Long term collection of data in accordance with a written plan on
the subjects of alarms, calibration results, equipment issues,
noncompliance with concepts of operations. This metric may be
difficult because we would expect that agencies and personnel
will be reluctant to share operational issues.
–
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13. Are lessons learned from other benchmarking locations being
communicated and utilized? We would expect to see metrics around
benchmarking activity and how lessons learned are being considered in
revisions to planning.
14. How important is standardization in this mission space for this application?
To what degree is standardization being explored, planned, executed and
evaluated? Standardization could apply to the equipment, the types of
personnel, training, maintenance, and concepts of operations, standards
of operations and accounting and assessment of the mission. Related
metrics include:
– Establishment and use of standardized equipment configurations
and detection parameter settings. We expect that
standardization in this area would simplify and make more
effective activities including training, planning for and analysis of
exercises, the adjudication of alarms and maintenance of
equipment, and acquisition of spare parts.
15. How well is the concept of operations being followed and how
effective is it? Does it contain steps that can be eliminated,
streamlined, improved? Are there additional steps that would make
the mission space more effective? To what degree is the concept of
operations seen as reasonable and well integrated? Related metrics
include:
– The degree of standardization within the concept of operations
– The degree to which the concept of operations is being followed
– The degree to which the concept of operations is aligned with the
region, the state and international best practices
– The degree to which the concept of operations is aligned with
training, equipment procurement, reporting, evidentiary data
gathering
– The number of times the concept of operations is not followed,
the reasons why and any consequences
– The quality of the concept of operations as viewed by the
operating personnel, the reachback support, local law
enforcement and the trainers
– The quality of the concept of operations as seen by the
remaining stakeholders
– The presence of a committee or other group to review and
assess the concept of operations, including the incorporation of
lessons learned from drills and red team exercises and results of
benchmarking with similar mission deployments at other
locations.
16. How well are lessons learned from drills, red team exercises and normal
operations being utilized? Related metrics are:
– A documented formal process/plan to capture lessons learned
from each workshop, drill, and exercise
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Lessons learned from drills and exercises are captured in afteraction reports and briefings from the exercises.
– The presence of a formal process for reporting of learnings from
normal operation and how much it is being used.
17. How effective is the sharing of lessons learned to the appropriate
stakeholders? Related metrics will be:
– Number and quality of reviewed reports documenting lessons
learned
– Presence and quality of reviewed periodic summaries of lessons
learned
– Number and quality of meetings to brief lessons learned to
stakeholders
– Presence and quality of web addressable resources for
reviewing or adding lessons learned.
18. What legal/jurisdictional/inter-agency issues were identified as part of
STC? Related metrics are:
– To what extent were the Country A Attorney/District Attorney
Offices were involved in developing the mission
– To what level they remain committed to the mission
– Comparison between what they expected to happen and what
has happened
– The quality of the experience with issues around the necessity
for probable cause, reasonable suspicion, search and seizure,
as well help in obtaining search warrants relative to the RadNuc
mission.
–

Is the new RadNuc mission symbiotic with the other international, national,
state and local missions?
We have made the point that this RadNuc screening mission will have to be
integrated into an existing set of missions at the border crossing. We should also
point out that the missions already being executed at the border crossing are part
of a broader national (and probably international) set of mission responsibilities.
Just as those missions extant at our border crossing should be integrated into a
larger strategic security plan, so should this new RadNuc screening mission.
Advantages are that there more likely will be support from the other mission
resources, like sharing of information technology infrastructure, sharing of space,
and willingness to integrate concepts of operations including interdiction and
response. In terms of willingness to accept costs among the agencies, a
symbiotic relationship would be expected to be a positive.
Supporting questions around this question of symbiosis are:
1. How are the international, national, regional and local partnerships created
to support this RadNuc screening initiative and how have the partners
embraced the mission as evidenced by developing tactics, techniques and
119

procedures that will help achieve the overall enterprise goals? Related
metrics include:
– The presence and quality of multiagency committees that
address the full scope of missions related to trade facilitation,
regulatory compliance, security at all levels, regional and local
governmental operations and public perception and impact and
how this RadNuc mission is related
– Frequency of documented meetings of these committees
– Level of representation of the partner delegates at these
meetings
– Written plan assessing effectiveness with respect to this mission
– of the partnerships and the likelihood of continuing them
– Written description of the RadNuc mission program metrics and
the level of acceptance by these partners
– Level of agreement among the partners on how mission
performance will be measured and what data will need to be
collected to enable the measurement
– Amount and quality of data collected as planned
– Level of involvement with international stakeholders affected by
this mission.
2. Are the costs of this new mission characterized by each stakeholder and
acceptable to those agencies that are affected at the local, national and
international levels? Related metrics include:
– Presence and quality of written and reviewed analyses of
financial and other costs to each organization
– Documentation of meetings discussing these costs, ways to
control them, ways to reduce them in the future, and ways to
compensate for them.
3. Are the benefits to each stakeholder characterized and accepted by
relevant representatives of the stakeholder? Related metrics include:
– Presence and quality of written and reviewed analyses of
benefits to each organization
– Documentation of meetings discussing these benefits, ways to
continue or increase them
– Evidence of success in maintain or improving benefits to
stakeholders in a way that does not cause uncompensated loss
to others.
4. To what degree is the equipment to be used for RadNuc screening
compatible with the equipment being used in related activities like law
enforcement, customs compliance checks, safety checks, reachback and
emergency management? Related metrics include:
– Evidence of committees continuing to work toward better
integration of equipment used at the border crossing station.
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5. How compatible are the concepts of operations for RadNuc screening with
the concepts of operation for the other missions at the border crossing?
Related metrics include:
– Evidence of committees continuing to work toward better
integration of the operations used at the border crossing station.
6. Does the RadNuc mission positively or negatively impact the ability to
execute other law enforcement missions? Related metrics include:
– Written analysis of increase or decrease in arrests, fines, tariffs
at the border crossing not related to the RadNuc mission
– Written analysis of an increase or decrease in personnel
required at the border crossing and in the region caused by the
RadNuc mission.
7. What is the quality of commitment by the partners to support this
increased mission space in the region (especially at the border crossing)?
We would look for evidence a significant dialogue around the increase in
mission space and how it was bringing various levels of cost and benefits
to the partners. Related metrics include:
– The presence of relevant high level strategic goals in the
strategic plans of all of the partners,
– Inclusions of the new mission space into the existing mission
statements of all of the partners,
– Budget and appropriations processes for each of the partners to
support the new mission
– Evidence of a strong consensus needed between the lead
agency and the relevant partners on programmatic goals and
objectives, timelines and metrics.
8. Have the partners established and committed to a governance structure
that includes this new mission? If a threat is detected but not interdicted in
one part of the region, will the authorities in another part of the region
interdict it? Will the legal framework support this type of interdiction
throughout the region? Metrics that might be applicable include
– Establishment of necessary regional committees and
subcommittees
– Number and fraction of relevant state and local government
agencies/representatives involved
– Number and fraction of relevant federal agencies/officials
involved
– Number and fraction of needed cooperative agreements signed
– Requisite number and frequency of committee, subcommittee
meetings
– Presence of a signed regional ConOps
– Degree of participation in region-wide red team exercises around
the new mission space.
9. Are there partnerships with other international, federal, and state and local
organizations that are mutually beneficial? For example, federal and state
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and local emergency management organizations might want to share
equipment requirements development processes. They also might want
to provide mutual procurement activities. Furthermore, planning for
response to and recovery from the detonation of a radiological or nuclear
threat should include many of the resources that will be used in the
detection and interdiction phases. Related metrics include:
– Agreements around what types of information could be shared
with which organizations in the event of a detonation
– Signed memoranda of understanding about information sharing
– Presence of signed protocols to support these memoranda
– Presence in the information sharing software architecture to
support the protocols
– Presence of effective integrated planning teams to continually
assess and advocate improvements in architectural elements of
the combined mission space.
From these considerations, then, an interesting set of metrics related to planning
and management of the RadNuc mission can be developed for our hypothetical
border crossing station.
A summary of the metrics derived in the report is shown here. The list will be
followed by a series of tables describing how the values of some of these metrics
can be found. Other metrics will prove difficult to measure or obtain.
Unfortunately they are the ones most valuable in determining the efficacy of our
enterprise.
1. Deterrence metrics
– Consensus definition of deterrence
– Consensus definition of deterrence of the Radnuc threat
– Consensus on the level of deterrence of the RadNuc threat that is
worthwhile
– Consensus on level of deterrence achievable at an acceptable cost
– Actual deterrence effect on adversaries
2. Stakeholder planning commitment metrics
– Presence of a championing organization in the region
– Level of advocacy for the mission
– Degree of involvement by stakeholders in planning
– Consensus on benefits and costs to all deriving benefit
– Consensus on benefits and costs to all affected by the mission
– Committee to discuss ways to increase benefits and decrease or
compensate costs to all of the stakeholders.
– Consensus on how costs and benefits are assessed
– Number of jurisdictions involved
– Results of benchmarking commitment plans in other similar mission
spaces
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3. RadNuc awareness metrics
– Frequency of press coverage
– Fraction of informed press coverage
– Frequency of popular media comparing effects of RadNuc mission
compared to predictions (delay times, costs, arrests)
– Number of workshops held to brief community leaders
– Number and quality of advanced training courses and workshops in
law enforcement and emergency response communities
– Fraction of relevant district attorneys and judges have briefed
– Availability of relevant legal points of contact
– Quality of communication to support the medical community.
– Fraction of these patients with documentation about radioisotopes from
medical procedures
– Presence of and participation by citizen engagement programs
– Number and fraction of authorized source holders briefed/provided
– Scores from public opinion polls around whether the cost
(financial as well as societal) is reasonable for the threats
– Presence of and participation in citizen engagement programs
for radiological and nuclear security
– Quality of a plan to establish and maintain a sound legal basis
for detection and interdiction
4. Coverage of threat space metrics
– Types of equipment purchased for screening stations
– Types of equipment purchased to support communications
– Test results giving the probability of detecting threats in Primary
– Test results giving the probability of resolving the threats in Secondary
– Test results giving the probability of resolving the threats in Tertiary
– Modeling results that show systems capability under varying
conditions
– Modeling results showing probability of encountering threat quantity
materials
5. Readiness metrics
– Consideration of system component failure modes and effects
– Quality of calibration plans
– Data related to quality assurance of the measurements systems
– Effectiveness of training
– Trainee knowledge scores following initial and refresher training
courses
– Fraction of trainees capable of executing RadNuc duties
– Evaluation scores during drills and other exercises
– Number of emergency responders initially trained for each course
– Refresher training frequency
– Percentage of emergency responders trained for each partner agency
– Number/frequency of discussion-based exercises (seminars,
workshops, tabletops)
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Number/frequency of operations-based exercises (functional, drills, full
scale)
– Level of partner agency participation in each exercise
– Training and exercise participant feedback metrics
– Number and type of training courses for each agency
– An assessment of the quality of the training around the concepts
of operations training
– Availability of additional complementary specialized training (
– Written and budget authorized plans for requalification of
personnel involved in scanning
– Availability and use of refresher training and/or requalification
– Frequency of updates to the training plan
– Degree to which training costs are controlled, minimized and
judged reasonable
Support to Country A’s overarching missions metrics
– Consensus on how screening at the border crossing supports broader
radiological and nuclear missions.
– Agreements to support the operational evaluation of advancing
technologies in detection, communication and information fusion at
border crossing
– Agreements on evaluation of more integrated concepts of operation at
the border crossing as the mission gets a broader footprint.
Rate of threat material encounter metrics
– Types and quantities of commodities expected g
– Types of packaging and packing that might alter radiation levels
– Predictions of frequency of nuisance alarms from NORM
Commitment for Tertiary screening support
– The predicted times for responses by requisite special capabilities
– The expected minimum and maximum times for resolution of alerts
– The variation in ability to respond depending on frequency of request,
and other factors like regional fires, weather conditions, and public
events
– Documentation of commitments to provide timely, certified support
Concept of operations and reachback metrics
– Benchmarked against some other installation regarded as successful
– Degree of implementation
– Presence of a signed regional concept of operations (ConOps)
– Frequent validation of integrated concept of operations
– Frequent validation of reachback and bomb squad support. operations
– Response time to adjudicate alarms in Secondary and Tertiary
– The degree of standardization within the concept of operations
– The degree to which the concept of operations is being followed
– The degree to which the concept of operations is aligned with the
region, the state and international best practices
–

6.

7.

8.

9.
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The degree to which the concept of operations is aligned with
training, equipment procurement, reporting, evidentiary data
gathering
– The number of times the concept of operations is not followed,
the reasons why and any consequences
– The quality of the concept of operations as viewed by the
operating personnel, the reachback support, local law
enforcement and the trainers
– The quality of the concept of operations as seen by the
remaining stakeholders
– Continuing assessment of concept of operations
10. Operations impact at border crossing metrics
– The types and amount of additional equipment to operate
– The types and amount of additional equipment to maintain
– The degree of additional concept of operations responsibilities
– The degree that personnel feel that the changes enable them to
perform their jobs more or less effectively
– The degree to which they have confidence in the equipment
– The degree to which they are likely to turn off the equipment or ignore
alarms
– Delays in passenger vehicles caused by RadNuc screening mission
– Delays in commercial vehicles caused by RadNuc screening mission
– Impact of delays on just-in-time trade
– Number of safety events at border crossing caused by RadNuc
screening operations
– Quality of the experience as public go through screening
11. Information sharing metrics
– The presence and use of information fusion centers
– Agreements among relevant institutions (international, national, state,
regional) to provide and share data.
– Agreement on how to share threat information and situational
awareness reports
– Ability to get timely and sufficient information to the users throughout
the region, as demonstrated in exercises
12. Cost of the equipment metrics
– Capital and annual support costs for each equipment type
– Routine calibration, maintenance and repair costs
– Average cost to equip and train each type of equipment operator.
13. Cost to other agencies metrics
– Annual cost for each relevant organization to support the mission
– Cost of red team exercises and/or drills for each organization
14. Space requirements metrics
– Space utilization plan showing how mission fits
– Plan to provide special needs for Tertiary screening
15. Procurement metrics
–
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Qualified procurement committee responsible for selection of
equipment
– Reference to benchmarking performance with similar equipment
– Clarity of description of source of funding (federal, state, and/or
local agencies)
– Clarity around which organization will be responsible each phase
of procurement
– Modeling and simulation that establishes the number and types
of equipment needed
– Level of understanding by the authorizers of the procurement
around the mission requirements
– Level of understanding of technical basis for the equipment
selection
– Quality of long term planning for for maintenance and spare
parts, and spare instruments
– Quality of adequate conditioned space for storage of the
equipment, including spare parts
– Analysis around whether the procurement plan helps or hurts the
prospects of any of the other missions relevant to the border
crossing
– Clarity of the acceptance requirements for procured equipment
– Evidence that the acceptance tests were performed per plan
– Documented results of testing communicated to appropriate
people
– Data showing how much of the equipment failed acceptance
tests
16. Maintenance planning metrics
– The presence and quality of a written and reviewed maintenance
plan that details how the equipment will be maintained: by
individual agencies, by a regional capability, and/or by vendors
– Inclusion of the costs of this maintenance plan in the estimated
procurement and operating costs
– Degree to which the maintenance planning addresses the
equipment of all of the agencies which will support the mission
17. Leverage of existing capabilities metrics
– Type and numbers of existing equipment
– Existing training and certifications for hazardous materials
characterization, handling, examination, especially radiological
and nuclear
– Number and quality of existing protocols and procedures for
response to radiological situations (spills, orphaned sources)
– Type and number of exercises and drills in the country, state and
region applicable to the RadNuc mission operational envelope
– Number and type of emergency responders within each agency
18. Partnership-related metrics
–
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Number and fraction of relevant State A and local government
agencies/representatives involved
– Number and fraction of relevant Country A agencies/officials
involved
– Number and fraction of needed cooperative
agreements/MOUs/MOAs signed
– Frequency of committee, subcommittee and other related
meetings
– Time/effort required to develop and finalize ConOps; revision
frequency
– Number and fraction of needed agency-specific standard
operating procedures in place; revision frequency
– Types and numbers of drills to reinforce learning and test skill
levels and protocol efficacy
– Types and numbers of agency leadership participation in drills
19. External viewpoint metrics
– Value of the mission as viewed by relevant international
organizations
– Alignment with international security missions
– Alignment with Country A security missions
20. Quality of Operations metrics
– Number of jurisdictions involved in screening, interdiction, response
– Number of people involved
– Consistency of operations
– Operational characteristics of portal monitors and other fixed detectors
– Frequency of alarms
– Causes of alarms
– Number and fraction of alerts referred to secondary screening, tertiary
screening
– Response times for primary detection, secondary screening, tertiary
screening, technical reachback
– Operational difficulties in escorting and controlling alarming vehicles to
secondary and then to tertiary screening (when necessary)
– Results of analysis of alarm adjudication/resolution results (categories,
outcomes, etc.)
– Results of analysis of number/frequency of missed alarms (red
teaming, exercises, known calibration sources)
–

Further Categorization of Metrics
In this section the following general questions are addressed as they pertain to
the proposed metrics for regional nuclear security upgrades. These questions
ask:
(1) From what sources are particular data for metrics obtained?, and
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(2) What methodologies are most applicable to obtaining the data?
Understanding how to categorize the metrics and their data helps us determine
the best means for gathering the necessary data. No one organization collects
or stores all the data for a particular metric, partly because the scale of the data
must be taken into account and understanding the scope of the data is
necessary. There exist different organizations that store data at the federal,
state, and local levels; thus, it would be incorrect to focus on any one specific
organization from which to obtain a particular subset of metric data.
Three broad principal metric types may be categorized in this study: financial
metrics, operational metrics, and performance metrics. Generally, financial
metrics help determine the cost-benefits of the program, operational metrics
describe how an organization or agency conducts itself within the context of a
larger system, and performance metrics aid us in understanding the
effectiveness of the program implementation.
Alternatively, some metrics do not lend themselves well to categorization under
these three types because their data are more specific. They fit best within
categories tailored to their role within the mission space. Some of these metrics
will be available within the public sphere of knowledge through organizations
such as the Country A Transportation Security Administration (TSA-A),
Department of Transportation (DOT-A), and Department of Homeland Security
(DHS-A), while others will be more difficult to obtain due to their sensitivity.
These metrics are categorized into groups that are defined based on the needs
of the proposed mission space.
Both static and dynamic data will exist. Generally, static data includes
infrastructure data such as border crossing layout and facilities, roadways and
waterways into and out of a region or cost data for equipment and facilities.
Dynamic data is that which changes with time such as traffic flow, commodity
profile data for a region or response times to threat alerts. Time-in-motion data is
a form of dynamic data that may be used for operational assessments. This
particular data type is useful, for example, for determining the best changes to
the existing organizational structure in order to increase the efficacy and
effectiveness of the RadNuc mission. For much of the metrics, however, the
designation is provided or assumed that the data collected will consist of an
“initial” assessment.

Financial Metrics
The implementation and increase in mission space can be a financial burden on
a government or agency or businesses, and financial metrics are used to
calculate direct and indirect costs. Measuring the costs against the estimated
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overall benefit of the new mission space allows an agency to determine the
effectiveness of the program. Ultimately, this information will help an agency
decide the degree of implementation available for the new program.
Financial metrics generally include metrics dealing with cash flow, including
spending and earnings. In an assessment, we would analyze financial metrics
such as equipment repair costs, costs of training exercises, and cost/benefit data
regarding impacts to commerce in a region. Any piece of data which provides
insight into how money is managed within an organization is applicable under
this category. These metrics are important to the stakeholders of the mission,
especially those who make decisions of whether or not to fund particular projects
under the sustained mission.
Mostly, the data for financial metrics already exist in some form. Some of this
data like equipment costs and warranties may come from the manufacturer or an
insurance agency. Other data such as costs for training each type of RadNuc
operator may come from those conducting the training, the agencies being
trained, or both. Furthermore, data necessary for determining the total cost for
each agency to execute and sustain the missions will come from a variety of
public and agency specific sources and may even need to be synthesized from
multiple metrics and data.

Operational Metrics
Operational metrics mostly concern the utilization of resources within each
agency. They track the dynamics of each organization and how they are linked
to other organizations. Metrics which address the operational level may include
the “number of something” on the agency level, such as number and type of
equipment owned and maintained and number of emergency responders who
undergo RadNuc training. They may also include regional level metrics such as
number of roadways/waterways near the border crossing or into or out of a
region and the number of vehicles using these roadways. Some of this data
such as number of roadways into and out of a region may be obtained simply by
analyzing a current map of the region. Others, such as number and type of traffic
across these roadways, will need to be acquired from Department of
Transportation (DOT-A) databases and state and local transportation agency
sources.
To help measure how agencies are linked within the existing architecture, metrics
dealing with information sharing may fall under this category as well. These
include the number of interconnected regional fusion centers, number of shared
“lessons learned” incident reports, and community-of-interest feedback and
inquired. The metrics involving information sharing help determine the level of
interconnectedness between agencies and also the appropriate behaviors a
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particular agency should undertake in a variety of situations. For instance, when
a threat is detected, what level of information may one agency share with another
or, when a known threat crosses into another agency’s jurisdiction, what process
is required for an agency to either continue pursuing the threat or pass along the
pursuit. The data for these metrics are likely to be sensitive in nature since they
include specific details on how each agency and how the integrated mission
operates and thus may not be available in the public domain. Because of this,
close cooperation with agencies will need to be established in order to obtain the
necessary data for these metrics.

Performance Metrics
Some metrics assess how well an organization performs against a set of criteria.
These performance metrics may focus on how well an organization performs
against itself. For instance, during an in-house upgrade, a before and after
performance snapshot may be taken to determine the effectiveness of the
upgrade. Under this category fall metrics such as knowledge scores from before
and after training courses and probability of detection of various types of threats
before and after equipment upgrades. Other performance metrics may focus on
how well an organization performs against a critical success factor, in our case
defeating a radiological or nuclear threat. “Red cell” results and data from threat
alerts would be used to assess the performance of an organization versus
multiple threat types and a variety of threat pathways. Benchmarking also
provides a source of data. These metrics could then be used to modify the
mission to improve the effectiveness of the organization at combating these
threats.
Data for these metrics may be obtained from a full spectrum of sources, some
public and others agency specific. Even still, due to the nature of performance
metrics, some data would need to be obtained through more sensitive channels.
This is because these data may be used to outline capabilities and weaknesses
and could be used by an enemy to negatively impact the agency or mission.

Data Sources for Metrics
Surveys
One approach to data collection consists of surveys. These surveys may be
questionnaires or polls, which serve to determine key data on any scale whether
it is at a regional or local level. They must focus on the metrics they collect data
for due to the difficulty in follow-up questions to clarify responses.
Questionnaires may be automated, freeing up time for later analysis. One must
keep in mind, however, that while questionnaire type surveys are relatively
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simply to generate and collect, they may receive a small response from the
population of interest. Further time would need to be spent to determine if this
level of response is sufficient for the purposes of our study. Data for metrics that
involve the public stakeholder (public, press, decision and policy makers, etc.)
support and acceptance for the increase in mission space may be collected using
questionnaires and polls. Furthermore, individual agency data and statistics may
be obtained through the use of questionnaires.
Interviews/Expert panels
Other types of surveys include interviews and expert panels. These surveys are
not as scalable as questionnaires and are more time intensive. They may
require large amounts of resources and represent narrow viewpoints. However,
when facing a complex issue, direct input from those involved on a day-to-day
basis helps collect valuable information. While raw quantitative data may not be
obtained from an interview or expert panel, other useful information may be
recorded.
Government/Agency maintained databases
Empirical data may be obtained from databases maintained by the government
and local supporting agencies. The data found here are generally highly
credible. Some databases may contain information sensitive in nature and thus
data collection from them may be difficult. These databases may contain data
that are both static and dynamic, which would affect data collection methods.

Suggested Data Sources for Various Metrics
Country A Transportation Security Administration (TSA-A)
The TSA-A collects and assesses transportation security data for the entire
Country A. Much of this data includes infrastructure data and usage data for the
many threat pathways relevant to by our RadNuc mission. Some of the
information is sensitive such as training information and threat procedures for
security personnel in the transportation field. Also collected may be technology
data that relates to security. Crucial to an assessment of regional security, this
may include efficiency data and detection rates for portal monitors and other
radiation detectors.
Metrics for which data may be collected from TSA-A databases include test
results giving probability of detecting various threat types for each detector type,
response data to alerts including alarm adjudication/resolution results, causes of
alerts, and frequency of alerts. Much of the data relating to national security may
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be sensitive in nature, and estimation may be required to determine data for
certain metrics.
Country A Department of Homeland Security (DHS-A)
The DHS-A collects and provides data and statistics from multiple response
layers of the nuclear detection architecture. These response layers address
emergency planning and recovery, infrastructure protection, and threat mapping
for regional police, fire, and emergency teams. While possibly sensitive, this
data would be essential in determine numerous metrics such as number and
frequency of missed and incorrectly handled alerts, “red cell” results, and
operating characteristics of portal monitors and other fixed detectors.
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource (CIKR) data may be laid over the
foundational maps. These may include data associated with law enforcement
facilities, commercial facilities, emergency services, healthcare and public health
centers, and regional and local government facilities. Metrics for which data may
be collected using DHS-A databases and these tools include mapping regional
jurisdictions of emergency and medical response agencies and estimating
response times for interdiction of detected threats. Included would be metrics
dealing with roadways along with traffic data for these pathways.
Country A Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA-A)
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA-A) is part of the DHS-A.
In developing an integrated regional RadNuc security plan, data from FEMA-A
would aid in determining the level of interoperability among the existing
emergency organizations. Furthermore, data for metrics such as the degree of
collaboration on the existing emergency response infrastructure, number and
types of benefits to state, local, and federal emergency responders, and number
and fraction of current standard operating procedures (SOP) for emergency
threats are available from FEMA-A. This information would help determine the
overall quality of information sharing and mutual benefit among organizations,
along with the overall preparedness of individual organizations and agencies to
combat a threat. Because FEMA-A develops response data to natural disasters
as well as terrorist threats, they are an ideal source for developing an integrated
model.
Country A Department of Transportation (DOT-A) and Bureau of
Transportation Statistics (BTS-A)
The Department of Transportation (DOT-A) and its organizations provide
transportation data and statistics on federal and state levels. An example of a
state level organization under the DOT is the State A Department of
Transportation (DOT-A1). These organizations maintain and provide dynamic
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volume data such as population by area or cargo through specific pathways. For
instance, volumes of commodities of different types expected to pass through our
border crossing will be included in data the DOT-A maintains. This data would
aid in developing metrics such as random encounter probability of a threat along
pathways, number/frequency/durations of vehicles and vessels patrolling region
and of surge deployments, and integration of partnerships among regions.
Equipment vendors
Individual vendors of detection equipment would need to be contacted to collect
data on specific equipment metrics. These metrics would focus on statistical
data on equipment operation characteristics and instrumentation quality control
data.
Local/Regional agencies
Local and regional agencies are expected to be a vital resource when
investigating metrics dealing with these agencies specifically. Each agency
operates differently, and because of this, specific attention will need to be
committed to each to appropriately address particular metrics. These metrics for
equipment and training purposes may include fraction of time equipment is
applied to the mission, fraction of time equipment is found to be improperly
calibrated, number and frequency of seminars, workshops, and tabletops. Other
metrics, which deal with the quality of regional partnerships, support for the
increase in mission space, and mutual benefits among agencies, include number
and fraction of agency-specific SOPs in place, number and fraction of authorized
source holders briefed/provided with “best practice” reports, and number of
signed MOAs about information sharing.
Data from these agencies may be provided by each within their own databases
or even maintained by a higher-level agency. For instance, local agencies may
provide data to district or state organizations. If not, methods such as interviews
and surveys may need to be employed in order to determine key data for specific
agencies.

Tabulated Metrics
The following three tables are simply examples of how the metrics may be
tabulated to chart the types of data they are associated with, whether the data
may change over time, and from where the data may be obtained. Under the
“source(s)” column, “agency” is listed for any metrics from which the organization
that provides the data may differ from region to region in the case of local
agencies; “agency” may also refer to multiple agencies from which the data may
be obtained.
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Table 8. Metrics associated with threat coverage and operations
Equipment costs
and associated
maintenance
Number of each type
of equipment
purchased
Number of each type
of equipment
maintained
Costs of procurement
and maintenance
Fraction of time
equipment is
available for use (fully
functional and
operational)
Fraction of time
equipment is applied
to mission
Mean time to repair
Rates of equipment
loss/upgrade/replace
ment
Causes of failure and
failure modes
Calibration frequency
for each type of
equipment
Fraction of time
equipment is found to
be improperly
calibrated
Instrumentation
quality control data
Capital, recurring
(equipment warranty),
and routine costs
(calibration,
maintenance, and
repair) for each
equipment type

Type

Static/Dynamic

Source(s)

Operational

Static

CBP-A

Operational

Static

GSA

Financial

Static

CBP-A, Vendor,
GSA

Operational

Dynamic

CBP-A

Operational

Dynamic

CBP-A

Operational

Dynamic

Vendor

Operational

Dynamic

CBP-A

Operational

Dynamic

Vendor

Operational

Static

CBP-A

Operational

Dynamic

CBP-A

Operational

Dynamic

CBP-A

Financial

Dynamic

CBP-A, Vendor,
GSA
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Table 9. Metrics associated with financial considerations
Personnel training,
perceived benefits of
training, and costs
Number of emergency
responders who undergo
initial training
Number of refresher
courses for trained
emergency responders
Number and Fraction of
emergency responders
trained within each
agency
Number and frequency of
seminars, workshops, and
tabletops
Number and frequency of
functional exercises, full
scale exercises, and drills
Feedback from training
and exercise participants
Evaluation scores during
drills and other exercises
Trainee knowledge scores
following initial and
refresher training courses
Fraction of trainees
demonstrably capable of
executing PRND duties
Costs of training
(exercises, refresher
courses, workshops,
seminars, tabletops, and
drills)
Average cost to equip and
train each type of PRND
operator (PRD, RIID,
backpack, mobile
detector, portal monitor,
fixed detectors)

Type

Static/Dynamic

Source(s)

Operational

Static

CBP-A, Training
Provider

Operational

Static

Agency, Training
Provider

Operational

Static

Agency, Training
Provider

Operational

Static

Agency, Exercise
Provider(s)

Operational

Dynamic

Agency, Exercise
Provider(s)

Performance

Dynamic

Agency, Training
Provider,
Questionnaire

Performance

Dynamic

Training Provider

Performance

Dynamic

Training Provider

Operational

Dynamic

Training Provider

Financial

Static

Agency, Training
Provider

Financial

Static

Agency, Vendor
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Table 10. Metrics associated with threat types and pathways
Coverage of threat types
and pathways
Size and fraction of the
physical area actually
covered by screening
operations
Number of lanes used at
border crossing equipped
with RPMs
Number of vehicles using
roadways
(interior/perimeter)
Fraction of trainees
demonstrably capable of
executing RadNuc duties

Type

Static/Dynamic

Source(s)

Operational

Static

GSA-A,DOT-A

Operational

Static

CBP-A

Operational

Static

DOT-A, BTS

Performance

Dynamic

Training Provider

Operational

Static

State A Highway
Patrol, MA1 Police
Department,
County Sheriff

Operational

Static

Vendor

Operational

Dynamic

Agency

Causes of alerts

Operational

Dynamic

Agency

Frequency of alerts

Operational

Dynamic

Agency

Operational

Static

CBP-A

Performance

Static

CBP-A

Performance

Dynamic

CBP-A

Performance

Dynamic

CBP-A

Performance

Dynamic

CBP-A

Performance

Dynamic

Training Provider

Number/frequency/duration
of vehicles patrolling region
and available
Operating characteristics of
portal monitors and other
fixed detectors
Number and fraction of
emergency responders
carrying detection
equipment on shifts daily

Number and fraction of
alerts referred to
secondary screening or
tertiary screening
Alarm adjudication results
(categories, outcomes,
etc.)
Number and frequency of
missed alerts
Number and frequency of
incorrectly handled alerts
Response times for
primary detection,
secondary screening, and
technical reachback
“Red teaming” results
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Table 10. Continued
Coverage of threat types
and pathways
Test results giving
probability of detecting
various threat types for
each detector type
Modeling results which
estimate the probability of
detecting threats under
varying conditions

Type

Static/Dynamic

Source(s)

Performance

Static

Vendor

Operational

Static

Vendor,
Assessment Team

Metrics requiring broader consideration, discussion and consensus
The metrics in the previous three tables can be achieved with surveys and/or just
a few meetings with single organizations. There are many important metrics,
however, that will require multi-organization discussions, probably over a
substantial length of time. In fact, in the introduction of a new mission to an
already complex environment, a phased approach is recommended. The first
phase would involve building relationships with a broad community of
stakeholders. In this phase, high level broad goals would be developed for not
only this new mission but goals that are broader that would include this new
mission. The next phase could include considerations of how the existing
architecture would have to be modified to support this broader mission – and to
support the new mission. Benchmarking of similar enterprises could be
leveraged. This phase could also include plans to transition the enterprise from
startup to sustained operation. The next steps could include phased installation
of the equipment, development of integrated concepts of operations, and
synthesis of lessons learned.
A list of some of the metrics associated with this broader planning and support
building, architecture modifications and lessons learned is shown in Table 11.
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Table 11. Broader more meaningful and difficult metrics
Broader planning and
consensus building

Type

Static/Dynamic

Deterrence provide by
RadNuc at border crossing

Benefit

Static

Optimal multi-party
cost/benefit

Value

Static

Symbiosis with other
missions in region

Value

Dynamic

Acceptable cost to trade

Cost

Static

Public support for mission

Value

Dynamic

Inclusion in strategic
planning (transition plans)

Value

Dynamic

Mission advocacy

Value

Dynamic

Quality of information
sharing

Operational

Static

Quality of regional
concepts of operation

Operational

Dynamic
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Source(s)
DHS-A, DOD-A,
FBI-A, CIA-A,
International
Country A
Agencies, regional
business,
International
business, Regional
political, Regional
and state public
representatives
Country A
agencies, Country
B agencies
Country A trade
representatives,
regional trade
representatives,
DHS-A, Regional
politicians
Federal, state and
local press,
Country B press,
regional citizen
action groups
Country A
agencies, State A
agencies, regional
trade
Regional
champion, DHS-A
DHS-A, DOD-A,
DOJ-A, DOT-A,
DEA-A, regional
politicians, regional
police, regional
justice
DHS-A, DOJ-A,
DOT-A, DEA-A,
regional law
enforcement,
public
representatives

Table 11. Continued
Broader planning and
consensus building

Type

Static/Dynamic

Benchmarking

Operational

Static

Integrated architecture

Operational

Dynamic
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Source(s)
DHS-A,
international
experts,
Department of
Commerce-A,
DOJ-A, DOT-A
Country A
Agencies, regional
business,
International
business

Summary Discussion Regarding Metrics
In a large metropolitan area, there are many organizations involved in detection
and interdiction (and prosecution) of criminal activities. There are also several
organizations involved in the planning and execution of response and recovery
from natural disasters and terrorist activities. These organizations generally have
federal, state and local connections. Frequently, there are also international
connections. Each of these organizations has an architectural construct
(whether identified or not) to support its needs (like policy development, budget
management, operations, legal, etc.) The introduction (or expansion) of the
mission of detection and interdiction of radiological and nuclear threats will add
requirements to many of these organizations. This additional burden will be
continuous. If the program designed to introduce this added functionality/burden
to the organizations with the region is compartmentalized to consider only its
near-term and limited perspective, then the metrics used to assess the quality of
the program also will be limited, and may not be representative of the attributes
necessary for sustained mission success.
If one broadens his perspective to consider how this new mission can interleave
with the missions space already existing in the region, then other metrics might
be developed. These metrics are more about the quality of partnerships,
commitment by the partners to continue to support the new missions, perception
of mutual benefit to other federal and state and local programs, and public
acceptance of the cost and societal impact of the new mission. These other
metrics are more difficult to articulate and to measure. However, the act of
constructing the consensus around the definitions of these metrics and
consensus around how to assess them is viewed by the author as very valuable.
Of course, if the application of RadNuc screening at our border crossing can
deter the adversary from trying to attack anywhere within Country A, that result
would be very beneficial. If this can be done with acceptable cost, then the
solution is nearing ideal. But the level of deterrence can only be approximated
since the mind of the adversary is not known. Nonetheless, the discussion
around how much deterrence might be provided by this border crossing
application, in concert with a layered architecture of other deterrence strategies,
would be an excellent way to improve the prospects. This is one of the
objectives espoused by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, who
proposes a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, or GNDA.(Government
Accountability Office, 2012)
The chart in Figure 65 below depicts the relationship between the difficulty in
obtaining metrics and their value to assessing overall efficacy of the new RadNuc
mission. The metric concerning direct measure of deterrence is considered as
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most difficult but most significant. At the lower left part of the chart are shown
those metrics most often discussed in the literature and in the experience of this
author. These metrics are easiest to measure. Because of the emphasis in cost
benefit ratio, they are popular since they feed easily into CBA analyses.
However, the most important costs are likely those that are not so easily
measured, like the costs to the other agencies, the costs to business and the
cost to the public. Similarly, the benefits are broadly difficult to measure, beyond
those most often mentioned in the literature – like goals associated with how
much tariff is generated, or how many arrests are made. More important benefits
would be taking the opportunity to develop a broad informed consensus on trade
facilitation with simultaneous security improvements at the border crossing.

141

High

Deterrence

Multi-party
optimal
cost/benefit

Relevance to Sustained Mission Efficacy

Regional
mission
advocacy

Reachback and
response
commitment

Quality of
regional
strategic
planning

Quality of
regional
ConOps

Public
support
for
mission
Quality of
information
sharing

Low

Acceptable
cost to
trade

International
program
alignment

Coverage
of threat
types

Number of
trained
personnel

Benefits to
other
programs

Public
awareness

Delays at
the border

Acquisition
cost
Number of
pagers
bought

Easy

Hard

Difficulty of Measurement

Figure 65. Metrics for success of RadNuc mission added to existing border
control mission space
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The author has shown a framework for assessment of the long term efficacy of
RadNuc detection systems at international land border crossings. This
framework is composed of five elements. The first element is a three
dimensional model of the border crossing to help develop strategic questions.
This three dimensional model should include perspectives showing primary,
secondary and tertiary screening locations. The second element is a two
dimensional dynamic model of the traffic flow across the border, including the
degree to which different types of vehicles might be delayed. This two
dimensional dynamic model also should include primary, secondary and tertiary
screening simulation. The third element is a model of the organizational
structure which will be necessary to implement the RadNuc mission, including its
relationship with the organizational structure already extant in the region to
support all the other missions associated with the border crossing. The fourth
element is a strategic view of how the RadNuc screening mission at the border
crossing fits into the overall global, national and regional picture. The fifth
element is an approach to develop the metrics by which one can judge the
efficacy of the overall enterprise in executing this RadNuc mission addition.
From the literature search, we have seen how several types of approaches have
been undertaken to get at the issue of assessing efficacy of border crossing
operation – even before the introduction of the additional RadNuc screening
mission. We have seen that the general conclusion is that some combination of
objective and subjective techniques might provide different perspectives that
would but supportive in the development of a holistic view of the situation.
What has been surprising to the author is that the literature discusses the
importance of getting the views of a broad collection of relevant stakeholders but
when the analysis is actually done, the collection of stakeholders becomes
relatively narrow compared to the community of stakeholders affected by the
notional policy change or mission additions. In fact, the author has concluded
that one characteristic that hampers the quality of the analysis is that the mission
statement is imprecise in spite of obvious effort to make the statement precise.
The imprecision comes from a lack of full understanding of the potential impacts
on the full range of important stakeholders. An example is the statement that we
want to examine the efficacy of the RadNuc screening mission at an international
border crossing. A better statement would be that we want to examine how the
addition of a RadNuc screening mission impacts the efficacy of the complete set
of missions and operations of the entire enterprise in contact with the border
crossing. Of course, one will want to limit the scope of any analysis. But the
author believes that a deliberative process should be developed (and reviewed)
for selection of which stakeholders might be impacted in the long run. Another
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conclusion is that the analysis should include a steady state operation (which is
what most of the literature seems to represent) but also should include unusual
conditions to determine if there is an unexpected set of stakeholders or missions
to consider. An example might be how a hurricane or a flood or a fire at the
border crossing station or an armed insurrection might affect the ability to
execute the RadNuc mission or how the RadNuc mission might affect the ability
of the enterprise to execute the planned response to these upset conditions.
The use of a static isometric view of the border crossing location and of a
dynamic simulation model helps bring to mind what if questions that will elicit
perspectives not obvious previously.
The model of the organizational structure helps one ask questions about the
quality of relationships that would be important to ensuring the long term efficacy
of the enterprise when the RadNuc mission is added to it. It makes obvious
questions about metrics like whether joint working groups have been developed,
and are still operational and effective. It raises obvious questions about who has
responsibility for what part of the mission space under differing conditions.
One of the most important conclusions, from the point of view of the author, is
that the most important metrics will be some of the most difficult to articulate to
everyone’s satisfaction, and the hardest to measure. But the dialogue around
articulating the metrics is likely to be very important in shaping a holistic view of
the enterprise in which our new mission will reside. Everyone may view the
picture through a different perspective. But everyone’s perspective likely will be
better informed because of the discussion.
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Program Code for NetLogo Model
1 g loba l s [ sample−car
2 rn ; ; Random number .
3 num−cars−secondary−incoming ; ; The t o t a l number of incoming v ehi c l e s
in the secondary screening por t ion of the model .
4 num−cars−secondary−outgoing ; ; The t o t a l number of outgoing vehi c l e s
in the secondary screening por t ion of the model .
5 tot−secondary ; ; Total number of v ehi c l e s in secondary
s c reening .
6 num−cars−incoming ; ; The t o t a l number of v ehi c l e s wai t ing
in l i n e to c ros s the border on the incoming s ide .
7 num−cars−outgoing ; ; Tht t o t a l number of v ehi c l e s waiting
in l i n e to c ros s the border on the outgoing s ide .
8 tot−wait ; ; Total number of v ehi c l e s wai t ing in
l i n e to cros s the border .
9 s−l imi t ; ; The speed limi t f o r a l l vehi c l e s .
10 s2−l imi t ; ; The lowset s tar t ing speed given to a
veh i c l e .
11 s2−upper−l imi t ; ; The upper l imi t f o r the random f l o a t
given to the speed of v ehi c l e s .
12 tot−num−cars−incoming ; ; Used in determining the number of
veh i c l e s that have crossed the border .
13 tot−num−cars−outgoing ; ; Used in determining the number of
veh i c l e s that have crossed the border .
14 tot−num−cars ; ; Total cars c ros s ing border .
15 incoming−t r a f f i c −data ; ; Used f o r l oading incoming t r a f f i c data.
16 outgoing−t r a f f i c −data ; ;
17 flowtime−data ; ;
18 f lowtime ; ; The time assoc iated with the t r a f f i c f l ow . txt data . Used to t e l l
NetLogo when to generate veh i c l e s .
19 t r a f f i c −flow−incoming ; ; Number of v ehi c l e s incoming according to Traf f
icFlow . txt (this i s cur rent ly not being used .)
20 t r a f f i c −flow−outgoing ; ; Number of vehi c l e s outgoing according
to Traf f icFlow . txt ( th i s i s cur rent ly not being used . )
21 bob ; ; Used to t e s t the random number
generator
22 d i s t r i b u t i on ; ; .
23 prob ; ;
24z ;;
25 ]
26
27 t u r t l e s −own [ speed speed−l imi t speed−min t o t a l x wait−time wait−time−i
wait−time−o ]
28
29
30 to setup
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31 c lear−a l l
32 ask patches [ setup−world ]
33 ask patches [ setup−road ]
34 ask patches [ setup−secondary ]
35 ask patches [ setup−boundary ]
36 ask patches [ setup−lane1 ]
37 setup−cars
38 setup−trucks
39 do−p l o t s
40 load−t r a f f i c −data
41 s e t t r a f f i c −flow−incoming 1
42 s e t z 0
43 ; watch sample−car
44 reset−t i c k s
45 end
46
47 to load−t r a f f i c −data
48 ; ; This procedure loads in patch data from a f i l e . The format of the
f i l e i s : pxcor
49 ; ; pycor pcolor . You can view the f i l e by opening the f i l e Fi le IO
Patch Data . txt
50 ; ; using a simple text editor . Note that i t automatical ly loads the
f i l e ” Fil e IO
51 ; ; Patch Data . txt ”. To have the user choose their own file , see load−own
−patch−data .
52
53 ; ; We check to make sure the f i l e exi s t s f i r s t
54 i f e l s e ( f i l e −e x i s t s ? ”Flowtime . txt ” )
55 [
56 ; ; We are saving the data into a l i s t , so i t only needs to be loaded
once .
57 s e t incoming−t r a f f i c −data [ ]
58
59 ; ; This opens the f i l e , so we can use i t .
60 f i l e −open ”Flowtime . txt ”
61
62 ; ; Read in a l l the data in the f i l e
63 whi le [ not file−at−end? ]
64 [
65 ; ; f i l e −read give s you va r i abl e s . In th i s case numbers .
66 ; ; We store them in a double l i s t ( ex [ [ 1 1 9.9999] [1 2 9.9999]
...
67 ; ; Each i t e rat ion we append the next three−tuple to the current
list
68 s e t incoming−t r a f f i c −data sentence incoming−t r a f f i c −data ( l i s t
f i l e −read ) ; f i l e −read f i l e −read ) )
69 ]
70
71 ; user−message ” F i l e l oading complete ! ”
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72
73 ; ; Done reading in patch information . Close the f i l e .
74 f i l e −c los e
75 ]
76 [ user−message ”There i s no Tra f f icFlow . txt f i l e in current d i r ec t ory !
”]
77
78
79 prin t incoming−t r a f f i c −data
80 end
81
82
83 to setup−world
84 ; color 63 is a dark green
85 i f ( pcolor = black ) [ set pcolor 63]
86 end
87
88 to do−p l o t s
89 c lear−plot
90 s e t di s t r ibut ion [1 997 2375 3170 3363 3302 3106 2827 2524 2162 1904
1644 1352 1163 976 842 595 534 423 376 255 257 202 141 125 91 53
72 50 37 34 28 17 11 16 12 10 5 7 3 3 3 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 0]
91 s e t prob [0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24
0.26 0.28 0.3 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.4 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.5 0.52
0.54 0.56 0.58 0.6 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.68 0.7 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.78
0.8 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1]
92 l e t m 0
93 ; set−current−plot−pen ” Dist ”
94 whi le [m < l ength di s t r ibut i on ]
95 [ plotxy item m prob item m distribution
96 s e t m m + 1]
97 end
98
99 to setup−road ; ; patch procedure
100 ; ; This i s f o r the incoming ( bottom) lane s
101 i f ( pycor < −12) and ( pycor > −19) [ s e t pcolor white ]
102 i f ( pxcor < 2) and ( pxcor > 0) and ( pycor < −12) and ( pycor > −19) [
s e t pcolor red ]
103 i f ( pxcor < 37) and ( pxcor > 35) and ( pycor < −12) and ( pycor > −19) [
s e t pcolor blue ]
104 ; ; This i s f o r the outgoing ( top ) lane s
105 i f ( pycor < 18) and ( pycor > 11) [ s e t pcolor white ]
106 i f ( pxcor < 2) and ( pxcor > 0) and ( pycor < 18) and ( pycor > 11) [ s e t
pcol o r red ]
107 i f ( pxcor < −34) and ( pxcor > −36) and ( pycor < 18) and ( pycor > 11) [
s e t pcolor 86]
108 ; ; This i s f o r changing the color of the incoming lane s be for e the
por t a l s
109 i f ( pxcor < 1 ) and (pxcor > −57) and ( pycor < −12) and ( pycor > −19)
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[ set pcolor 9.8]
110 ; ; This i s f o r changing the color of the outgoing lane s be for e the
por t a l s
111 i f ( pxcor < 57) and ( pxcor > 1) and ( pycor < 18) and ( pycor > 11) [ s e t
pcol o r 9 . 7 ]
112 end
113
114 to setup−secondary ; ; patch procedure
115 i f ( pycor < 10) and ( pycor > −11) and ( pxcor < 40) and ( pxcor > −40) [
s e t pcolor 9 ]
116 i f ( pycor < 8) and ( pycor > 6) and ( pxcor < 4) and ( pxcor > −1) [ s e t
pcol o r green ]
117 i f ( pycor < 8) and ( pycor > 6) and ( pxcor < 40) and ( pxcor > 38) [ s e t pcol o r
orange ]
118 i f ( pycor < 8) and ( pycor > 6) and ( pxcor < −37) and ( pxcor > −39) [ s e t pcolor
85 ]
119 i f ( pycor < −8) and ( pycor > −10) and ( pxcor < −37) and ( pxcor > −39) [ set pcolor
84 ]
120 i f ( pycor < −8) and ( pycor > −10) and ( pxcor < 37) and ( pxcor > 35) [ s e t pcolor
83 ]
121 ; ; Patch used f o r outgoing−secondary s c r e ening v ehi c l e s ( bottom l e f t
patch of secondary )
122 i f ( pycor < −9) and ( pycor > −11) and ( pxcor < −38) and ( pxcor > −40) [ set pcolor
87 ]
123 i f ( pycor < −9) and ( pycor > −11) and ( pxcor < 40) and ( pxcor > 38) [ s e t pcolor
88 ]
124 i f ( pycor < 8) and ( pycor > 6) and ( pxcor < −34) and ( pxcor > −36) [ s e t pcolor
64 ]
125 end
126
127 to setup−boundary ; ; patch procedure
128 i f ( pycor < −12) and ( pycor > −19) and ( pxcor > 55) and ( pxcor < 57) [ set pcolor
yellow ]
129 i f ( pycor < 18) and ( pycor > 11) and ( pxcor > −57) and ( pxcor < −55) [ set pcolor
yellow ]
130 end
131
132 to setup−lane1 ; ; patch procedure
133 ; ; lane f o r incoming ( bottom) lane s
134 i f ( pycor < −10) and ( pycor > −13) and ( pxcor < 40) and ( pxcor > 35) [s e t pcolor
white ]
135 ; ; lane f o r outoging ( top ) lanes
136 i f ( pycor < 12) and ( pycor > 9) and ( pxcor < −34) and ( pxcor > −40) [ s e t pcolor
white ]
137 end
138
139 to setup−trucks
140 i f number−of−incoming−trucks > world−width
141 [
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142 user−message (word ”There are too many trucks f o r the amount of road. Please
decrease the NUMBER−OF−TRUCKS s l i d e r to below ”
143 ( world−width + 1)
144 ” and pres s the SETUP button again . The setup has stopped . ” )
145 stop
146 ]
147 s e t s−l imi t 0.4
148 s e t s2−l imi t 0.0000001
149 s e t s2−upper−l imi t 0.3000009
150 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
151 ; ; ; This section i s used to construct 6 lanes of t r a f f i c on the INCOMING
(BOTTOM) s i d e
152 set−default−shape t u r t l e s ” truck ”
153 c r t number−of−incoming−trucks [
154 s e t color red
155 s e t xcor random−xcor
156 s e t ycor −13
157 s e t heading 90
158 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
159 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
160 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
161 s e t speed−min 0
162 s e t total 0
163 s e t x 2
164 s e t wait−time 0
165 s e t wait−time−i 0
166 separate−trucks
167 ]
168
169 c r t number−of−incoming−trucks [
170 s e t color red
171 s e t xcor random−xcor
172 s e t ycor −14
173 s e t heading 90
174 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
175 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
176 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
177 s e t speed−min 0
178 s e t total 0
179 s e t x 2
180 s e t wait−time 0
181 s e t wait−time−i 0
182 separate−trucks
183 ]
184
185 c r t number−of−incoming−trucks [
186 s e t color red
187 s e t xcor random−xcor
188 s e t ycor −15
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189 s e t heading 90
190 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
191 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
192 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
193 s e t speed−min 0
194 s e t total 0
195 s e t x 2
196 s e t wait−time 0
197 s e t wait−time−i 0
198 separate−trucks
199 ]
200
201 c r t number−of−incoming−trucks [
202 s e t color red
203 s e t xcor random−xcor
204 s e t ycor −16
205 s e t heading 90
206 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
207 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
208 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
209 s e t speed−min 0
210 s e t total 0
211 s e t x 2
212 s e t wait−time 0
213 s e t wait−time−i 0
214 separate−trucks
215 ]
216
217 c r t number−of−incoming−trucks [
218 s e t color red
219 s e t xcor random−xcor
220 s e t ycor −17
221 s e t heading 90
222 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
223 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
224 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
225 s e t speed−min 0
226 s e t total 0
227 s e t x 2
228 s e t wait−time 0
229 s e t wait−time−i 0
230 separate−trucks
231 ]
232
233 c r t number−of−incoming−trucks [
234 s e t color red
235 s e t xcor random−xcor
236 s e t ycor −18
237 s e t heading 90
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238 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
239 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
240 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
241 s e t speed−min 0
242 s e t total 0
243 s e t x 2
244 s e t wait−time 0
245 s e t wait−time−i 0
246 separate−trucks
247 ]
248
249 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
250 ; ; ; This section i s used to construct 6 lanes of t r a f f i c on the OUTGOING
(TOP) s i d e
251 c r t number−of−outgoing−trucks [
252 s e t color blue
253 s e t xcor random−xcor
254 s e t ycor 12
255 s e t heading −90
256 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
257 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
258 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
259 s e t speed−min 0
260 s e t total 0
261 s e t x 2
262 s e t wait−time 0
263 s e t wait−time−o 0
264 separate−trucks
265 ]
266
267 c r t number−of−outgoing−trucks [
268 s e t color blue
269 s e t xcor random−xcor
270 s e t ycor 13
271 s e t heading −90
272 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
273 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
274 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
275 s e t speed−min 0
276 s e t total 0
277 s e t x 2
278 s e t wait−time 0
279 s e t wait−time−o 0
280 separate−trucks
281 ]
282
283 c r t number−of−outgoing−trucks [
284 s e t color blue
285 s e t xcor random−xcor
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286 s e t ycor 14
287 s e t heading −90
288 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
289 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
290 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
291 s e t speed−min 0
292 s e t total 0
293 s e t x 2
294 s e t wait−time 0
295 s e t wait−time−o 0
296 separate−trucks
297 ]
298
299 c r t number−of−outgoing−trucks [
300 s e t color blue
301 s e t xcor random−xcor
302 s e t ycor 15
303 s e t heading −90
304 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
305 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
306 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
307 s e t speed−min 0
308 s e t total 0
309 s e t x 2
310 s e t wait−time 0
311 s e t wait−time−o 0
312 separate−trucks
313 ]
314
315 c r t number−of−outgoing−trucks [
316 s e t color blue
317 s e t xcor random−xcor
318 s e t ycor 16
319 s e t heading −90
320 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
321 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
322 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
323 s e t speed−min 0
324 s e t total 0
325 s e t x 2
326 s e t wait−time 0
327 s e t wait−time−o 0
328 separate−trucks
329 ]
330
331 c r t number−of−outgoing−trucks [
332 s e t color blue
333 s e t xcor random−xcor
334 s e t ycor 17
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335 s e t heading −90
336 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
337 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
338 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
339 s e t speed−min 0
340 s e t total 0
341 s e t x 2
342 s e t wait−time 0
343 s e t wait−time−o 0
344 separate−trucks
345 ]
346 end
347
348 to setup−cars
349 i f number−of−incoming−cars > world−width
350 [
351 user−message (word ”There are too many cars f o r the amount of road .
Please decrease the NUMBER−OF−CARS s l ide r to below ”
352 ( world−width + 1)
353 ” and press the SETUP button again . The setup has stopped . ” )
354 stop
355 ]
356 s e t s−limi t 0.4
357 s e t s2−limi t 0.000001
358 s e t s2−upper−limi t 0.3000009
359 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
360 ; ; ; This section i s used to construct 6 lanes of t r a f f i c on the INCOMING
(BOTTOM) side
361 set−default−shape t u r t l e s ” car ”
362 c r t number−of−incoming−cars [
363 set color red
364 set xcor random−xcor
365 set ycor −13
366 set heading 90
367 ; ; ; set initial speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
368 set speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
369 set speed−l imi t s−l imi t
370 set speed−min 0
371 set total 0
372 set x 2
373 set wait−time 0
374 set wait−time−i 0
375 separate−cars
376 ]
377
378 c r t number−of−incoming−cars [
379 s e t color red
380 s e t xcor random−xcor
381 s e t ycor −14
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382 s e t heading 90
383 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
384 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
385 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
386 s e t speed−min 0
387 s e t total 0
388 s e t x 2
389 s e t wait−time 0
390 s e t wait−time−i 0
391 separate−cars
392 ]
393
394 c r t number−of−incoming−cars [
395 s e t color red
396 s e t xcor random−xcor
397 s e t ycor −15
398 s e t heading 90
399 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
400 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
401 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
402 s e t speed−min 0
403 s e t total 0
404 s e t x 2
405 s e t wait−time 0
406 s e t wait−time−i 0
407 separate−cars
408 ]
409
410 c r t number−of−incoming−cars [
411 s e t color red
412 s e t xcor random−xcor
413 s e t ycor −16
414 s e t heading 90
415 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
416 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
417 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
418 s e t speed−min 0
419 s e t total 0
420 s e t x 2
421 s e t wait−time 0
422 s e t wait−time−i 0
423 separate−cars
424 ]
425
426 c r t number−of−incoming−cars [
427 s e t color red
428 s e t xcor random−xcor
429 s e t ycor −17
430 s e t heading 90
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431 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
432 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
433 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
434 s e t speed−min 0
435 s e t total 0
436 s e t x 2
437 s e t wait−time 0
438 s e t wait−time−i 0
439 separate−cars
440 ]
441
442 c r t number−of−incoming−cars [
443 s e t color red
444 s e t xcor random−xcor
445 s e t ycor −18
446 s e t heading 90
447 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
448 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
449 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
450 s e t speed−min 0
451 s e t total 0
452 s e t x 2
453 s e t wait−time 0
454 s e t wait−time−i 0
455 separate−cars
456 ]
457 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
458 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
459 ; ; ; This section i s used to construct 6 lanes of t r a f f i c on the OUTGOING
(TOP) s i d e
460 set−default−shape t u r t l e s ” car ”
461 c r t number−of−outgoing−cars [
462 s e t color blue
463 s e t xcor random−xcor
464 s e t ycor 12
465 s e t heading −90
466 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
467 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
468 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
469 s e t speed−min 0
470 s e t total 0
471 s e t x 2
472 s e t wait−time 0
473 s e t wait−time−o 0
474 separate−cars
475 ]
476
477 c r t number−of−outgoing−cars [
478 s e t color blue
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479 s e t xcor random−xcor
480 s e t ycor 13
481 s e t heading −90
482 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
483 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
484 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
485 s e t speed−min 0
486 s e t total 0
487 s e t x 2
488 s e t wait−time 0
489 s e t wait−time−o 0
490 separate−cars
491 ]
492
493 c r t number−of−outgoing−cars [
494 s e t color blue
495 s e t xcor random−xcor
496 s e t ycor 14
497 s e t heading −90
498 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
499 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
500 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
501 s e t speed−min 0
502 s e t total 0
503 s e t x 2
504 s e t wait−time 0
505 s e t wait−time−o 0
506 separate−cars
507 ]
508
509 c r t number−of−outgoing−cars [
510 s e t color blue
511 s e t xcor random−xcor
512 s e t ycor 15
513 s e t heading −90
514 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
515 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
516 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
517 s e t speed−min 0
518 s e t total 0
519 s e t x 2
520 s e t wait−time 0
521 s e t wait−time−o 0
522 separate−cars
523 ]
524
525 c r t number−of−outgoing−cars [
526 s e t color blue
527 s e t xcor random−xcor
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528 s e t ycor 16
529 s e t heading −90
530 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
531 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
532 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
533 s e t speed−min 0
534 s e t total 0
535 s e t x 2
536 s e t wait−time 0
537 s e t wait−time−o 0
538 separate−cars
539 ]
540
541 c r t number−of−outgoing−cars [
542 s e t color blue
543 s e t xcor random−xcor
544 s e t ycor 17
545 s e t heading −90
546 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0
547 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
548 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
549 s e t speed−min 0
550 s e t total 0
551 s e t x 2
552 s e t wait−time 0
553 s e t wait−time−o 0
554 separate−cars
555 ]
556 ; set sample−car one−of tur t l e s
557 ; ask sample−car [ s e t color red ]
558 end
559
560 ; th i s procedure i s needed so when we c l i c k ”Setup” we
561 ; don’ t end up with any two car s on the same patch
562 to separate−trucks ; ; t u r t l e procedure
563 i f any? other t u r t l e s −here
564 [ fd 1
565 separate−trucks ]
566 end
567 to separate−cars ; ; t u r t l e procedure
568 i f any? other t u r t l e s −here
569 [ fd 1
570 separate−cars ]
571 end
572
573
574 to go
575 s e t bob random−gamma 2 13
576
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577 ; s e t t r a f f i c −flow−incoming 1
578 ; i f z = incoming−t r a f f i c −data [
579 ; c r t t r a f f i c −flow−incoming [
580 ; s e t c o lor red
581 ; s e t xcor −56
582 ; s e t ycor −13
583 ; s e t heading 90
584 ; ; ; ; s e t i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0 .1 to 1.0
585 ; s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t
586 ; s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t
587 ; s e t speed−min 0
588 ; s e t t o t a l 0
589 ; s e t x 2
590 ; separate−trucks
591 ;
592 ; ] ]
593 ; s e t z z + 1
594 ; p r int z
595 ; whi l e [m < l ength d i s t r i b u t i on ]
596 ; [ plotxy item m prob item m d i s t r i b u t i on
597 ; s e t m m + 1 ]
598
599
600 ; ; makes the t u r t l e s ’ Pause ’ at each t o l l booth .
601 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = red ) and ( t o t a l = 0) [ s e t speed 0.04 s e t
totaltotal+1]]
602 ; ; i f the v e h i c l e s have a t o tal = 1 you do not want to add 1 to the
t o t a l again . Hence the next l i n e .
603 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = red ) and ( t o t a l = 1) [ s e t speed 0 . 0 4 ] ]
604
605 ; ; Determine i f t u r t l e s go to secondary based on probabi l i ty
606 ; ; The d i s c riminator alarm l e v e l can be changed on the i n t e r f a c e screen .
607 ; ; Incoming
608 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = blue ) and ( t o tal = 0 or t o tal = 1) and ( bob
> Discriminator−l e v e l −incoming ) [ move−to patch 39 −12 s e t heading 0 ] ]
609 ; ; Outgoing
610 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 86) and ( t o t a l = 0 or t o t a l = 1) and ( bob >
Discriminator−l e v e l −outgoing ) [ move−to patch −39 11 s e t heading 180 ] ]
611
612 ; ; Used f o r determining the t o tal number of cars that have passed through the c r
ossing.
613 ; ; Incoming Side
614 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( pcol o r = yel low ) and ( x = 2) [ s e t
tot−num−cars−incoming tot−num−cars−incoming + 1 s e t x x + 1 ] ]
615 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( pcol o r = red ) [ s e t x 2 ] ]
616 ; ; Outgoing Side
617 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = yellow ) and ( x = 2) [ s e t
tot−num−cars−outgoing tot−num−cars−outgoing + 1 s e t x x + 1 ] ]
618 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = red ) [ s e t x 2 ] ]
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619
620 s e t tot−num−cars tot−num−cars−incoming + tot−num−cars−outgoing
621
622 ; ; used to makes veh i c l e s in secondary turn l e f t
623 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = orange ) [ s e t heading −90]]
624
625 ; ; Make veh i c l e s stop in secondary f o r screening
626 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = green ) [ s e t speed 0 ] ]
627
628 ; ; making vehi c l e s turn once they reach the cyan patch
629 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 85) [ s e t heading −180]]
630
631 ; ; making vehi c l e s turn once they reach the second cyan patch ( c o lor 84)
632 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 84) [ s e t heading 9 0 ] ]
633
634 ; ; making vehi c l e s turn once they reach patch of col or 87
635 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 87) [ s e t heading 9 0 ] ]
636
637 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = 88) [ s e t heading 0 ] ]
638
639 s e t num−cars−secondary−incoming 0
640
641 s e t num−cars−incoming 0
642 s e t num−cars−outgoing 0
643
644 ; ; Determining how many incoming vehi c l e s are in the secondary
s c reening por t ion
645 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( ( pcol o r = 9) or ( pcol o r = green ) or (
pcol o r = orange )
646 or ( pco lor = 85) or ( pcol o r = 84) or ( pcol o r = 83) or ( pco lor = 88)
or ( pco lor = 64) ) [ s e t num−cars−secondary−incoming num−cars−
secondary−incoming + 1 ] ]
647
648 s e t num−cars−secondary−outgoing 0
649 ; ; Determining how many outgoing vehi c l e s are in the secondary
s c reening por t ion
650 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( ( pcol o r = 9) or ( pcol o r = green ) or
( pco lor = orange )
651 or ( pco lor = 83) or ( pcol o r = 87) or ( pcol o r = 88) or ( pco lor = 64) )
[ s e t num−cars−secondary−outgoing num−cars−secondary−outgoing +
1]]
652
653 ; ; Determining the number of veh i c l e s in secondary screening .
654 s e t tot−secondary num−cars−secondary−incoming + num−cars−secondary−
outgoing
655
656 ; i f tot−secondary > Threshold [ stop ]
657 i f t i c k s > 30000 [ stop ]
658
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659 ; ; Determining the number of veh i c l e s in l i n e to c r o s s the border on
the incoming s i de
660 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = 9 . 8 ) [ s e t num−cars−incoming num−cars−
incoming + 1 ] ]
661
662 ; ; Determining the wait time of veh i c l e s c r o s s i n g the border .
663 ; ; Incoming
664 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = 9 . 8 ) or ( pcol o r = red ) [ s e t wait−time wait−
time + 1 ] ]
665 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = 9 . 8 ) or ( pcol o r = red ) [ s e t wait−time−i wait
−time−i + 1 ] ]
666 ; ; Outgoing
667 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = 9 . 7 ) or ( pcol o r = red ) [ s e t wait−time wait−
time + 1 ] ]
668 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = 9 . 7 ) or ( pcol o r = red ) [ s e t wait−time−o wait
−time−o + 1 ] ]
669 ; ; Resetting the wait time so i t i s not a continual sum
670 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = yel low ) [ s e t wait−time 0 ] ]
671 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = yel low ) [ s e t wait−time−i 0 ] ]
672 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = yel low ) [ s e t wait−time−o 0 ] ]
673
674 ; ; Determining the number of veh i c l e s in l i n e to c r o s s the border on
the outgoing s ide
675 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = 9 . 7 ) [ s e t num−cars−outgoing num−cars−
outgoing + 1 ] ]
676
677 ; ; Determining the t o t a l number of vehi c l e s waiting to c r o s s the
border .
678 s e t tot−wait num−cars−incoming + num−cars−outgoing
679
680 s e t rn random 100
681 ; ; Making t u r t l e s from OUTGOING s ide leave secondary a f t e r screening
682 ; ; t u r t l e s are randomly d i s t r ibuted to the 6 OUTGOING l anes .
683 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = 64) and ( rn < 16) [ move−to
patch −40 1 2 ] ]
684 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = 64) and ( rn >= 16) and ( rn
< 33) [ move−to patch −40 1 3 ] ]
685 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = 64) and ( rn >= 33) and ( rn
< 50) [ move−to patch −40 1 4 ] ]
686 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = 64) and ( rn >= 50) and ( rn
< 66) [ move−to patch −40 1 5 ] ]
687 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = 64) and ( rn >= 66) and ( rn
< 83) [ move−to patch −40 1 6 ] ]
688 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = 64) and ( rn >= 83) [ move−to
patch −40 1 7 ] ]
689
690
691 ; ; making vehi c l e s go to s t a r t t r i p over again .
692 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 83) and ( rn < 16) [ move−to patch 40 −13] ]
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693 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 83) and ( rn >= 16) and ( rn < 33) [ move−to
patch 40 −14]]
694 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 83) and ( rn >= 33) and ( rn < 50) [ move−to
patch 40 −15]]
695 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 83) and ( rn >= 50) and ( rn < 66. ) [ move−to
patch 40 −16]]
696 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 83) and ( rn >= 66. ) and ( rn < 83. ) [ move−to
patch 40 −17] ]
697 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 83) and ( rn >= 83. ) [ move−to patch 40 −18]]
698 ; ; i f the v e h i c l e s reach the boundary then they die
699 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = yel low ) and ( t o t a l = 1) [ s e t t o t a l 0 ] ]
700 ; ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = yel low ) [ die ] ]
701
702
703 ; ; Making the outgoing t u r t l e s go to a random lane when they wrap
around the world .
704 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = yellow ) and ( rn < 16) [ move
−to patch 56 1 2 ] ]
705 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = yellow ) and ( rn >= 16) and
( rn < 33) [ move−to patch 56 1 3 ] ]
706 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = yellow ) and ( rn >= 33) and
( rn < 50) [ move−to patch 56 1 4 ] ]
707 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = yellow ) and ( rn >= 50) and
( rn < 66) [ move−to patch 56 1 5 ] ]
708 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = yellow ) and ( rn >= 66) and
( rn < 83) [ move−to patch 56 1 6 ] ]
709 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = yellow ) and ( rn >= 83) [
move−to patch 56 1 7 ] ]
710
711 ; ; Making the incoming t u r t l e s go to a random lane when thy wrap
around the world .
712 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( pcol o r = yel low ) and ( rn < 16) [ move
−to patch −56 −13]]
713 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( pcol o r = yel low ) and ( rn >= 16) and
( rn < 33) [ move−to patch −56 −14]]
714 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( pcol o r = yel low ) and ( rn >= 33) and
( rn < 50) [ move−to patch −56 −15]]
715 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( pcol o r = yel low ) and ( rn >= 50) and
( rn < 66. ) [ move−to patch −56 −16] ]
716 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( pcol o r = yel low ) and ( rn >= 66. ) and
( rn < 83. ) [ move−to patch −56 −17]]
717 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( pcol o r = yel low ) and ( rn >= 83. ) [
move−to patch −56 −18] ]
718
719
720 ; ; Determining how many times a car i s asked something whi le in the portal
721 ; ask sample−car [ i f ( pcol o r = red ) and ( t o tal = 0) [ s e t t o t a l t o t a l + 1 ] ]
722 ; ask sample−car [ i f ( pcol o r = yellow ) [ s e t t o t a l 0 ] ]
723
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724 ; ; i f there i s a car r ight ahead of you , match i t s speed then slow down
725 ask t u r t l e s [
726 l e t car−ahead one−of t u r t l e s −on patch−ahead 1
727 i f e l s e car−ahead != nobody
728 [ s e t speed [ speed ] of car−ahead
729 slow−down−car ]
730 ; ; otherwise , speed up
731 [ speed−up−car ]
732 ; ; ; don ’t slow down below speed minimum or speed up beyond speed limi t
733 i f speed < speed−min [ s e t speed speed−min ]
734 i f speed > speed−l imi t [ set speed speed−l imi t ]
735 fd speed ]
736 t i ck
737 end
738
739 to slow−down−car ; ; tur t l e procedure
740 s e t speed speed − d e c e l e r a t i on
741 end
742
743 to speed−up−car ; ; tur t l e procedure
744 s e t speed speed + ac c e l e rat ion
745 end
746
747 ; Copyright 1997 Uri Wilensky.
748 ; See Info tab for full copyright and license.
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VITA
James Dale White became Vice President for Middle
East Lab Operations, reporting to Dr. Ron
Townsend, Executive Vice President, Battelle
Memorial Institute on July 1, 2011.
Mr. White previously worked at Oak Ridge National
Laboratory (ORNL) for 44 years in a wide variety of
research and development activities related to
nuclear power and nuclear security. During this time
frame, his responsibilities have evolved from
principal investigator to project manager to line
management and then broad oversight of R&D
program portfolios. His research and program
management experiences have included
nondestructive testing, heat transfer for reactor
safety, instrumentation and control systems, manmachine interface for nuclear power, probabilistic risk
assessment for nuclear safety, software engineering, radiation detection systems
development and assessment, and nonproliferation R&D technologies. Mr. White
frequently has developed and led multi-organizational R&D programs for federal and
private sponsors. Recently, Mr. White led the Battelle funded Air Cargo Screening
Cooperative Research and Development Cooperative Research and Development
Agreement (CRADA), a collaboration of several national laboratories and Battelle. Mr.
White has served in various leading roles for national and international technology
assessments, and he has served as a U.S. representative to several international
meetings and workshops. Mr. White has B.S. and M.S. degrees in nuclear engineering
from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville (UTK). He currently is a doctoral student
at UTK.
Specific positions Mr. White has held previously at ORNL are described here. From
1967 to 1987, he held various research and development positions, including program
manager positions. From 1987 to 1991, Mr. White held the position of Program
Manager, Department of Energy Advanced Controls Program. In this position, he was
responsible for the overall DOE program for research and development in the
application of modern control theory, human factors and advanced instrumentation to
advanced reactor concepts being funded by the DOE.
From 1991 to 1994, Mr. White held the title of Manager, ORNL Light Water Reactor
Program. In this position, Mr. White was responsible for all of the research and
development at ORNL funded by the DOE related to light water reactors.
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From 1994 to 1998, Mr. White moved into line management, holding the position of
Head, Controls and Systems Integration Section, within the ORNL Instrumentation
Division at ORNL. In this position, Mr. White was responsible for management of an
organization whose mission was research and development in controls and systems
integration applied to nuclear energy, the steel industry, and the glass products
industry, among others.
From 1998 to 2001, Mr. White held the position of Head, Measurement Sciences
Section, within the Instrumentation & Controls Division at ORNL. In this position,
Mr. White was responsible for managing research and development at ORNL in the
new and advanced measurement techniques, instrumentation and methodologies.
From 2001 to 2004, Mr. White held the position of Group Leader for Nuclear
Material Detection and Characterization, Nuclear Science and Technology Division
at ORNL. In this position, Mr. White was responsible for managing research and
development in instrumentation and methodologies for systems that are used in
detection and characterization of materials that might be used in radiological or
nuclear threats.
From 2004 to 2006, Mr. White held the position of Director, ORNL Nonproliferation
R&D Programs. In this position, Mr. White was responsible for management of the
research and development of measurement systems and methodologies to detect
nuclear proliferation.
From 2006 to 2007, Mr. White was assigned to the Department of Homeland
Security to provide program management support for projects related to detection
and interdiction of radiological and nuclear threats. In this position, Mr. White
mentored the DHS Program Manager in management of research and development
of systems for countering the nuclear threat in a metropolitan area. He helped
coordinate research and development performed by several DOE national
laboratories.
From 2007 to 2009, Mr. White held the position of Director, ORNL Advanced R&D
Programs to Counter the Nuclear Threat. He was the program director for the work
done throughout ORNL in research and development of systems to support U.S.
government programs for detection and characterization of the nuclear threat.
From 2009 to 2011, Mr. White held the position of Director, ORNL Homeland
Security and Advanced Programs. In this position, Mr. White was responsible for
management of program at ORNL funded by the Department of Homeland
Security. He also was responsible for the development of new program concepts
related to the nuclear threat.
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Mr. White also had several outside activities during his 44 years at ORNL. In 1990,
he was a consultant to Loyola College (World Technology Evaluation Center). As a
consultant, he served as a member of a panel which traveled to Japan to evaluate
nuclear power technology and nuclear R&D in Japan relative to the same topics in
the United States. In 1991, Loyola College retained Mr. White to co-lead a larger
panel to examine how nuclear power instrumentation and controls systems in the
United States compared to those in Russia, in the United Kingdom, in France, in
Germany and other countries. Mr. White and his panel traveled to these countries
and met with leaders in the application of modern instrumentation, control and
human factors technologies and methodologies to nuclear power.
In 1993, Mr. White served as a member of the National Research Council for Safety
Implications of Application of Digital Instrumentation and Controls to Nuclear Power
Plants. In this position, Mr. White provided reviews of plans for U.S. nuclear power
plants to use digital based controls and human factor support system in nuclear
power plants.
In 2003, Mr. White was retained as a consultant to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission for Reactor Safeguards. In this position, Mr. White supported the NRC
in evaluation of the use of modern instrumentation, control and human factors
technologies in U.S. nuclear reactors.
Mr. White graduated from the University of Tennessee with B.S. and M.S. degrees
in nuclear engineering in 1967 and 1968, respectively.
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